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AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 



AMERICA'S RACE 
TO VICTORY 

BY 

LIEUT. COL. K. REQUIN 

OF THE TKK.SCH AHMV 

wm AM nmcoucnom vr 

GENERAL PKYTON C. MARCH 

CHIEF OP 8TAFF 
W/Jfl Thrift Fif DIAGRAM H 




KZW YORK 

FREDERICK A. STOKES COMPANY 

PUBLISHEP^ 






Copyrighted in France, by 
Lieutenant Colonel Requin 



Copyright, 1919, by 
Frederick A. Stokes Company 



All rights reserved 



ifcC V51319 

©CI.A536977 



INTRODUCTION 

In "America's Race to Victory " Lieutenant 
Colonel Requin has presented a vivid and 
stimulating picture of the problem which our 
country faced in April, 1917, the faulty organ- 
ization with which we at first attempted its 
solution and the gradual steps by which our 
national endeavor gained momentum until it 
swept everything before it in what was, indeed, 
a " race to victory." 

To this work of appreciation of the military, 
industrial and political effort of another nation 
Colonel Requin applied a mind stamped with 
the General Staff "doctrine" of Marshal 
Foch and the French Ecole Superieure de 
Guerre and developed by battle experience 
during the first two and half years of the war. 

Until his arrival in the United States with 
Marshal Joffre in May, 1917, Colonel Requin 
knew little of our military resources and noth- 
ing of our national character, our political 
system or the obstacles which were to be over- 
come. But he at once comprehended our po- 



vi INTRODUCTION 

tential military stren^h, our military attri- 
butes hidden beneath our apparent commer- 
cialism and all the intricacies of our national 
existence. 

With the trained eye of the experienced gen- 
eral staff officer he saw also the weak points 
of our military system and, with infinite tact, 
unremitting industry and a keen perception 
of relative values, set about the difficult and 
delicate task of helping us produce strength 
where there had been weakness and order 
where there had been chaos. 

Colonel Requin's assistance contributed ma- 
terially to our military success. As he himself 
says, he " never for one instant doubted the 
Army of the United States." This intimate 
collaboration with American comrades and 
this undying faith in our arms have given him 
a peculiar fitness to undertake the interpreta- 
tion of the development and employment of 
our army. 

" America's Race to Victory " does not pro- 
fess to be a comprehensive history of our par- 
ticipation in the war. It is rather a tribute to 
our national spirit rendered affectionately and 
proudly by a comrade in arms who was close 
enough to see our faults but yet at the same 



INTRODUCTION vii 

time able to retain the perspective necessary 
to visualize our effort as a whole and who never 
lost the faith which made success a foregone 
conclusion. 

(Signed) P.C.March, 

General, Chi^f of Staff, 



COMMAND IN CHIEF OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 

THE ALLIED ARMIES 

The Marshal June 19th, 1919 



Note 
For Lieutenant-Colonel R^quin 

I am returning to you herewith your man- 
uscript on "America's Race to Victory/' 

Aside from a few little matters of detail, 
which you will find noted in Chapter VIII, the 
quality, and general tone of the work, and the 
spirit in which it was conceived, appear to me 
most praiseworthy, 

I cannot do otherwise than approve its 
publication. 

Cordially yours, 

(signed) Foch. 



IX 



FOREWORD 

The motives which determined me to write 
this book are three-fold : 

I was struck by the difficulty experienced 
equally by my co'mpatriots and by my friends 
in America in forming a correct mental picture 
of the great work accomplished by the army 
of the United States, and by its Chiefs on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

I had observed that, according to the point 
of view at which they were placed and the im- 
pressions which they received, either from the 
front or the rear, their judgments were apt to 
fluctuate in the course of the last year of the 
war between unreserved admiration and the 
most unjustified disillusion. 

Lastly, in putting these still recent memories 
in order, I have experienced a personal satis- 
faction which I shall not try to hide, in realiz- 
ing that, alike in the darkest hours and in the 
most glorious of days, I never Had an instant's 
doubt of the Army of the United States. 

This is not a history of the war, nor even 
of that final period in which the American 

xi 



xii FOREWORD 

army took such a splendid part, for the moment 
has not yet come to pass judgment on the oper- 
ations themselves. 

It is solely the military effort and its results 
that I have undertaken to discuss — an effort 
judged by a Frenchman who had the rare good 
fortune to follow it from its beginning, and 
the distinguished honor of sometimes collabor- 
ating in it. 

At this moment, when the echo of the formi- 
dable battles which have shaken Europe for 
four and a half years still rings in our ears, 
and may well confuse our brains, I do not pre- 
tend to set forth here the whole truth, not even 
regarding the events which took place apart 
from the field of battle. But in striving to 
reach as near as possible to the truth, I may 
perhaps aid the reader to find it for himself. 
I dedicate this study to all those alike from far 
or near, — those who came to us from the 
United States or who remained at home to 
organize victory, — who have personally aided 
vis in gaining it: to you, my comrades, who 
marched to the music of the cannon from the 
new world to the old, impatient to intervene 
in the great drama of battle, and who fell in 
full glory in the fulfilment of the last act. 



FOREWORD xiii 

May your names remain piously graven on 
the memory of every Frenchman, just as the 
lofty and humane ideal for which you died 
remains forever inscribed upon the folds of 
your Star Spangled Banner. 

(Signed) Lieutenant Colonel E. Requin. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introdoction V 

Note ix 

Foreword xi 



CHAPTER I 

MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE IN THE 
SPRING OF 1917 

An Estimate of Available Forces. The Nature 
OF the War Problem Faced by the Allies . 1 



CHAPTER II 

THE MILITARY POWER OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN APRIL, 1917 

The War Problem Faced by America and the 
Manner in which She Solved It 16 

The Decision to Send Over an Expeditionary 
Force and to Organize a Great Army — The 
Passage op the Conscription Act 16 

XV 



xvi CONTENTS 

CHAPTER III 

THE MILITARY PREPARATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 

PAGE 

I. The Reorganization op the Army and the 
Spirit which Inspired This Reorgani- 
zation 36 

The First Expeditionary Division . . 45 
The Problems of the American General 

Staff 46 

General Pershing's Plan 49 

Building the New Army 54 

II. Material Organization of the Camps. 

Equipping and Arming the Army . . 62 

III. American War Industries 73 

Small-Arms 74 

Artillery Materiel 75 

Aviation 80 

IV. Training the Army 82 

V. The Plan for Transportation 100 

VI. Great Administrative Reforms 105 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PREPARATION IN FRANCE 

General Pershing's Role — Organization op 
Bases, Lines of Communication and the 
Training of Troops — First Participation in 
Active Fighting Through the Assignment of 
A Sector to American Units 114 



CONTENTS xvii 

CHAPTER V 

MILITARY SITUATION ON THE WESTERN 
FRONT IN MARCH, 1918 

PAGE 

Waiting for the Great German Offensive . .132 



CHAPTER VI 

SITUATION OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN 
MARCH, 1918 

Results Obtained BY One Year OF Preparation . 139 
The American Army on the Eve of Battle . , 139 



CHAPTER VII 

THE AMERICAN ARMY'S MARCH TO THE 
TUNE OF THE GUNS 

From March to November, 1918 162 

CHAPTER VIII 
THE AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 

The Part It Played Judged by Marshal Foch . 174 

Conclusion 197 

Index *•,«.. 207 



AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 



CHAPTER I 

MiLiTAHY Situation in Europe in the 
Spring of 1917 

An Estimate of Availohle Forces. The Nature of the 
War Problem Faced by the Allies 

The United States entered the war at the 
moment when the Entente were ahout to 
undertake operations of a decisive character 
agreed upon by the Commanders in Chief, No- 
vember 15, 1916, at the Inter- Alhed Confer- 
ence at Chantilly. 

The plan of action thus estabHshed at the 
close of 1916 for the year 1917 amounted in 
effect to concerted offensives on all the fronts 
of the Coalition, at a date approximating as 
nearly as possible to April 1st, with due allow- 
ance for the climatic conditions of each theatre 
of operations. 

Since America did not declare war upon 
Germany until April 6, 1917, her army could 
not take part in the campaign of 1917. 

If we wish, however, to realize the unques- 
tionable value, both national and moral, of her 
intervention early in 1917, we must recall how 
the great and well founded hopes of the Coali- 

1 



^ AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

tion crumbled under the double blow of the 
Russian collapse and the prolonged disorgani- 
zation of the Inter- Allied High Command. 

Accordingly, it is easy to understand that 
the promised despatch of American troops to 
the French front, and their arrival in 1917, 
were a potent factor in effacing the painful 
impression of the events of the spring. 

The campaign of 1917 had been planned 
by the Allies to the end of obtaining a decisive 
victory, and it was to this end that they ought 
logically to have planned it. 

The Allied armies had, in point of fact, at- 
tained at the opening of 1917 a maximum 
strength which they were certain that they 
could not surpass, and which they were not 
sure of being able to maintain, in view of the 
losses suffered by their armies and the relative 
exhaustion of their resources in men. 

The old principle of war, which consists not 
only in uniting all your means before acting, 
but quite as much in acting on the instant that 
all your means are united, at last found its 
application in the forces and plans of the 
Entente. 

The new British armies, sent to the front in 
1916 and transformed by organization and 
training into an instrument of war of the 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 3 

highest value, comprised a total of 79 divi- 
sions, of which 62 were in France, equipped 
with 3000 field guns, 2000 heavy guns, almost 
all modern, and supplies of ammunition 
amounting to 11 million shells for field artillery 
and 4 million shells of large calibre. 

But the British General Staff already fore- 
saw that the measures taken by the Home 
Office for maintaining the army's strength at 
the front would be insufficient. New methods 
were being studied to remedy this, without any 
clear certainty that they would prove success- 
ful. 

The Italian army, augmented by 10 divisions 
during the winter, attained a total of 55 divi- 
sions (52 of which were on their ovni front), 
to which were added numerous formations 
amounting numerically to about 10 more divi- 
sions. Italy would be able to maintain her 
strength throughout 1917, even allowing for 
heavy losses; her military cooperation prom- 
ised to be serious and well ordered. 

The Belgian army comprised 6 divisions of 
full strength, perfectly equipped, regularly 
trained, in excellent condition both physical 
and moral, ready for action, but without suffi- 
cient reserves to maintain a prolonged battle. 

The Russian army, utilizing its enormous 



4. AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

resources in men, was expected to augment its 
strength by some 60 divisions before the sum- 
mer of 1917, according to the plan announced 
by the High Command at the Conference of 
November, 1916. Even granting that this pro- 
gramme should not be carried out, Russia 
would nevertheless, so it seemed, enter the cam- 
paign with her 200 existing divisions, 185 of 
them on the European front, assuming an in- 
crease of 39 divisions since the Inter- Allied 
Conference of November 15th. The Allies 
had furnished Russia with important resources 
in artillery materiel and ammunition. She in 
return could have furnished an additional 
2,000,000 of fresh troops, had it not been for 
the difficulties and delays that the Revolution 
engendered in her military organization. It is 
true that the eventual outcome of this Revolu- 
tion, then barely launched, was largely specu- 
lative. Nevertheless the Provisional Govern- 
ment seemed to be making genuine efforts to 
overcome the difficulties of the moment, and it 
was still possible to hope that the Russian 
army, better equipped than it had ever been 
before, would bring to the Coalition the serious 
support of its enormous strength in men. 

The Roumanian army was reorganizing 
rapidly with the aid of a French military mis^ 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 5 

sion of high efficiency; and it was already as- 
sumed that it would return to the front before 
the summer of 1917 under highly honorable 
conditions. 

Lastly, measures were being taken to main- 
tain, if not to reinforce, the small and uncon- 
querable Serbian army, whose fighting quali- 
ties had once more been proved by its successes 
at the end of 1916 in the sector of Monastir, 

The French army, which since 1914 had been 
sustaining the heaviest drains, because of the 
intensity and continuity of its effort, had at- 
tained its maximum strength: 118 divisions, of 
which 109 were in France; 2,965,000 men 
under arms, of whom 192,000 were in the 
Orient; guns and ammunitions of war esti- 
mated, on its own front, at : 

5800 field guns 
3650 heavy guns 
20 million shells for field guns 
7 million shells for large calibre guns 

But from the opening of 1917, the problem 
of numerical strength claimed the attention 
both of the General Staff and the Government 
of the Republic. It became apparent that its 
maintenance during 1917 was going to impose 
such sacrifices upon the nation that in the com- 



6 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

paratively near future it would be necessary 
to make reductions in either the composition 
or number of the large units. 

On the enemy's side the principal adversary, 
Germany, was putting forth an exceptional 
effort to utilize the sum total of her resources 
in men, and to intensify her industrial output. 
She recalled the difficult conditions under 
which she had been obliged, in 1916, to replace 
Austrian forces with a part of her own forces, 
in order to check at any cost the victorious 
thrust of the Russians ; and her object now was 
evidently to send to the front the largest pos- 
sible number of fighting units, in order to be 
prepared for any new development of a similar 
sort. At the beginning of April, 1917, the 
German army already numbered 214 divisions, 
of which 150 were on the Franco-British front; 
and the programme for her new formations 
was expected to raise these figures to a total 
of 24.2 divisions before the end of 1917. This, 
apparently, was to be Germany's maximum 
effort, and from this epoch onward the French 
General Staff predicted that the maintenance 
of such a number of divisions in a battle of 
prolonged duration and sustained intensity 
would exceed even Germany's possibilities, — a 
prediction which was justified in 1918. 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 7 

Germany's war materiel was estimated at 
9200 field guns or light howitzers and 6800 
heavy guns. 

To sum up, the German army still appeared 
to be a redoubtable adversary that had de- 
veloped its strength to the limit, but to this 
end had mortgaged the future unconditionally. 

Austria, far from forming new divisions as 
Germany was doing, had been obliged to re- 
duce her army by two or three large units, in 
consequence of the losses of 1916. Her re- 
sources in men were of small value, partly be- 
cause they included many hospital cases re- 
enrolled for the fourth time, and partly because 
of the extreme youth of the class of 1919, which 
had already been called to the colors. She 
numbered at most 79 divisions, of which 45 
were on th.e Russo-Roumanian front. 

Taken as a whole, the value of her army had 
diminished; its morale had been shaken; and 
the keen jealousies of its mixed races were 
steadily hastening its disintegration. In the 
eyes of the French General Staff it was a struc- 
ture whose outer walls were still standing, but 
seamed with cracks that foreshadowed its col- 
lapse if Germany did not hasten to prop it up. 

The most that can be said of the 13 Bul- 
garian divisions is that they still constituted a 



8 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

solid armyj with sufficiently well stocked sup- 
ply depots, but an army that was visibly weary 
of war. 

As for the Turks, their manifestly and 
rapidly diminishing forces had dropped from 
50 to 45 divisions, and these incomplete and 
insufficiently equipped, with resources in fresh 
troops limited to approximately 200,000 men 
for the needs of the coming campaign of 1917. 

Accordingly, the available forces of all the 
armies at the outset of April may be summed 
up as follows : 

178 Allied divisions against 150 German di- 
visions on the Anglo-French front ; 

62 Italian divisions against 32 Austrian di- 
visions on the Italian front ; 

200 Russian divisions ( without counting the 
small handful of Roumanians) against 127 di- 
visions of Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians and 
Turks on the Rus so-Roumanian front ; 

24 Allied divisions against 15 Enemy divi- 
sions (the latter, to be sure, of fuller strength 
than the Allied divisions) on the Macedonian 
front. 

Considering only these figures, it was evident 
that on all the fronts there was a numerical 
superiority in favor of the Allies. This supe- 
riority could not be modified or destroyed ex- 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 9 

cept by the bringing into action of some 30 
solid divisions of the newly formed German 
troops, or by that element of political uncer- 
tainty which is inherent in every coalition when 
put to the test of time. 

Numerical strength, however, was only one 
factor in forming an estimate; other factors 
were the High Command, the morale, the 
training of the troops and the use which they 
could make of the new, complete and varied 
equipment. 

Seen from these different points of view, the 
Anglo-French armies united all the conditions 
required for conducting a decisive action, with 
just one exception — the most important of 
all — unity of command. The Allied Govern- 
ments, having been unable to reach an agree- 
ment on this essential point, had hoped to make 
up for it with understandings or formulas that, 
unfortunately, were too vague to work success- 

fully. 

This did not alter the fact that the British 
and French armies, in position to bring into 
line as the opening move of the campaign, a 
total of 100 divisions, represented together an 
offensive force that had never been surpassed. 

The form of battle contemplated by the 
High Command relied largely upon ma- 



10 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

noeuvres to break up the methodical organiza- 
tion of the German offensive. But this plan, 
conceived at the close of 1916, gave no 
promise of great results except on the sole 
condition that they could acquire and 
maintain throughout the entire duration of the 
action a considerable numerical superiority. 
Now, from the time when the plan had been 
conceived, the numerical superiority of the 
combined Anglo-French forces had not ceased 
to shrink day by day, through the arrival of 
new German divisions coming from the East. 

Consequently it was upon the other armies, 
and particularly the Russians, that the task re- 
verted of facilitating by concerted and sus- 
tained offensives the manoeuvres upon which 
the Coalition relied for success. On the Rus- 
sian side this hope was doomed to disappoint- 
ment. 

The Revolution, by first weakening and later 
disorganizing the Russian army, progressively 
set free forces which the German General Staff 
hastened to transfer to the Western front; it 
was while these transfers were being made that 
the Allies opened the battle of April 14th. 

The very limited success of the French of- 
fensive at its opening gave rise to a disappoint- 
ment that was at least premature, followed by 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 11 

a halt in operations. The inevitable conse- 
quences were a change of French Commander 
in Chief, and a wave of demoralization 
throughout the army which even the energy 
of the new Commander in Chief, General 
Petain, had no small difficulty in counteracting. 

By the end of April the game of 1917 had 
been played. The fighting was destined to be 
resumed at various points, but under the form 
of a warfare of attrition. We were destined 
to see numerous Commanders in Chief of equal 
distinction try out numerous other plans, per- 
haps equally good, fight numerous British or 
French battles, all equally glorious — but with 
no decisive result. 

Although American military intervention 
could not modify the result of the campaign 
of 1917 — since, I repeat, the game had al- 
ready been played and lost for the current year 
— it was none the less necessary that it should 
take place without a delay. 

Accordingly, the first manifestation of force 
resulting from the despatch of American 
troops to Europe was destined to have a pro- 
found influence not only upon the morale of 
the army, following as it did upon the morrow 
of the above mentioned crisis, but also upon 
that of the whole nation profoundly stricken 



12 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

by the events of April. If the France of 1917, 
weakened not so much in her material forces as 
in her morale, recovered rapidly, she was pow- 
erfully aided in this recovery by the United 
States. 

From the American point of view, an imme- 
diate participation in the struggle was the best 
means of making the whole American nation 
understand the character of the war and the 
burdens that it imposed. 

It was, besides, the only way of hastening the 
organization of an effective war machine which, 
as will be seen further on, had to be built up in 
all its detail. 

In regard to the enemy and the neutrals, the 
landing of American troops on French soil 
would be a clear declaration that America 
pledged herself without reserve, and that she 
would employ, to borrow the expression used 
by President Wilson, "All her power and all 
her resources to bring the Imperial German 
Government to terms, and force it to end the 
war." 

From the point of view of the direction of 
operations and of the future campaign, an 
examination of the forces of the Coalition re- 
vealed the difficulty of keeping these forces at 
the level attained in 1917, and showed that in 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 13 

view of the situation created by events in Rus- 
sia, the small addition of an American army 
had become indispensable for carrying out in 
1918 any new plan of action of a decisive char- 
acter. Now, in order to be ready in 1918, the 
American army, assuming that one existed, 
would have to be landed in Europe in 1917, 
and undertake and complete in France those 
great works of installation and communication 
without which a modern army is foredoomed to 
impotence. 

Since this army, in point of fact, did not yet 
exist, it was doubly necessary that, as soon as it 
was created, it should be brought over at the 
earliest possible moment to complete its organi- 
zation and its training in France, in that at- 
mosphere of battle which doubles every energy, 
intensifies every effort and hastens every de- 
cision. 

To sum up, the campaign of 1917 might have 
been decisive. Logically it ought to have been. 
But it was not decisive, and even in the montli 
of April, 1917, it was clearly seen that it would 
not be. Nothing remained to the AlHes but 
the hope of winning a decisive victory in 1918, 
and it was towards this single goal that they 
must bend their entire energies. This was the 



14 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

moment for America to enter the contest; it 
was equally her duty to enter it now. 

For, considering the rate of losses suffered 
by the Allies, and the cost in material and in 
morale to the nations at war since 1914, it was 
becoming evident that if the Allies did not win 
the war in 1918 they ran the risk of being 
forced into a lame and halting peace by unfore- 
seen events, beyond the control of their guiding 
minds. Dissatisfaction was increasing in all 
the countries. It was the expression of a gen- 
eral reaction of the whole organism of Europe 
against the sufferings of a prolonged war. 

It was this conviction which, with implacable 
logic, proclaimed the necessity of not losing a 
single day, of accomplishing the indispensable 
at once, even at the cost of wounding personal 
vanities, of shaking off inertia, breaking down 
resistance, arousing the half-hearted, all with 
the sole motive of one and all working together 
for the decisive battle of 1918; it was this con- 
viction, I repeat, which the Allies strove to 
impress upon the United States. In spite of 
slowness, delays and blunders, in spite of every- 
thing, it is due to the fact that the United 
States had awakened to this conviction while 
there was still time, that she was able to play in 



SITUATION IN EUROPE — SPRING, 1917 15 

the last act of the world war that part upon the 
battlefield which she had elected to play. 

Such being the problem of the war in the 
spring of 1918, how did America propose to 
solve it? 



CHAPTER II 

The Military Power of the United States 
IN April, 1917 

" It is plain enough how we were forced into the 
war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of 
the Imperial German Government left us no self- 
respecting choice but to take up arms in defence of 
our rights as a free people and of our honor as a 
sovereign Government." 

{President Wilson's speech, June Uth, 1917.) 

The War Problem Faced by America and the Manner 
in which She Solved it 

THE DECISION TO SEND OVER AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

AND TO ORGANIZE A GREAT ARMY THE PASSAGE 

OF THE CONSCRIPTION ACT 

We know why America entered the war. 
President Wilson made it clear to whole world. 
He repeated it to the first troops that sailed, 
when he reminded them that they were going 
to France to defend the honor and liberty of 
the United States. 

But how, — and by this I mean, with what 
fighting equipment, — did she enter the war? 
This is what we need to understand, before we 
can measure the extent and the might of her 
military effort. 

In April, 1917, America brought to the ser- 
vice of the Allies, not only her 102 million in- 

16 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 17 

habitants, but also her immense natural re- 
sources and that incomparable industrial ac- 
tivity which she had developed in times of 
peace. 

Now, despite these resources ; notwithstand- 
ing the inflexible will of the President, the 
energy of the Chiefs to whom he was about to 
entrust the task of organizing an army, the 
quality of the men whom Acts of Congress 
would furnish, and lastly and most notably, the 
spirit which had enrolled this great people in 
the cause of liberty, — in spite of all this, it was 
nothing less than astounding to see in what a 
state of military unpreparedness the United 
States had undertaken to enter the war. 

And surely, if we tell the whole truth it will 
tend, not to diminish, but rather to exalt the 
merit and the fame of those who controlled 
America's destiny and guided her military 
efforts. In view of the glorious goal achieved, 
there should be no hesitancy in revealing the 
starting-point, since between the two we behold 
a great people marching to the cannon's music, 
over-striding the Atlantic in pursuit of their 
immutable objective, which their national in- 
terests and their noble ideals had alike pro- 
claimed from the day of their setting forth, 
and which their energy finally attained. 



18 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Those who belong, like us Frenchmen, to a 
nation perpetually obliged to maintain, in de- 
fense of its rights and its life, a military organi- 
zation ever ready for service, cannot conceive 
of the incredible difficulties represented by the 
transformation into a modern military power, 
— and this, too, within the space of a few 
months, — of a nation whose geographic situa- 
tion, past history, political ideals and estab- 
lished institutions had guided it solely toward 
the works of Peace. 

At the moment when President Wilson de- 
cided to join the Allies of the West, to save the 
honor of America and the Liberty of the world, 
the American people were as far from war as 
their shores were distant from the European 
battlefields. 

In comparison with the enormous armies that 
the two opposing Coalitions had at their dis- 
posal, what did the total military strength of 
the United States amount to? 

A Regular Army of approximately 200,000 
men and a National Guard of about 150,000. 

The first was animated by the finest tradi- 
tions of bravery and honor. 

The latter drew its sole strength from that 
virtue which every American citizen possesses 
in a greater or less degree : his sense of duty. 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 19 

Both of these forces were imbued with the 
purest patriotism, but their organization was 
out of date, their training and armament were 
totally insufficient and inadequate for the new 
form that warfare had assumed since the end 
of 1914. 

The basic unit of this army was theoretically, 
at least, a Division, comprising three Brigades 
of three Infantry Begiments, three Artillery 
Begiments, one Cavalry Begiment, one Begi- 
ment of Engineers and the various other 
branches of the Service, — in short, a unit prac- 
tically impossible to use in modern warfare. 

All the belligerent armies had ended by 
adopting an approximately uniform type of 
Division, which represented the true fighting 
unit, comprising all the organic parts indis- 
pensable for living, moving, and carrying out 
an offensive or defensive action. These Divi- 
sions, British, French or German, were inter- 
changeable in each army. They constituted, 
on the checker-board of modern warfare, the 
pawns which the High Command moved at 
pleasure to carry out its offensive and defensive 
combinations. These same Divisions were em- 
ployed when going into battle. Now the 
American Division was found, in point of fact, 
as a result of its organization to be incapable 



20 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

of playing this role : it was too heavy owing to 
the large number of its regiments, too feeble 
owing to the insufficient proportion of artillery 
and machine guns, and the total absence of the 
new engines indispensable alike for attack and 
defense (howitzers, trench-mortars, hand gre- 
nades, rifle grenades, automatic rifles, infantry 
guns, etc.) . 

For that matter, even assuming that the 
American Division could have been equipped 
with these various engines of war, its defective 
composition and its weakness in companies of 
infantry would have prevented it from making 
effective use of them. 

Furthermore, these huge American units did 
not exist, excepting on paper, and practically 
the army had to be re-created on entirely new 
bases. 

The American officers had been unable to 
follow the difficult phases of the formidable 
struggle, except from a distance, through the 
columns of the press, or the reports of their 
courageous ambulance drivers (both men and 
women) . And yet the United States had as- 
signed a number of excellent officers as ob- 
servers with the British and French armies. 
Unfortunately, the information which these 
officers furnished regarding both the material 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 21 

organization and the methods of combat of the 
Allied armies remained practically unutilized. 

Both the Intelligence Department and the 
organization of the American General Staff 
were so defective that the information fur- 
nished by these officers was neither appreciated 
at its just value, nor put in order and used. 

Consequently, what changes were taking 
place remained only imperfectly understood by 
the great majority of American officers. The 
profound reasons underlying these changes, the 
constant evolution in methods of combat, with 
their consequent effect on material means, on 
the training of troops and the instruction of 
the higher officers wholly escaped them. The 
best informed only got so far as to conceive, 
with no small effort, the superficial physiog- 
nomy of a battle as conducted in 19 IS. And 
even these constituted a very small number, 
without authority and without influence upon 
the others. The majority revealed, by the very 
nature and multiplicity of the questions they 
asked of their British or French colleagues, 
their total ignorance of the war they were about 
to engage in, and at the same time their eager 
desire for enlightenment. 

No general officer had ever exercised the sort 



22 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

of command that he would be called upon to 
assume in the very near future. 

No school was ready to receive the thousands 
of officers whom it was necessary to drill and 
instruct, in order to prepare Commanders for 
the new army ; and by an inexplicable anomaly 
the essential schools which had formerly been 
in operation ( General Staff Schools, School of 
Fire for Field Artillery) were closed. But all 
the officers, with the exception of a negligible 
minority who persisted in considering as final 
the instruction formerly received at West 
Point, were eager to learn and to know. The 
youngest of them attacked their task with such 
zeal that the days promised to be too short to 
satisfy their thirst to be quickly and thoroughly 
taught. 

The General Staff was composed of officers 
of high distinction, possessing a solid military 
knowledge and an extensive general culture, 
but ridiculously few in number, and distributed 
between the War College and the War Depart- 
ment, with no rational organization into divi- 
sions, or effective specialization. Accustomed 
to endless meetings and conferences which even 
with the best of them threatened to kill the 
spirit of decision, they were deprived of the 
necessary means and authority to accomplish 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 23 

the enormous task which might well have 
caused the best constituted of General Staffs 
to hesitate. 

As a matter of fact, the American General 
Staff included some excellent officers, but con- 
sidered as a General Staff it did not exist. 

Its Chief of Staff was, by the laws and regu- 
lations then in force, deprived of that high 
authority which he ought to have exercised 
over his own Staff officers, as well as over the 
several Departments of the army. 

The central administration seemed organized 
with a view to peace and not to war. Is it 
necessary to recall that only the branches and 
departments presenting a special interest in 
times of peace had responsible Chiefs at their 
head? Such were the Engineer Corps, the Sig- 
nal Corps, the Medical Corps, the Coast Ar- 
tillery. But by an anomaly which can be ex- 
plained only by the essentially pacific policy 
of the United States, there existed no directors 
responsible for the organization and instruction 
of the essentially fighting branches of the ser- 
vice: the Infantry, the Field Artillery, the 
Cavalry! Consequently, the great interests of 
these three branches must perforce be entrusted 
to departments which had neither the compe- 
tence nor authority nor responsibility that were 



S4 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

essential. And thus it happened that through- 
out a long period there was no one man at 
Washington from whom one could get a final 
decision on a question of Artillery ! 

The essential organization constituted in 
France and in the neighboring countries by the 
Direction of Artillery in times of peace, sup- 
plemented during the war by the Ministry of 
Munitions and Fabrications, existed in the 
United States only in embryonic form. The 
Ordnance Department, comprising a few spe- 
cially trained officers, could not materially take 
the place of a Department that is indispensable 
to assure the supply of war materiel required 
by the newly created forces. It would have 
been overwhelmed from the start. 

The Air Service was yet to be created in all 
its details, at a time when discussions concern- 
ing the organization and employment of 
Aviators was at its height. 

But above all it was necessary to apply, both 
to the existing organizations and to those yet to 
be created, the great principles of direction and 
subordination, of coordination of efforts and 
division of work, which give to the military 
machine its full efficiency, provided, of course, 
that we add the motive power, that is to say the 
Chief. 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 25 

The American army, in times of peace, could 
not grow except within the modest proportions 
fixed by the law of 1916, which set the limit at 
300,000 men for the Regular Army and at 
450,000 for the National Guard, with a corre- 
sponding increase every three years. The 
President, however, was authorized to see that 
this increase was effected if in his judgment 
the condition of the times demanded it, and he 
had decided, as an initial step, to accomplish 
this between April and August, 1917. But this 
measure fell far short of satisfying the needs 
of the new organization, which could be met 
only hy resorting to conscription. Accordingly, 
it was essential to make the public understand 
the imperious necessity of having Congress act 
quickly on a question which, at any other time 
would have shocked the pacific mind of the 
United States. 

Unquestionably, public opinion arose like a 
single man behind the President; and those 
who were the guests of the United States in 
April, 1917, will never in their lives forget the 
wild enthusiasm of the crowds, the pledges 
offered by those thousands upon thousands of 
men, women and children, with clear and reso- 
lute eyes. 

When their National Hymn arose from 



26 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

these crowds, or when they filled the arching 
heavens above New York with the accents of 
the Marseillaise, we experienced a profound 
emotion such as one feels in the presence of a 
controlling force of future destiny — but how 
remote was this future? Would it be to- 
morrow — or somewhat later ? 

Would it be too late? The whole problem 
centered there, immense and full of anguish. 

Upon entering the war, the people accepted 
its heavy burdens, but accepted them with 
closed eyes; they could not yet realize them, 
and since they did not yet realize, the question 
might well be asked, in what manner they were 
going to support them. 

The first indication, however, was encour- 
aging. I refer to the clear-cut determination 
of the people to understand the war, its form, 
its development, its consequences. Now, any- 
one who sincerely wishes for knowledge is al- 
ready prepared to be instructed. The Ameri- 
can people, at a distance of some thousands of 
kilometres from the war, may well serve as a 
striking example. 

What one of us has not heard repeated scores 
of times the same identical phrase: " The peo- 
ple don't realize!" Naturally, the American 
people could not " realize " the war, before be- 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 27 

ing informed and enlightened as to the con- 
ditions of the war ; but, apart from the Govern- 
ment's duty to inform them — a duty which 
was duly performed — the people ably pro- 
ceeded to inform themselves, and the part 
played by the press, by public speeches, by 
the American war correspondents, by all sorts 
of agents under all sorts of titles, was immense 
and of great benefit. It would be impossible 
to give too much credit to this passionate desire 
for the truth, and to those who undertook to 
satisfy it. 

The result was commensurate with the 
effort. The American people were so quick to 
understand the war into which they had en- 
tered, that we were able to say to our American 
friends, " Beware of the phrase ' The people 
don't realize! ^ Never trust to it as an excuse 
for delaying necessary measures. Never say, 
* We are behindhand, because the people don't 
realize.' Say instead, ' We have not an hour 
to lose, because the people will be quick to 
realize.' " And, in point of fact, progressively 
from East to West, all America entered the 
war. 

Early in the month of October, Mr. Lane, 
Secretary of the Interior, returning from a trip 
through the West, was able to say, " The war 



28 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

spirit is magnificent in the western states. The 
West, like the East, is determined to carry the 
war to a finish." 

It was not enough, however, to reahze the 
war; it was necessary above all, to realize the 
value of time as a factor in the war, and not 
merely in the war as a whole, — which in itself 
is none too easy, — but more especially in the 
last act of the war, which was about to begin. 

Truth requires that I should indicate here a 
distinctly American trait which, fostered by the 
love of progress, may nevertheless result in 
war-time in grave miscalculations. I refer to 
that paramount desire to do something 
"American," in other words, something better 
than anything that the others have yet done. 

To be sure, in a war that represents a con- 
stant evolution, one must never cease to pro- 
gress. At the same time the essential thing is 
to do well before trying to do better. 

For when once the battle is joined, it runs 
its course implacably; and one does not have 
at one's disposal, as in times of peace, the 
leisure to make all the experiments that one 
Avould like. The enemy is there, face to face. 
Before attacking him with the best means, we 
must guard against him with what means we 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 29 

have, especially when they have been tested by 
our colleagues. 

In other words, we do not make war with the 
means that we would like to use, but with those 
that we have, and we perfect them later on, 
when we have the Time ! 

My excuse for calling attention to this 
American trait is that, while pointing down the 
road of progress, it is capable of leading one 
astray from that beaten daily path which must 
be followed if one is to progress. More spe- 
cifically, it is because of its regrettable effects 
upon the production by the United States of 
modern engines of war. The fact that 
America's mistakes were minimized, thanks to 
the output of the Allies' war industries, is no 
sufficient reason for passing them over in 
silence. There is a lesson here for the future, 
which America will not fail to bear in mind. 

What the United States found difficult to 
recognize, before realizing the implacable na- 
ture of this war, was that, coming into it, as she 
did, in the last act, she had no time to indulge 
in experiments. What she had to do was to 
get ready for the decisive campaign of 1918, 
not, of course, with all her forces, but with 
forces enough to cooperate effectively, and 



30 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

with reserves ready to throw their weight into 
the balance in the final settlement. 

The conception of the value of time did not 
penetrate readily into every brain. It did not 
always find expression in the most appropriate 
measures. But in the end we shall see that it 
made steady progress, up to the moment when 
the German offensive in March, 1918, demon- 
strated the truth of the Allies' contention. 

In the first days of May, 1917, the Govern- 
ment at Washington received the Allied Com- 
missions which came successively to pay their 
respects to the American people, and to set 
forth their views of the present and future 
situation. 

After consulting the Heads of the British 
and French Commissions, and after receiving 
the advice of the victor of the Marne, President 
Wilson, with a spirit of decision and a grasp 
of present and future needs that today we can 
hardly overpraise, decided to send without de- 
lay an Expeditionary Corps to France, to con- 
stitute the advance guard of the great army 
which the United States had decided to raise 
and equip during the progress of the war, to 
the end of assuring a victorious issue. 

In a few days the American General Staff, 
notwithstanding the limited number of its con- 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 31 

stituent officers and the faulty organization 
that we have ab-eady emphasized, estabhshed 
in collaboration with the first French and 
British officers to arrive in Washington, the de- 
tails of an Expeditionary Corps, organized in 
full conformity with exigencies of modern war- 
fare. All discussions were curtailed, and all 
difficulties overcome. The Staff resolutely 
adopted what the experience of the Allies, and 
more particularly that of France, indicated 
should be done. It would seem that there has 
hardly been enough appreciation shown for the 
value of this first work, and the spirit in which 
the American General Staff conducted it. 

Indeed, if we bear in mind the difficulties set 
forth above, if we recall the rapidity with which 
the Expeditionary Corps was created, and 
finally if we reflect that its organization 
achieved in the first essay the practically un- 
changed type of the future American Division, 
we must concede that its organization redounds 
to the highest credit both of the American 
Military Mission, which had first conceived it 
in Paris, and to the officers of the American 
General Staff who perfected it at Washington. 

The first Expeditionary Corps was destined 
to serve, in a measure, as an experimental unit 
for the General Staff of the American Army 
in France, making it possible to complete the 



32 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

investigations ordered by General Pershing as 
a basis for his subsequent recommendations. 

Appointed Commander in Chief of the Ex- 
peditionary Forces on the 14th of May, Gen- 
eral Pershing preceded his army to France. 
On the other side of the Atlantic he began the 
colossal task of organizing a great army, on 
the threshold of the battlefield on which it was 
destined to be engaged almost before it was 
formed. 

In order to understond the world-wide effort 
of America, we must follow its simultaneous 
development in the United States and in 
France; for the task accomplished in France 
was not merely, as one might be tempted to 
think, a continuation of the other. We shall 
see presently that the problem was much more 
complex. It was not merely a question of 
completing the training of an army initiated 
in the United States, which would have been a 
simple problem of coordination. But it was 
necessary to carry on simultaneously a double 
organization, both in the United States and in 
France, where the greater part of the materieP 

1 Materiel: This word has been adopted in the American 
army for the past 16 or 17 years in a sense quite different to 
the military mind from the English word " material," It 
means everything which constitutes the army outside of 
" personnel," a word which the American army has also 
adopted. ** Material " is rather raw material, which, when 
made into guns, etc., becomes " maUriel." 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 33 

of war (cannon, munitions, aeroplanes, etc.), 
were delivered to the troops after their de- 
barkation. Consequently the units arriving in 
France were either incompletely equipped or 
not equipped at all ; and furthermore this lack 
of materiel was a heavy handicap, not only in 
organizing but also in training the troops in 
the United States. 

The first decisions made by the Government 
of the United States up to the date of May 
14th may be summed up as follows: 

The despatch of an Expeditionary Corps ; 

The formation of a great army, on lines to 
be determined by General Pershing in collabo- 
ration with the Allies ; 

The despatch to Europe of divisions of this 
new army, after giving them a preliminary 
training in the United States ; 

The despatch of officers preceding the troops 
to the Anglo-French front, in order to com- 
plete their training; 

Direct and immediate support, generously 
given to the Allies by the despatch of special 
troops (Engineer troops. Ambulance Service, 
regiments of railroad men, foresters, etc.), 
destined to relieve the corresponding services 
in the British and French armies. 

These decisions found their confirmation a 



84 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

few days later through the passage of the War 
Act which furnished the necessary means for 
carrying them out. 

Ey the terms of this Act, the President of 
the United States was authorized: 

1. To bring the Regular Army and the Na- 
tional Guard up to maximum strength by con- 
scription, if there were not sufficient volunteers 
to reach the strength authorized by the law of 
1916. 

2. To issue a call September 1st for a first 
contingent of 500,000 recruits destined to form 
the " National Army." 

3. To levy later a second contingent for the 
same purpose. 

4. Lastly, to make from the men subject to 
conscription under the law a levy of whatever 
number might be required to constitute or 
maintain the units whose creation might be 
necessitated by the war. 

These basic decisions having once been made, 
it remained only to apply them, and to this end 
to conduct simultaneously in the United States 
and in France certain preliminary lines of 
study and work, so that when the first con- 
tingent furnished by conscription should be 
called, their organization, training and trans- 
portation could be carried on simultaneously. 



AMERICA'S MILITARY POWER: 1917 35 

In the following chapters we shall examine the 
manner in which this preparation was accom- 
plished in the United States and in France, 
from 1917 to 1918. 



CHAPTER III 

The Military Preparation in the United 
States 

" We are about to carry the flag into battle, to lift 
it where it will draw the fire of our enemies. We 
are about to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it 
may be millions, of our men, the young, the strong, 
the capable men of the nation, to go forth and die 
iDeneath it on fields of blood far away." 

{President Wilson's speech on June Hth, 1917.) 

1, The Reorganization of the Army and the Spirit 
which Inspired this Reorganization. 

The plan for a general reorganization of the 
army was elaborated in the United States in 
accordance with the recommendations cabled 
by General Pershing. 

It was on American soil that the constituent 
elements were formed and assumed their first 
cohesion; and there the instrument of war was 
forged. 

Its creation represents an immense work, 
the work of an entire people. It was the fruit 
of relentless effort, the fulfilment of the com- 
bination of individual wills, progressively co- 
ordinated by the American Government. The 
men who accomplished this task, unique in the 
annals of the world, contributing to it all the 
vigor of their minds and bodies, deserve our 
admiration and our gratitude. 

36 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 37 

And we have no hesitation in granting these 
in full measure when we realize that they went 
to work handicapped by a defective central 
administration, with imperfect methods, and 
fully aware of all these defects, but without 
the means of remedying them otherwise than 
by additional energy, perseverance and effort. 

In view of the irresistible wave of public 
opinion that resulted in the passing of the 
Army Act of the month of May, we might 
have been prepared for radical administrative 
reforms that would forthwith transform the 
central military organization. On the con- 
trary, this necessary transformation took place 
only through successive reforms, distributed 
over six or eight months, carefully studied by 
the Secretary of War, imposed by the force 
of circumstances and demanded by steadily 
awakening public opinion. 

During the initial period, which was a period 
of studies that already required decisions and 
commands, even the best of men, shackled by 
hampering laws, could not have rendered the 
best accounts. By themselves they could do 
no better than they did. With a different or- 
ganization and with different methods they 
could have done far more. 

And perhaps it might have been possible to 



38 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

reduce, if not to avoid the hesitations and de- 
lays, inseparable from every new organization, 
which characterized the period from May to 
August, 1917. 

The task, it must be conceded, was arduous. 
The United States, in common with other 
countries, but perhaps to a greater degree than 
other countries, had a natural repugnance to 
modifying its laws. 

There is never a complete absence of danger 
in changing what already exists, whether good 
or bad, without being ready to offer a substi- 
tute; and the idea of proceeding by evolution, 
instead of adopting revolutionary methods, is 
in itself a wise idea. Accordingly, the Gov- 
ernment at Washington did its utmost to 
reconcile the indispensable new measure with 
the existing laws ; but such a combination was 
often none to easy ! 

Consequently, in pointing out that the 
evolution progressed slowly, we must carefully 
guard against inferring that, considered in its 
entirety, it could have proceeded much more 
rapidly. Eventually it resulted in a complete 
reform of the War Department, reorganized 
on a new basis, by a man whose name will re- 
main associated with the great work of prepar- 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 39 

ing the American Army: the Secretary of 
War, Newton D. Baker. 

With a mind open to all new ideas, and plac- 
ing the quest of truth above all considerations 
of national or personal vanity. Secretary 
Baker gave to the War Department in as full 
a measure as he deemed it possible to give, the 
organization, the Chiefs and finally the pro- 
ductive activity which found their justification 
in 1918. 

On the other hand, the Government of the 
United States, having appointed a General in 
Chief and sent him to France, showed the 
great merit of placing full confidence in him. 

In point of fact, there devolved upon Gen- 
eral Pershing not only the responsibility for 
the operations of the American Army in the 
future, but the task of determining the means 
of action of which he had need, and conse- 
quently of recommending to the Government 
at Washington a plan for the organization of 
an army, a plan for its training, and a plan for 
its transportation. 

General Pershing's Staff represented " The 
Front/' But it was '' The Rear/' that is to 
say America, on whom it devolved to furnish 
the means which he requested; and in the 
course of preparations in the United States 



40 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

there were initiatives to be taken and decisions 
to be made which General Pershing could not 
always either inspire or dictate. 

In other words, the United States found it- 
self obliged to hasten the work of preparation, 
the details of which could not be supervised by 
the Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary 
Forces : — for he had too much else to do. 

In this connection, it may be pointed out, 
that the relative inaction of the General Staff 
at Washington, and the lack of military Chiefs 
duly invested with indisputable authority re- 
sulted in much too long delays. This disad- 
vantage was aggravated by a lack of close re- 
lations between the Rear and the Front, the 
Staff officers in America being manifestly too 
little informed as to what their Expeditionary 
Force was doing in France. 

Regardless of the cause, and without await- 
ing the result of the studies being pursued in 
France by the Staff of the Expeditionary 
Forces, it ought to have been possible, one 
would think, to settle officially a class of ques- 
tions regarding which no doubt should have 
existed. 

For example, was it necessary to wait four 
months before appointing and sending to 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 41 

France the futui-e division commanders, with 
a part at least of their respective Staffs? 

Was it necessary to wait three months be- 
fore opening an Artillery School in the United 
States? — or before working out, in collabora- 
tion with the Allied governments, a plan for 
transportation, which could not in any case 
have been put into execution except by close 
cooperation between the Allied Navies? 

Evidently not. 

For General Pershing could not in any case 
have failed to wish to have personal direction 
of the training of his subordinates and future 
collaborators ; he could not have failed to wish 
for the arrival of Artillery officers already 
trained; and it certainly w^as not within his 
power to procure transports at the moment 
when it was declared in Washington that there 
was none to be had. 

And all this was so true that, in his first 
recommendations, General Pershing insisted 
with all his might upon the urgency of obtain- 
ing decisions upon all points that it was then 
possible to decide. For that matter, is not the 
whole problem of army communication based 
on the fundamental principle of establishing 
it from the Rear towards the Front? 

We will conclude by saying: 



42 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

That if it was justifiable to await General 
Pershing's recommendations and to follow 
them scrupulously in everything concerning 
the general plans of organization, training and 
transportation, it would still have been pref- 
erable to take day by day and without delay 
such measures as must in any case aid the exe- 
cution of these plans, relieve the crushing bur- 
den of the Commander in Chief of the Ex- 
peditionary Forces, and lastly, save precious 

time. 

* * * 

The causes, however, which delayed the 
work which should have been done, were not 
only of an administrative nature; they were 
also psychological. 

Certain reforms encountered the opposition 
of an obstinate minority of officers whom their 
temperament, their military training or their 
age debarred from new ideas. Perhaps they 
were all the more antagonistic to these innova- 
tions be>cause the latter appeared to them to 
be demanded far less by the experience of a 
war unknown to them, than by the very men 
who had made that war, that is to say, by 
foreigners. 

This obstruction by a minority, in point of 
fact so small that it could have been reduced 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 4S 

to figures, contrasted so sharply with the cur- 
rent thought of the American people, and with 
the enthusiasm of the officers of the new army 
as a whole, that while one might regret it, one 
could not really be seriously troubled by it. 
For was it not a fact that in the army, just as 
in the Diplomatic Service, just as in all 
branches of National activity, routine was 
destined to disappear, swept away by the 
breath of the great war, borne on the new cur- 
rent towards truth, clarity, reality! 

Such was to be the fate in the United States, 
as throughout the entire world, of retrograde 
administrations and ideas. 

It was in the general setting of this evolution 
towards progress that a solution was found, 
from 1917 to 1918, of the problem of organ- 
izing, training and transporting the American 
army, all leading up to the simplest but also the 
most difficult act, its employment on the 
battlefield. 

Without following day by day the develop- 
ment of this organization, we may note in the 
following pages its principal stages. 

Nothing comparable with it had been done 
since the formation of the British armies in 
1915-16. Besides, the problem faced by the 
United States offered conditions of peculiar 



44 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

difficulty, since, aside from men and money, 
everything had to be either created or trans- 
formed. It was possible to shorten the period 
of preparation ; unfortunately, it was not possi- 
ble to dispense with it. 

Now, since 1914 Germany's game had de- 
pended upon the inevitable delays in the com- 
mon preparation of the armies of the Entente. 
It aimed at wearing out or destroying the 
armies that were immediately dangerous, be- 
fore they could receive the direct support of 
their Allies. 

It was the delays of the young British armies 
in preparing to take the offensive that per- 
mitted the German General Staff to wage a 
local combat with the French army at Verdun 
from February 21st to July 1st, 1916. 

To guard against the repetition of such a 
situation of war it was incumbent upon 
America to prepare from the outset an offen- 
sive army, resolutely overleaping the earlier 
stages passed through by the several Allied 
armies. 

She could do this only by utilizing their ex- 
perience ; and she had the exceptional merit of 
being willing to do so. 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 45 
The First Expeditionary Division 

On May 25th the composition of the first 
Expeditionary Division was announced as 
follows : 

Two Brigades of Infantry, i. e, four Regi- 
ments, and a fifth Regiment of Marines ; 

One Brigade of Artillery, comprising three 
Regiments and a Battery of trench-mortars; 

One Regiment of Engineers ; 

One Battalion of the Signal Corps; 

One Air Squadron; 

Indispensable Troops and Services. 

With some modification of detail in the com- 
position, and more especially in the numerical 
strength of the units, this first division bore a 
close resemblance to what was destined to be- 
come the model of the future American Divi- 
sion. Nevertheless, it took from 2 to 3 months 
to decide definitively upon the type of this 
latter unit. The reason was that in this, as in 
all other matters, they very naturally wished 
to have the advice of General Pershing. But 
it was impossible for General Pershing to pass 
judgment until he himself had arrived in 
France, and watched the Allied divisions, if 
not his own, in action. And owing to the small 
amount of tonnage available for its transporta- 
tion, it was going to take two months before 



46 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

the first American unit could be wholly trans- 
ported. 

The Problems of the American General Staff 

Herein lay a serious danger which did not 
escape the attention of the American Staff offi- 
cers at Washington. 

In the early days of June, 1917, the General 
Staff decided, in order to save time, practically 
to adopt as type of the new division, the form 
of the first division whose composition had been 
submitted to General Pershing before his de- 
parture ; and they determined that they should 
proceed without delay to work out a general 
plan of organization, training and transporta- 
tion, — for after all it considered that it was 
best to decide off-hand such questions as de- 
pended for solution mainly upon good sense 
and the necessities arising from the situation of 
the war. 

The first fundamental decisions to be made 
seemed to present no questions of doubt; 
furthermore, they could not wait. 

The problem consisted first of all in the 
transportation of an army of a million men, 
and placing them as quickly as possible at the 
front, face to face with Germany. For the 
more rapidly American intervention could be 
effected, the niore prompt would be its success. 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 47 

Now this depended upon the tonnage, equip- 
ment and training. 

Taking up first of all the question of train- 
ing, the American Staff decided that it could 
and should be conducted on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 

In America it would be accomplished less 
efficaciously and less rapidly than in France. 
But the further the training could be pushed 
in the United States, the sooner it could be fin- 
ished in France, — that is to say, the sooner 
the troops could take an effective part in the 
fighting. This question, the General Staff 
very justly observed, had no bearing upon the 
lack of tonnage; or rather, it was the lack of 
this tonnage which urged them to undertake 
without delay the training of troops in 
America. The importance of such training, 
for troops destined to measure their strength 
against the German army, was not a question 
needing demonstration. 

As regards the difficulties of organization, 
the General Staff regarded as most serious the 
lack of Artillery equipment. But since France 
was able to f m^nish this, it was not an obstacle 
to the despatching of divisions to Europe. 
Their Artillery regiments could wait to be 
organized until after they were disembarked. 



48 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

The other troops could also receive their share 
of the equipment in France. 

To carry out this programme, there was 
urgent need of constructing vast training 
camps for the new army in the United States ; 
and the American General Staff concluded by 
deciding : 

1. That 100,000 men per month must be sent 
to France, beginning with the month of 
August ; 

2. That the interned enemy vessels should 
be. utilized for transporting these troops ; 

3. That 16 divisional instruction camps 
should be established without delay in the 
United States. 

If it were possible to reproduce here in de- 
tail the various propositions offered at that 
time, it would be surprising to see how close 
these contemplated solutions came to what was 
done in 1918. 

These propositions, however, mainly re- 
peated those set forth by Marshal Joffre in a 
lecture delivered at the War College during his 
sojourn in Washington, in the course of which 
he outlined before General Scott, the Ameri- 
can Chief of Staff, and General Kuhn, Presi- 
dent of the War College, what he conceived 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 49 

that the mihtary effort of the United States 
should be. 

Accordingly, high praise is due to these offi- 
cers for the spirit of realization which possessed 
them ; and it is a matter of regret that the Gen- 
eral Staff did not at that epoch possess greater 
authority. Otherwise, from one to two months 
could have been gained for carrying out Gen- 
eral Pershing's plan. 

General Pershing's Plan 

General Pershing's recommendations, and 
his plan of action as a whole, arrived in Wash- 
ington in the course of June and July. He 
was unable to send them sooner; but we have 
seen that on many points it had been possible 
to anticipate him and satisfy his requests even 
before they had been formulated. 

The plan submitted by General Pershing 
to his Government contemplated the employ- 
ment of a million men in France for the offen- 
sive campaign of 1918, to be disembarked be- 
fore July of that year, — without consideration 
of the forces that it might be necessary to send 
to the front later on, nor of the total numerical 
strength of the future American Army, which 
he estimated at 3,000,000 men (a numerical 
strength to be reached within two years) . 

The million men required by General Persh- 



50 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

ing were to constitute an army of 5 corps, each 
corps consisting of 4 fighting divisions and two 
replacement, base, or instruction divisions. 

This was the problem over which the General 
Staff toiled, finally reaching the plan of organi- 
zation for the division, approved on August 
8th, and that of the Army Corps published 
March 5, 1918. 

At the same time the Chiefs of the various 
branches and services concerned worked out the 
first formation of special troops and services 
essential to a modern army, such as the numer- 
ous formations connected with the Engineer 
Corps, the Medical Corps, the Signal Corps 
and the Ordnance Department. 

What constituted the new fighting units, the 
organization of which had at last been decided ? 

The American Division was to comprise : 

Two brigades of Infantry equivalent to four 
regiments made up of companies of 250 men ; 

One brigade of Artillery, comprising three 
regiments (one of them a regiment of 155mm 
howitzers) and a battery of trench mortars; 

One regiment of Engineers ; 

One Signal Corps Battalion; 

Fourteen Machine-gun Companies (bat- 
talion, brigade or division) , and all correspond- 
ing services, amounting in total to 27,152 men. 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 51 

This formation, carefully studied in view of 
the new necessities of modern warfare, closely 
resembled, as may be seen, the first division of 
the Expeditionary Corps. An increase had 
been made in the numerical strength of the 
companies of Infantry, raised from 200 to 250 
men, and in the proportion of machine-guns, 
etc., in consequence of which this fighting unit 
possessed in Infantry a numerical strength al- 
most double that of the Allied, or Enemy divi- 
sions. Theoretically, it represented the maxi- 
mum of offensive power which a division could 
attain without compromising its mobility. 

In point of fact, it might be criticized as be- 
ing too heavy a unit to be handled by inexpe- 
rienced Staff and Special Service officers. But 
this disadvantage was offset by the advantage 
afforded by large numerical strength in a war 
in which the wastage of the Infantry is very 
rapid ; and it is common knowledge that at the 
front no unit is ever complete. At all events, 
it could be considered that the formation of the 
American Division was now well established. 

The army corps which could not be normally 
constituted until it arrived in France, was to 
represent a total of more than 100,000 men, 
even with its limitation to four fighting divi- 



52 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

sions. This seemed to the Allied Staffs a very- 
large unit to handle. The American Staff, in 
deciding to adopt it, was obviously influenced 
by the necessity of maintaining the fighting 
strength, on an army-corps front, by the 
method of relieving by divisions, a method 
which leaves the Army Corps Staff in its sec- 
tor: which is perfectly true/ As a matter of 
fact, that was the method to which all the bel- 
ligerents had resorted. But it looked as though 
the American Staff was trying to improve on 
this by enlarging all their units, a procedure 
that was not without danger. 

With the short time at their disposal, it 
really was to be feared that the Supply Ser- 
vices might meet with the most serious difficul- 
ties in furnishing supplies for such huge units 
during battle. And in fact this was what hap- 
pened several times in 1918. 

Parallel to the organization of the larger 
units, the divisions and the army corps, a col- 
lective plan was established for the formation 
of all the troops and services of the fighting 



1 It is well known that in the course of this war, the Divi- 
sion had become the true fighting unit and that the Army 
Corps was a ladder-like formation that could include two, 
three or four divisions, all interchangeable. 



REORGANIZATION OP THE ARMY 5S 

forces, whether employed at the front or at the 
rear.^ 

A certain number of these special units had 
been organized at once from the existing re- 
sources, by a preliminary decision of July 13th, 
relative to : 

Railroad Regiments ; 

Road Service; 

General Construction Service; 

Water Supply Service ; 

Forestry Service; 

Supply Trains ; 

Survey and Printing Service; 

Mining Service, etc. 

This decision was supplemented in the month 
of August, by the organization of all the troops 
and services attached to the Engineers, the 
Quartermaster and the Ordnance Department. 
But in order to create a new unit, a decision 
is not in itself sufficient. It is necessary to 

2 The artillery of the Army Corps comprised: 

1 Regiment of 155mm (6 in.) howitzers; 

1 Regiment of 4.7mra American guns; 

4 Brigades of 155mra (6 in.) Filloux gmis; 

4 Brigades of Howitzers 8'^ (English) or 9.5" con- 
structed in the United States after the design of 
the Schneider Company; 

20 Batteries of 2 pieces of 10" guns; 

10 Batteries of Mortars 12 of 3 pieces; 

But this comprised only a part of the programme for a 
heavy and high-powered artillery established at 
Washington. 



54 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

study and to ^x in detail the exact composition 
in men, horses, trucks, material, spare pieces, 
etc. This is a painstaking task, that is em- 
bodied in documents known to the French 
General Staff as Tableauoo d'Effectifs de 
Guerre, and to the American General Staff' as 
" Tables of Organization." 

This detailed work required weeks to accom- 
plish ; but at the cost of sustained application it 
was at last finished, and the American Army 
existed on paper. It was now becoming more 
and more urgent to put these plans into opera- 
tion. . Consequently the War Department did 
not wait for the arrival of recruits, but immedi- 
ately utilized the already formed troops of the 
Regular Army and National Guard, and trans- 
formed them in accordance with the new model. 

Building the New Army 

The constitution of the military forces of the 
United States was effected during the year 
1917 in three progressive phases, from March 
to October. 

The first phase covered the increase of the 
Regular Army, as was contemplated by the 
Law of 1916, that is to say, by voluntary en- 
listment. Such enlistment it was found neces- 
sary to supplement by conscription in August, 
1917; and the Regular Army was transformed 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 55 

into divisions of the new type, and approved 
by the Secretary of War. In July the Na- 
tional Guard was federalized, brought up to 
full strength by conscription, and formed into 
divisions of the adopted uniform type. Lastly, 
the divisions of the National Army were con- 
stituted out of recruits called in pursuance of 
the Law of 1917, from September-October of 
that year onward. 

These three organizations were destined, at 
no distant day, to be welded together and desig- 
nated by the single name, "Army of the United 
States." But in 1917 they were still separate 
and distinct. 

The Regular Army was the permanent army 
in the times of peace. Beginning with the 
month of July, 1917, the new regiments au- 
thorized by the National Defense Act of 1916 
were created.^ Divisions of the new type 
adopted by the Expeditionary Force, up to the 
authorized number of 8 or 10, were formed 
successively through a new grouping of the 
existing units. Unfortunately the lists were 
still incomplete, and in July the army still 
showed a deficit of 42,000 men necessary to 



3 64 rejjiments of Infantry, besides a 65th Infantry Regi- 
ment in Porto Rico; 21 regiments of Field Artillery; 25 regi- 
ments of Cavalry; 7 regiments of Engineers and 7 Battalions 
of Divisional Telegraph operators. 



56 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

bring it up to its full regulation strength of 
320,000 men. 

The National Guard could, under the exist- 
ing laws of America, be employed in two ways : 

The National Guard troops when called out 
by the President, under the authority of the 
" National Defense Act," are discharged from 
the National Guard on being mustered into the 
service of the United States and become part 
of the United States Army. 

When recently called to the Mexican border 
the men were not enlisted individually but with 
their units, under their own officers, and were 
mustered into the United States Army. Newly 
appointed officers received their commissions 
from the President, through the Secretary of 
War, and not from the Governors of their re- 
spective states, for units were no longer under 
control of their Governor. If, however, the 
National Guard is called to the service of the 
United States through the draft, which is con- 
scription of the men who are in the National 
Guard, these men serve as individuals, and of 
course the President can nominate the officers 
and handle the replacements in his best judg- 
ment. 

It is by the first method that the National 
Guard was sent to the Mexican frontier. It 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 5T 

is by the second method that it was called in 
July, 1917. 

As far as possible Colonels were supplied 
from the Regular Army, and all the general 
officers that could be spared from the Regular 
Army were assigned to the newly formed bri- 
gades and divisions. 

Just prior to the regiments being taken into 
the National Army, they were ordered to re- 
cruit up to the present war strength which, in 
most cases, was difficult. Therefore, exchanges 
were made from one organization to another, 
and from the moment of entering into Federal 
Service the identity of the National Guard 
units was practically obliterated. (In the case 
of the 7th Regiment, N. G., S. N. Y., and the 
69th Regiment, N. G., S. N. Y. ; the 69th Regi- 
ment was ordered overseas shortly after 
America entered the war, and became the 165th 
U. S. Infantry. To complete its quota, men 
were drawn who had enlisted in the 7th and 
other regiments.) 

In many cases regimental officers of the vari- 
ous National Guard units were unable to pass 
the physical examination, and were therefore 
replaced by Regular officers. 

The permanent organization of the National 
Guard was composed of sixteen divisions. The 



58 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

42d Division was organized and formed by- 
quotas from all the states of the Union, so far 
as possible. The purpose of this was to interest 
the sympathies of the country as a whole in 
the war. This made seventeen divisions. 

In the month of July, 1917, the deficit in the 
National Guard was something more than 
100,000 men. 

As regards the New Army, or National 
Army J it was yet to be organized, beginning 
with September, and was to comprise at the 
start 16 or 17 divisions. 

The enlistment of volunteers having failed, 
up to August 1st, to fill up the gaps in the 
Regular Army and the National Guard, it be- 
came necessary, as the date fixed for the forma- 
tion of the National Army drew near, to de- 
termine what should constitute the first con- 
tingent to be called by the Draft. 

The resources were not lacking. The num- 
ber of men included within the scope of the 
military law of the month of May, 1918, and 
who had responded to the call, amounted to 
8,839,547,* which represented 93.5% of the 

4 White 6,712,456 

Colored 925,004 

Aliens 1,093,336 

Enemy Aliens 10^,751 

Total 8,839,547 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 59 

total number of men affected by the law, out 
of which it was foreseen that there might be 
4,712,180 possible exemptions. 

It was calculated that, in order to constitute 
and maintain all the units authorized by the 
programme of organization, up to the spring 
of 1918, approximately 1,500,000 men would 
be required. 

The contingent was at first limited to 687,- 
000, in view of the difficulties of cantonment, 
officering and equipment, none of which was as 
yet wholly surmounted. It was destined to be 
raised by three successive calls, issued at inter- 
vals in the course of the month of September. 

The American Army of 1917 was planned to 
consist altogether of 42 divisions, numbered in 
succession from 1 to 25 inclusive, for the Regu- 
lar Army, from 26 to 75 for the National 
Guard, and from 76 onward for the National 
Army. 

But beginning with the month of October, 
the General Staff worked out the formation of 
90 divisions, and by order of the Chief of Staff 
the programme for Artillery materiel and mu- 
nitions was computed on a basis of 40 divisions 
in France, by the month of June, 1918, instead 
of the 30 divisions requested by General Persh- 
ing. It appears from this that the American 



60 AJVIERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

General Staff, without awaiting the events of 
1918, had from the first prepared for the 
growth of the army under such conditions that 
success was unquestionable. 

Unfortunately the organization of American 
divisions, which it was essential to accomplish 
in order to give them an initial adhesion before 
they left America, was in the practical working 
out subject to two pertm-bing causes: 

1. The constant transfers of commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers, the necessity of 
which was not always apparent ; 

2. The instability of plans of transportation, 
according to whether it was decided to give 
preference to the divisions of the National 
Guard or of the Regular Army, the organiza- 
tion of one of these bodies being thus sacrificed 
to that of the other. 

It was this lack of Supreme control from 
which the American Army chiefly suffered in 
1917. From this lack arose the delays in or- 
ganization as well as the slowness of the train- 
ing, and to a certain degree that of transporta- 
tion, as will appear in what is to follow. 

It would be unjust to pass over in silence 
the participation of the colored population of 
the United States in the formation of the great 
American Army. 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 61 

It is a well known fact that there exist some 
12,000,000 Americans of the colored race. Be- 
fore the war this population furnished 2 In- 
fantry Regiments and 2 Cavalry Regiments, 
making a total of 10,000 men in the Regular 
Army. They served in the Island possessions, 
in the Philippines and Hawaii, and they dis- 
tinguished themselves in the Spanish- American 
War of 1898. 

The fii'st registration held in 1917, in pur- 
suance of the conscription law, included in the 
returns 737,628 negroes, representing S% of 
the Americans registered. Moreover, the large 
number of voluntary enlistments bore witness 
to the eagerness of the colored population to 
take part in the great European war. 

Such a state of mind could not fail to en- 
courage a Government, anxious to rally the 
entire population, to make appeal to Ameri- 
cans of colored blood. 

From 1917 to August, 1918, 277,000 negroes 
were incorporated in the National Army. 
They constituted several regiments of In- 
fantry, which General Pershing gladly lent to 
the French Army, in the midst of which they 
fought valiantly. 

But the great majority of these contingents 
entered into the composition of numeiFQUs spe- 



62 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

cial units indispensable to the movement and 
the life of a great modern army. 

They were largely employed, and rendered 
the greatest service, at the bases and on the 
lines of commmiication. 

//. Material Organization of the Camps, Equipping 
and Arming the Army 

The material installation of the troops which 
were to be furnished by conscription was pro- 
vided under conditions for the most part good. 
If the choice of certain camps was sometimes 
inspired by considerations other than those 
based on military necessity, these can be re- 
garded as exceptional cases. 

The United States training camps consti- 
tuted veritable military cities, admirably laid 
out, and each of them designed to accommodate 
41,000 men.' 

But in spite of the activity displayed in 
establishing them, it became necessary to post- 
pone the enrolling of the troops two weeks in 
order that the camps should be ready to receive 
them. In spite of this, thousands of workmen 
could still be seen at certain camps, as for 
example, at Camp Mead, near Washington, 

5 Namely, one division of 27,000 men together witli Ckjrps 
Troops, Army Troops and Depot Battalions. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPS 63 

completing the cantonments, after the troops 
had arrived and begun their training. 

The total cost of establishing these camps 
amounted in three months to the sum of $150,- 
000,000, impressive figures when one remem- 
bers that the annual cost of building the 
Panama Canal never exceeded $46,000,000. 
The American Official Bulletin^ by the way, 
has published the most varied and complete 
details regarding the work of organizing these 
camps, — a work which does the highest honor 
to American energy and spirit of enterprise. 

But even though the required conditions of 
comfort, hygiene and ample training-ground 
were all realized, the Army could not be trained 
without at least a minimum of equipment and 
armament. Now this minimum did not as yet 
even exist. 

In the month of May the United States had 
at the disposal of their army 126 batteries, com- 
posed of 4 pieces of 3-inch field guns, and eight 
batteries of 6-inch howitzers. The guns al- 
ready ordered and in course of manufacture 
promised to increase the Field Artillery by 136 
batteries at the end of a year! But no heavy 
guns or howitzers had been ordered. 

Now upon referring to the programme 
drawn up for the Regular Army, the National 



64 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Guard, and the !N"ational Army it was found 
that 18 field batteries were lacking to the first 
of these three organizations, 330 batteries to the 
second, and 432 batteries to the third, making 
a total deficit of 780 batteries. 

There existed, to be sure, certain Coast Ar- 
tillery capable of being utilized as heavy Ar- 
tillery of great power if mounted on railroad 
trucks, or even as army Artillery; but their 
preparation for such uses would have to be 
undertaken completely. 

Should it be decided to intensify the manu- 
facture of American guns and ammunition or 
to look elsewhere for better materiel? And in 
the latter case could this better materiel be 
manufactured in Europe, or would it be neces- 
sary to set up special factories in the United 
States? 

In order to understand the importance of the 
problem we must form some idea of the enor- 
mous consumption of guns and ammunition 
which marked the battles of 1916 and 1917. 

We fought the Battle of the Marne with an 
average of 400 rounds per gun, at a time when 
the French war factories were barely produc- 
ing 13,000 shells per day. In 1918 the Ameri- 
can troops alone consumed more than 100,000 
shells on certain days of battle. This same 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPS 65 

rate of consumption applied to the guns them- 
selves, and in a general way, to all materiels 
of war. This was in reality a consequence of 
trench warfare, or to speak more exactly, of 
modern warfare, which brings into service, both 
for attack and for defense, all industrial re- 
sources. 

The necessity of destroying the barbed-wire 
entanglements before sending forward the In- 
fantry to storm the enemy trenches, had de- 
manded enormous expenditures of shell, sup- 
plemented by torpedoes from trench mortars. 
The destruction of machine-gun shelters, and 
that of the dug-outs deep enough to be safe 
from guns of ordinary calibre, led to the de- 
velopment of heavy calibre howitzers and 
mortars. 

Aerial observation, the only means in certain 
circumstances of regulating the fire on objec- 
tives invisible from observing posts on the 
ground, assumed unexpected developments. 
Pursuit aviation developed side by side with 
aerial observation, either through our attacks 
upon the enemy's patrolling squadrons, or in 
the course of protecting our own planes from 
enemy attacks. 

Bombing aviation played a steadily increas- 
ing part in the fighting, and extended its radius 



66 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

of action further and further behind the 
enemy's lines, attacking with bombs of ever 
increasing power his assembling points, mili- 
tary depots, war manufactories and lines of 
communication. 

For transporting the enormous weights of 
war materiel, and especially the munitions em- 
ployed in modern battle, it was necessary to 
multiply the mileage of tracks and to develop 
an intricate network of railway lines and auto- 
mobile transports. 

Lastly, to avoid dying of poison before the 
day of victory, we were forced to answer gas 
with gas and poison with poison. 

All the above demanded a considerable 
quantity of materiel, and a sum total of pro- 
ductive energy even greater. 

It was in order to save precious time that as 
early as the opening days of INIay, Marshal 
Joffre had promised that the United States 
should have the aid of the French war factories, 
although at that time he could not state pre- 
cisely to what extent. 

His promise was promptly confirmed by the 
French Government, which offered to the 
United States five 75mm guns per day, begin- 
ning with September, 1917, and two of their 
155mm howitzers per day, from the beginning 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPS 67 

of October of the same year, with correspond- 
ing munitions for normal consumption. 

The superiority of French Artillery materiel 
over all other Field Artillery used during the 
war, and the preponderant role played by the 
rapid-fire " seventy-five millimeter " field- 
gun, both for attack and defense, was not only 
generally recognized, but admitted by our 
enemies themselves.^ 

The offer of the French Govermnent, trans- 
mitted by the High Commissioner of the Re- 
public, at Washington, gave the United States 
the means of arming their divisions successively 
upon their debarkation in France. Better still, 
it assured to the American divisions their com- 
plete allotment of 155mm howitzers even be- 
fore the French divisions themselves were 
entirely equipped with this modern weapon. 

Such an example of disinterested collabora- 
tion deserves to be recorded, especially when 
we remember with what anxiety the French 
General Headquarters were at that time await- 
ing the delivery of heavy modern armament 

6 See the secret pamphlet of the German General Staff on 
the lessons of the Battle of the Somme, issued at the begin- 
ning of 1917, in which the French success is in great measure 
attributed to " the exemplary employment of technical means," 
and in particular of the Artillery. The contents of this 
pamphlet were communicated to the American Geii^rg^l Staff, 
end to the Ordnance Department in May, 19X7, 



68 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

and particularly these same 155mm howitzers 
which, owing to their mobility and power, con- 
stituted the indispensable framework of any 
offensive. 

We recall that in 1916, before the offensive 
of the Somme, when the Commander in Chief 
enquired of General Foch how many divisions 
he expected to use, and what front of attack, 
he replied very justly, " Tell me first how many 
155mm howitzers you are going to give me." 

The delivery of two 155mm howitzers per 
day to the American Army was proposed in 
the common interest of future cooperation, and 
regardless of the immediate disadvantages to 
the French forces, and even of the opposition 
which it might arouse on the part of the French 
General Headquarters. 

But in spite of the unhoped-for advantage of 
such an agreement, its acceptance by the 
American Government was neither immediate 
nor unconditional, and it could not have been 
otherwise. In point of fact, this proposition 
placed the War Department in a delicate situ- 
ation in regard to its own officers, to Congress 
and to American manufacturers. 

It was natural that the pride of American 
officers who were responsible for the existing 
Federal armament^ had to be considered. It 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPS 69 

was no less natural that Congress, which had 
been called upon for appropriations for the 
manufacture of American war materiel, should 
be astonished if at the very outset of the war 
the War Department should choose different 
war materiel, and choose it from abroad. 

Lastly, the War Department would be run- 
ning counter to the private interests of the 
manufacturers, who rightly figured that their 
own productions would be diminished or re- 
tarded by the adoption of war supplies made 
in France. 

It is to the credit of the War Department 
that it rose above all these considerations of 
legitimate pride and of private interests, and 
adopted the materiel whose superiority had 
been clearly established by experience. 

A first programme for the manufacture of 
guns and munitions, drawn up at the beginning 
of June for a field army of 1,000,000 men, com- 
prised : 

The delivery by France of a still limited 
quantity of 75mm guns ; 

The manufacture in the United States of 
3-inch guns, firing the French " 75 " shell, to 
be later transformed into a gun of the Deport 
type, by the addition of a split spade trail 
which was at that time under consideration. 



70 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

The manufacture of 18-pound guns (Eng- 
lish model) , also firing the French " 75 " shell, 
but destined mainly for instruction purposes 
in the United States. 

Accordingly, the American General Staff 
had from the outset of the month of June wel- 
comed the idea of utilizing all available re- 
sources ; but, as can be plainly seen, it was still 
hampered by the desire to construct ordnance 
that might still bear the stamp " made in 
America," by incorporating such excellent ele- 
ments as the French shell, the French variable 
recoil-brake of Saint- Chamond and the Deport 
gun-carriage system. 

Furthermore, the Chief of Ordnance very 
justly hesitated to adopt definitively as part 
of the Artillery equipment a gun whose essen- 
tial feature, the recoil-brake, remained a secret 
unknown to him, and of which it was unjustly 
stated repeatedly that the American factories 
could never make it. 

Undoubtedly it was difficult to make; and 
even in France there were only a very limited 
number of specialists capable of making these 
brakes. But was not this an additional reason 
for placing them without delay at the disposal 
of the United States, and aiding the latter to 
begin manufacturing them? This was pre- 



ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPS 71 

cisely what was proposed to the French Gov- 
ernment by its representatives in Washington, 
— and this was what was done. 

From the time of his arrival in Washington, 
the High Commissioner of the French Repub- 
lic, M. Andre Tardieu, occupied himself chiefly 
in giving the Ordnance Department the benefit 
of the experience acquired by France during 
forty years of study and three years of war. 
He created an armament division and, in 
agreement with the Secretary of War, assured 
a close collaboration between the French and 
American Services. 

All the documents and information collected 
by the French General Staff and by the French 
Ministry of Armament and of Fabrications of 
War were placed at the disposal of the Ord- 
nance Department, and included information 
of a technical or military order, tracings and 
plans for the manufacture of guns and ammu- 
nition, results obtained on the battlefield, con- 
sumption, attrition, maintenance at the front, 
etc. These reports were constantly kept up- 
to-date, and communicated without delay to 
the various interested branches of the Ameri- 
can Army. 

The Ordnance Department, as well as the 
Department of Military Aeronautics, were 



7^ AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

thus enabled to appreciate the main ideas which 
had directed the formation of the French pro- 
grammes of manufacture of the successive 
phases of the war, and draw inspiration from 
them in establishing their own. They were 
constantly informed of the needs of the French 
High Command and of the studies undertaken 
in France to satisfy these needs. 

It was out of these mutual efforts, and in 
conformity with the directions of the American 
High Command, that a definite programme of 
war-fabrication was at last evolved. It con- 
sisted essentially in the adoption of materiel 
in current use in the French Artillery: 
" 75mm " guns, Schneider " 155mm " howitz- 
ers, Filloux " 155mm " long guns. 

The American Army did not take long to 
prove that it knew how to make excellent use 
of them. 

On the other hand, the French houses and 
companies ( Schneider, Forges et Acieries de la 
Marine), whose manufactures were being con- 
structed or designed in America, sent tempo- 
rary or permanent commissions, who thus 
brought the aid of specialists to the Ordnance 
Department. 

After much discussion, the American Gov- 
ernment had decided to keep her own infantry 



AMERICAN WAR INDUSTRIES 73 

rifle, and also to manufacture a rifle on the 
English model, transformed to fire the Ameri- 
can cartridge. The Government adopted the 
French auto-gun and machine-gun and the 
" 37mm " gun (while waiting for the delivery 
in the United States of the Browning model, of 
recognized excellence) ; also the French 240mm 
trench mortar, the rifle grenade V.B., and some 
English mortars ( Stokes Model) . 

In summing up, the essential problem of the 
choice and of the fabrication of materiel for 
light and heavy field artillery was settled by 
the assured supply from France, under such 
conditions that the entrance into line of the 
American army would not be delayed. 

These decisions taken, the United States 
next undertook to establish and get under way 
her war industries. 

///. American War Industries 

Certain delays in manufactures of war gave 
rise in the United States to a rumor of indus- 
trial failure, which cannot be too strongly con- 
tradicted. 

What should be emphasized at the outset is 
that the American Government had pledged it- 
self to give priority to the supplies ordered by 
the British and French Governments and that 
she kept this promise in spite of serious diffi- 



74 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

culties, such as the shortage of steel from Feb- 
ruary to July, 1917, and of transports during 
the winter of 1917-1918. 

Thus at the moment, when the output of the 
" 75 " guns was held up by lack of forgings, 
the Bethlehem Steel Company continued to 
supply French factories ; and during the height 
of the steel shortage, France received from the 
United States a daily average of 4130 tons of 
this metal. In the higher Inter- Allied inter- 
ests, and in order to keep her word, the United 
States never hesitated to delay her own manu- 
factures, and to run the risk of criticisms which 
did not fail to be made. 

Conceding all this, it still remains true that 
American war manufactures suffered certain 
delays contributable to causes partly of an 
administrative nature and partly technical. 

SmalNArms 

These delays did not effect the production of 
small-arms and the ammunition needed for 
them. On the contrary, the American factories 
attained in this regard an output of hitherto 
unknown proportions. 

Beginning with the month of March, 1918, 
the daily production equaled : 

320 machine guns 



AMERICAN WAR INDUSTRIES 75 

8000 rifles 

1800 pistols 

15,000 grenades 

11,000,000 cartridges 

In October these figures reached : 

1400 machine guns 

10,000 rifles 

3400 pistols 

30,000 grenades 

16,000,000 cartridges 

Artillery Materiel 

Unfortunately American industry was less 
well prepared to manufacture Artillery ma- 
teriel. The private factories had hitherto made 
little else than the rough forgings; and the 
Ordnance Department had at its disposal only 
a few Arsenals, which were of comparatively 
little importance and not well equipped. 

These Arsenals were immediately developed 
and specialized : 

Watervliet — for the manufacture of guns ; 

Watertown — for the manufacture of gun- 
carriages ; 

Rock Island — for the manufacture of re- 
coil-mechanisms. 

Furthermore, the Ordnance Department 
established near existing factories machine- 



76 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

shops equipped with the most modern ma- 
chinery and specialized for the production of 
some single part. 

Thus, for example, the Singer Sewing Ma- 
chine Factory, at Elizabeth, New Jersey, was 
equipped with a machine-shop capable of turn- 
ing out and finishing recoil-mechanisms for the 
" 75 " guns at the rate of 20 a day; the BuUard 
Engineering Company's Machine-Tool Fac- 
tory at Bridgeport was enlarged with a shop 
capable of a daily production of 6 " 155 " 
G.P.F. guns ; and the Dodge Brothers' Auto- 
mobile Factory at Detroit was equipped for 
the daily production of 5 recoil-mechanisms for 
the " 155 " G.P.F.'s, and 30 brakes for the 
" 155 " Schneider howitzers. 

Such extreme specialization, permitting the 
organization of manufactures on a very large 
scale, offered on the other hand the disadvan- 
tage of necessitating long delays in the de- 
livery, assembling and mounting the first parts 
finished. 

In point of fact, serious delays were incurred 
in connection with the first deliveries; and al- 
though at the time of the armistice all the war 
plants were thoroughly equipped, and the 
manufacture of the separate parts had every- 
where begun, their serial assemblage had not 



AMERICAN WAR INDUSTRIES 77 

been really systematized except in the case of 
the " 155's." 

The primary cause of delay must be sought 
in the numerical inadequacy of the technical 
personnel, and in the defective organization of 
the Ordnance Department from April, 1917, to 
February, 1918. Beginning with February 
that department's administrative reorganiza- 
tion, which we shall have occasion to explain 
further on, was destined greatly to improve the 
situation. 

At all events, the Ordnance Department, in- 
stead of furnishing the raw materials to the 
manufacturers and giving them orders for the 
finished articles, personally supervised all the 
sub-contracts, including the receiving and for- 
warding to the assembling shops of the sepa- 
rate parts for which the sub-contracts were 
given. 

On the other hand, America's industrial or- 
ganization and the methods of work in vogue 
in the United States necessarily involved some 
initial delays in getting the war manufactures 
fully started. 

The forging, executed much too roughly for 
the parts that had to be machine-finished, ne- 
cessitated certain supplemental operations that 
required a much larger number of machines. 



78 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

The method of turning out machines con- 
sisting wholly of standard parts, not requiring 
fitting, — a method necessitated in the United 
States in view of the lack of skilled workmen, 
— obliged the manufacturers before under- 
taking the work for which they had con- 
tracted to establish machine-shops completely 
equipped with far more numerous apparatus 
than is needed in France. 

It should be added, however, that the great 
majority of the factories surmounted all these 
difficulties, and that American industry 
plunged boldly into the construction of Artil- 
lery materials. 

The manufacturers, eagerly seeking infor- 
mation, added their own initiative to what they 
could learn, and their efforts were crowned 
with success. Factories of established reputa- 
tion, such as the Willys-Overland Company, 
the American Brake Shoe Company, the 
Dodge Company, the Osgood Company, the 
Bradley Car Company, the BuUard Company, 
etc., quickly brought their production up to 
the required standard. 

For the sake of clearness, it should be added 
that, after a period of experimentating, which 
might profitably have been shortened, when the 



AMERICAN WAR INDUSTRIES 79 

orders were once placed, the first deliveries of 
the finished articles took place as follows : 

The " 75 " guns, and the Schneider " 155's " : 
from 7 to 10 months after the order was 
placed ; 

The G.P.F. " 155 ": from 10 to 12 months 
after they were ordered ; 

The expected output was rapidly attained 
in the case of powder, explosives, cartridge 
cases and even shrapnel, the production of 
v/hich had reached the figure of 30,000, begin- 
ning with the month of March, 1918. 

On the other hand, long delays were neces- 
sary to perfect the manufacture of high ex- 
plosive shells, the adoption of which had neces- 
sarily followed that of other French equip- 
ment. In point of fact, it was not until No- 
vember, 1918, that the programme was fulfilled 
of turning out 100,000 explosive shells per day, 
for the " 75 " guns. 

We should also note the great effort made by 
America to extend the use of mechanical trac- 
tion, and particularly that of the caterpillar 
tractors. At the time of the armistice, her 
machine-shops were turning out every month 
more than 1200 five, ten and twenty-ton cater- 
pillar tractors. 

At the same time that it started the manu- 



80 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

factiire of the Renault assaulting tanks, the 
Ordnance Department, in conjunction with the 
Ford Motor Company, was planning a light 
tank that could be used either for attacking or 
as a Field Artillery tractor. A few sample 
tanks were built, and the Ford machine-shops 
were equipped for the production of 100 tanks 
per day, when the armistice was signed. 

It should be noted here that the Ford fac- 
tories which, before America entered the war 
were turning out automobiles at the rate of 
3600 a day, equipped themselves for the manu- 
facture of gun-carriages, submarine chasers 
and liberty motors, complete or in parts, — and 
more particularly, cylinders for this motor at 
the rate of 4000 a day. 

Aviation 

It should be said, however (while speaking 
of the liberty motor) , that the high hopes enter- 
tained by the American people of an abundant 
and rapid production of airplanes and equip- 
ment were doomed to disappointment. The 
Allies, and France in particular, had need of 
the raw materials and the detached parts which 
American manufacturers were furnishing 
them. Hence the Allies did not encourage the 
United States to adopt the models which had 



AMERICAN WAR INDUSTRIES 81 

already proved their worth at the front. Con- 
sequently, America sought to produce a motor 
and a plane that would lend themselves to the 
American method of manufacture in standard 
parts. 

After much discussion and research their 
efforts centred in the liberty motor, and the De 
Haviland aeroplane. But this motor had not 
yet been perfected, and it was found necessary 
to increase its power and lessen its weight. 
Consequently it was not until the end of 1918 
that its production reached the imposing 
figure of 5000 a month. Unfortunately the 
De Haviland aeroplane had not undergone 
modifications corresponding to those of the 
motor that it was destined to receive. 

The result of all these gropings and delays 
was that the American Aviation Service was 
forced to go into battle in 1918 equipped with 
French apparatus, and without being able to 
make the maximum use of the excellent and 
numerous personnel that it had succeeded in 
training, both in the United States and in 
Europe. 

To sum up: the results as a whole that are 
shown by an impartial examination of the 
American war industries, absolutely give the 
lie to the report of an industrial breakdown in 



82 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

the United States. At the same time we may 
draw from this industrial effort of America a 
conclusion and a lesson : 

America was able to develop rapidly the 
lines of production that were familiar to her 
manufacturers, such as small-arms, powder and 
cartridges, tractors, etc. But in spite of the 
knowledge of her engineers, the fidelity and 
skill of her mechanics, the perfection and power 
of her factories, it was only in the face of great 
difficulties, and often after serious delay, that 
she was able to perfect the manufacture of our 
ammunitions and weapons of war. 

Inventions are made only with great diffi- 
culty during the war. The technical mobiliza- 
tion, equally with the industrial mobilization 
of any country, ought to be completely pre- 
pared for in times of peace. 

IV, Training the Army 

The American Army was called upon to 
measure itself against a redoubtable adversary, 
trained to war through a long preparation in 
times of peace, and by three years of uninter- 
rupted fighting. 

Hence it was with good reason that the 
American General Staff emphasized, at the be- 
ginning of the month of June, the importance 



TRAINING THE ARMY 83 

of training, and the gravity of the problem it 
offered. Unfortunately they did not possess 
all the means essential to solving it by them- 
selves; but at least they had the merit of at- 
tempting to do so. 

Difficulties of every sort presented them- 
selves, either simultaneously or one after an- 
other : 

The formidable task of enlarging the Army ; 

The absence of any systematic military prep- 
aration; 

The remoteness of the field of battle ; 

The special character of the last wars in 
which America had taken part ; 

The insufficiency or absence of up-to-date 
training schools ; 

The scarcity, if not the total lack, of certain 
essential equipment for training; 

The limited authority of the General Staff, 
and its numerical insufficiency. 

It would have been desirable to organize the 
training, or at least so it seemed to us, on the 
following basis : 

In the first place, in order to make sure of 
reaching the desired goal, it was necessary to 
establish the conditions to be attained, namely : 
training of the Commanding Officers of the 
large units and their Staffs, and of line officers. 



84 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

from the Chief of Platoon up to the battalion 
Commander, of the Special Services, and of 
the troops themselves. 

Next it was necessary in the general form 
thus drawn up, to determine what part should 
be assigned to the training in the United 
States, and what part to the training in France, 
taking as a basis the plans already made for 
the organization and transportation of the 
large units. Lastly, this programme being 
once established, it remained to secure the 
means of carrying it out, namely : 

A strong and enlightened directing board at 
Washington acting in accordance with General 
Pershing's directions; the equipment of the 
units and training schools with training ma- 
terial ; 

The judicious employment of foreign ad- 
visors and methods. 

The first part, that is to say, the general 
plan, was drawn up; but the indefiniteness of 
the transportation schedules and the frequent 
hitches which occurred in the organization of 
the Army, introduced an element of permanent 
disturbance in the programme that was to be 
carried out in America. 

The directing organism was soon created 
under the name of Training Committee, Gen- 



TRAINING THE ARMY 86 

eral Pershing recommended to this Committee 
that it should keep in close touch with his Gen- 
eral Staff, and include in its number a few 
foreign advising officers. 

But as a matter of fact this committee 
played through several months a merely nomi- 
nal role in the training of the American forces, 
because it lacked that effective authority which 
could have been given to it only by the pro- 
posed reform of the General Staff, and by the 
presence among its members of officers who had 
served at the front. 

Before considering the training of the army, 
it was necessary to officer it, and to prepare in- 
structors. 

The resources offered by the Regular Army 
were notably insufficient even if a heavy drain 
was made upon it for officers. And where, in- 
deed, were to be found the 2000 officers needed 
at once for the Engineer Corps, the 3500 de- 
manded by the Artillery, without counting the 
tens of thousands of officers indispensable for 
the Infantry of the new army? 

In April, 1917, the sum total of officers in 
the American Army was only 9570. By De- 
cember, 1918, it was destined to have risen to 
183,000. 

France, in time of peace, had officers enough 



86 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

to satisfy the needs of both active and terri- 
torial armies calculated on a basis of her total 
mobilized strength ; yet dm-ing the years from 
1914 to 1917 she was obliged to commission no 
less than 100,000 officers, drawn from the ranks 
of the privates and non-commissioned officers. 
The wearing out, the losses and the men re- 
quired for new services in such a war, surpassed 
all provision. 

In order to be ready for such needs, and such 
rate of consumption, the Secretary of War as 
early as the month of April, 1917, attacked the 
problem resolutely. He decided to train with- 
out delay a new corps of officers in series aver- 
aging between 30,000 and 40,000 men, drawing 
from the Universities, from business, from the 
factories, from each and every class of society 
the boys and young men who represented the 
vital forces of the nation. 

The first thing was to give them mentality, 
the spirit of discipline and a preliminary gen- 
eral military training, which every officer 
worthy of the name ought to possess. Such 
was to be the essential aim of the " Training 
Camps for Reserve Officers." 

Following this preliminary training there 
were to be higher courses, either special or gen- 
eral as the case might be, conducted in Officers' 



TRAINING THE ARMY 87 

Schools, either in the United States or in 
France, and by means of a period of training 
at the front. 

The idea was good; and the method, if well 
applied, seemed excellent. Unfortunately it 
was not within the power of the Secretary of 
War to remove all the difficulties which 
hampered its success. But at least he did his 
best to remedy the difficulties as they arose in 
actual experience, or when they were frankly 
explained to him. Thus it was that each new 
series of courses marked an important progress 
over the preceding, and that little by little, the 
Doctrine of Warfare and methods of training 
were established in the United States as they 
had been in the other armies of the Entente. 

The first series of courses, from May 15th to 
August 11th comprised 4000 pupils. 

The training was given with infinite con- 
scienciousness by Regular Army officers, who 
lacked experience in modern warfare, without 
the aid of any foreign adviser and in pursuance 
of regulations not yet revised. Such instruc- 
tion naturally remained quite imperfect. 

In the course of it the most scrupulous appli- 
cation was made of pre-wartime regulations, 
with the dominant idea, highly to be approved, 
of inculcating in young officers the spirit of 



88 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

discipline and sacrifice. But in the application 
of this right idea, these inexperienced teachers 
often overstepped the end they purposed to 
attain. 

By assigning to combat too restrained a part 
and, within that restrained part studying com- 
bat with the armament of other days, they ran 
great danger either of giving their pupils false 
ideas, or of shaking the confidence of the better 
informed. 

They failed to recognize in practice the 
formidable power of Infantry and Artillery 
fire, and the imperious necessity of cooperation 
and of observation on the battlefield. 

In a word, they forgot that discipline is not 
only the result of exercise in close ranks, but 
that it can equally be acquired in the course of 
combat exercises in open order, rigorously 
exercised. It is the eternal confusion, which we 
have all known, between the end and the means. 

The pupils themselves had the impression 
that this instruction was not up-to-date ; and we 
repeat, that their confidence might well have 
been shaken if it had been of a less robust sort. 

They eagerly questioned the officers of the 
Allied armies whom they met during their 
hours of leisure. They read whatever was pub- 
lished on the war, and often expressed astonish- 



TRAINING THE ARMY 89 

ment at not finding in these publications what 
had been taught them the day before. 

With these reservations the bearing, the zeal, 
the progress of these young men called forth 
general admiration. Neither heat nor rain nor 
cold could stop them. An enormous sum of 
work was demanded of them, and they were 
constantly ready to give more than they were 
asked. The magnificent spirit of these reserve 
officer students had a decided influence on the 
new army. 

If, thanks to intensive training, and to the 
spirit which animated both instructors and 
pupils, the task was accomplished of giving to 
the latter a general military training, it was, 
on the other hand, impossible in these camps 
to prepare officers intended for special 
branches, owing to the lack of equipment, 
firing grounds, qualified instructors and time. 

In point of fact, there were young men soon 
to receive commissions as Artillery officers, who 
had never yet fired a gun. For these reasons 
it was all the more essential to have them 
trained without delay in special schools. But 
the organization and functioning of such 
schools again brought up the question of em- 
ploying foreign officers, in regard to which, as 
early as the month of May, Marshal Joffre, 



90 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

and later the French Government itself, had 
unsuccessfully urged the General Staff and 
Government of the United States to decide 
favorably. 

The arrival in July of General Pershing's 
recommendations, together with decisions 
taken by the Secretary of War in accord with 
the French High Commissioner at Washing- 
ton, fortunately abridged the long pending 
negotiations. Had they lasted much longer, 
they must inevitably have produced the false 
impression that the training of the American 
Army was being retarded by those whose duty 
it was to urge it forward. 

General Pershing, understanding the past 
and divining the futm^e, laid down as a dogma 
that success in this war depended chiefly on 
the training of the Staff. And in consequence 
it was imperative to prepare Staff officers in 
great numbers for their essential functions. 
At the same time, knowing the value of the 
lesson to be learned at the front, and the facili- 
ties offered in France for organizing and di- 
recting the training of the army. General 
Pershing insistently demanded the sending 
over of a large number of officers for all 
branches of the Service. 
. Lastly, — and this recommendation was des- 



TRAINING THE ARMY 91 

tined to remove all doubts and satisfy the pre- 
vailing opinion in the American Army and 
among the great majority of its officers — he 
specifically demanded the employment of 
British and French officers for teaching the 
special features of trerich warfare. 

Having in mind, undoubtedly, the aptitudes 
that he had personally observed in the two 
Allied armies, he specified that the teaching 
of the following subjects should be respectively 
entrusted : 

To the French, the teaching of Artillery, the 
grenade, the machine rifle, field fortification 
and liaison duties ; 

To the English, instruction in the use of the 
machine-gun, in " sniping," trench mortars, 
the bayonet and poison gas. 

General Pershing's judgment may be com- 
pared to the vastly too flattering declaration 
that General Bridges made regarding the 
French, to the representatives of the American 
press on April 24th, 1917, when he said of 
them : " Naturally they are our superiors. 
Put a French soldier into the trenches, and he 
will begin to dig up the soil and attend to his 
other duties as if he had been trained to them 
all his life. Our own men are excellent and 
well disciplined, but they have not the same 



92 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

inborn vocation for it that the French have. 
You also will find that you have a great deal 
to learn, a great many things that no one out- 
side of the French will be able to teach you." 

General Bridges will pardon a Frenchman 
for refusing to share his opinion in its entirety. 
We French and English learned a great deal 
from each other, and in such a war there was 
always a great deal to be learned from each 
other, quite as much by the French from the 
English as by the English from the French. 

In point of fact, in the great task of Inter- 
Allied collaboration, the English and the 
French have both furnished, as regards both 
the organization and the training of the Ameri- 
can Army, an example of moral union which, 
coupled with material union, has constituted 
their strength throughout the war. 

And this collaboration does honor both to 
the eminent men who instituted it, and those 
who have been its modest artisans, sincere and 
devoted, in all the branches of military activity : 
General Staff, Training, Organization, Arma- 
ment, Transportation. . . . 

What General Bridges doubtless meant to 
say was, that the collaboration of the French 
was, by the very force of circumstances, des- 
tined to assume a special importance. 



TRAINING THE ARMY 93 

The American Army was actually coming 
to fight in France, in the midst of the French 
Armies, in contact with the French nation, 
utilizing for its bases and lines of communica- 
tion the territory and railways of France ; and 
for its camps, schools and military establish- 
ments, also those of France. 

It was France that was destined to furnish 
to America the largest part of her war ma- 
terial during the lapse of time indispensable to 
the organization and putting in running order 
of her industries of war, — and practically un- 
til the signing of the armistice. 

ThanKs to their previous studies and labors, 
both before and during the war, the French 
General Staff were able to save America from 
many gropings and errors, from heavy losses 
in men and in money : that is, from the heavy 
price paid for experience. 

However, did not this collaboration tend to 
strengthen the knots that bind us to the past? 

That is why, in place of the timid collabora- 
tion of thirteen French officers proposed by 
the War College to Marshal Joffre in May, 
1917, General Pershing recommended that a 
hundred and sixty-five should be called, to- 
gether with the same number of British offi- 



(94 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

cers, supplemented respectively by the same 
number of non-conmiissioned officers. 

It is very interesting to observe that this 
recommendation practically reproduced the 
propositions made in the month of April, 1917, 
by the head of a small American Military Mis- 
sion in Paris, propositions to which no atten- 
tion had been paid, because of the bad organi- 
zation of the General Staff already mentioned, 
and the state of mind of a certain military 
circle. 

It may be seen from this that there have 
always been on the American General Staff 
certain officers, and those among the best, per- 
fectly informed as to the needs of their army, 
ambitious for the future of its new-born 
strength, and animated by the desire to carry 
its training to a very high point by utilizing 
the experience of their friends and allies. But 
it is equally plain to see what stubborn re- 
sistence was offered within the narrow military 
circle, to which we have referred, to the idea of 
invoking the aid of the experience of for- 
eigners. 

The task of the French High Commissioner 

was to overcome this resistence; and he re- 

J ceived from Secretary Baker the most sincere 

support. At the very moment when General 



TRAINING THE ARMY 



Q-) 



Pershing's recommendations arrived in Wash- 
ington, he had at last induced the American 
Government to accex:)t at least the cooperation 
of 24 officers, who for more than a month had 
been awaiting in France the authorization to 
embark. 

The valuable work of the British and French 
advisers made itself felt in every branch of the 
Army. It was coordinated and directed, so 
far as French collaboration was concerned, by 
the High Commissioner of the Republic, M. 
Andre Tardieu. And we shall not hesitate 
to say that, in following his formal instructions, 
these officers always expressed the opinion or 
desire of the Government and General Staff 
of France, to the exclusion of all personal 
opinions. 

The British Commission acted in accordance 
with the same spirit, or to speak more ac- 
curately, the two Commissions mutually de- 
voted themselves with all their strength and 
with all their heart to the accomplishment of a 
task that might spare their brothers at arms 
the harshest lessons of experience. 

At the end of the first course of instruction, 
27,341 reserve officers were appointed. 

At the close of the second course, which had 
the services of a few foreign officers as special 



96 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

instructors, from August to November, 1917, 
18,000 received commissions, and of these 
2,000 were sent to France. 

In July the Artillery School at Fort Sill 
was at last reorganized and opened. The 
American General Staff requested the services 
of four French Artillery officers as special in- 
structors there, and opened a series of courses 
for the benefit of a steadily increasing number 
of officers. 

Side by side with the School of Artillery, a 
School of Infantry was organized, in order to 
complete the training of young officers in the 
use of special arms. 

At Washington the War College endeav- 
ored, through a course of intensive training, to 
initiate into their special duties a certain nimi- 
ber of the Staff officers of the National Guard. 

Lastly, the training of the troops themselves 
was undertaken in accordance with a sixteen 
weeks' programme established by the General 
Staff, the training of the divisions began in the 
camps as fast as they were occupied by the new 
units. 

In each of these divisional camps the British 
and French advisors, grouped according to 
their different specialties, placed themselves at 
the disposition of the American Commanders, 



TRAINING THE ARMY 97 

Unfortunately the necessary equipment for 
training and armament was lacking, and some 
of the camps could be seen using cannon and 
machine-guns made of wood, and hand gren- 
ades made of clay, remarkable for their in- 
genuity, but productive of feeble results. 

Furthermore, since the camps were not com- 
pleted it was necessary to employ part of the 
troops in the work of construction and 
drainage. 

Constant transfers, due to the creation of 
special units or to the necessity of bringing up 
departing units to their full strength at a day's 
notice, — the result of not having figured in 
the first place on a wide enough margin, — de- 
prived the officers of their men, and the men 
of their officers, and disorganized the training 
from the outset. Sometimes a division which 
had made excellent headway in its training re- 
ceived at its departure 30% of new recruits, 
which radically changed its degree of prepara- 
tion for battle. It required months to remedy, 
even imrtially, a state of affairs which the 
executive officers deplored. 

On the other hand, the General Staff's pro- 
gramme of sixteen-weeks' training, even when 
enlarged and supplemented hy later circulars, 
was at best only a time schedule. It taught 



98 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

no theory of combat, because the General Staff 
was too far away from the battle front to feel 
that it had the right to establish such a theory ; 
and undoubtedly there was not a person in 
Washington who would have dared to attempt 
it. Hence the American officers were deluged 
by the flood of English and French regulations 
sent them, by notices of every sort, some of 
which agreed and some of which did not agree 
with the American regulations. They con- 
stituted a library for times of peace, and not a 
practical manual for war. This absence of 
guidance created uncertainty and confusion, 
and induced a large number of officers, am- 
bitious to do well, to create their private 
methods of training the men in their own units. 

The disadvantages were aggravated by the 
fact that the foreign advisers, assigned to teach 
certain specialties, were not qualified to teach 
anything else. They did their best to co- 
ordinate these specialties, to give them their 
proper place in the scheme of modern combat, 
but the result of their efforts depended solely 
upon the disposition and state of mind of each 
division Commander. 

Notwithstanding these difficulties, and de- 
spite all errors of execution, so much hard 



TRAINING THE ARMY 99 

work had been done, that the year 1917 was 
fruitful in results. 

On November 19th, 1917, the Secretary of 
War was able to say : 

" The training of our National Army is now 
making rapid progress. In all the camps the 
morale of our citizen soldiers is now excellent. 

" The men called upon to defend our coun- 
try under existing conditions are applying 
themselves to the work with a serious spirit 
and high purpose that promise the best of 
results. 

" The French and English officers assigned 
to aid in the training of our new army are 
arriving. They have come to initiate our men 
into the latest developments of modern war- 
fare, so that our troops may forthwith adopt 
the most efficacious methods of instruction, to 
avoid loss of time and of human lives. 

" In France, the training of our troops is 
being conducted with the same care. In the 
sector where they are now in the trenches, they 
are showing themselves worthy of the best 
traditions of our army." 

The new corps of officers were animated 
with a splendid spirit. These men, snatched 
but yesterday from their business life, bur- 
dened with responsibilities which they would 



100 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

resume in the near future, worked with an 
ardor that has not been surpassed in any army 
in the world. 

Through their own lofty conception of duty, 
they were able to impress the same conception 
upon their men. It should be added that offi- 
cers and men alike were absolutely confident of 
victory. In default of a complete military 
education, they carried in their hearts that high 
ideal that has formed the basis of America's 
strength, that wherever the flag of the United 
States is borne, victory must be achieved at any 
cost! 

They meant to go to Berlin, and they would 
have gone there, if the capitulation of Ger- 
many had not stopped them in the full tide of 
victory. 

V. The Plan for Transportation 

As we have already seen, the problem of 
transportation affected, rightly or wrongly, 
every decision taken at Washington. This 
should not be a source of surprise, since it has 
influenced every decision taken in the course 
of the war by any of the Entente Powers. 

The transportation of the American Army 
was intimately involved in the general problem 
of trans-oceanic service on behalf of the AlHes, 
since the latter were dependent for prosecuting 



PLAN OF TRANSPORTATION 101 

the war upon the aid furnished by America, 
and quite as much upon the food suppHes as 
upon the raw materials and certain manu- 
factured articles. Hence, it was the general 
problem of transportation which needed to be 
worked out by the Allied and Associated Gov- 
ernments, and their solution should have 
formed the basis for deciding the means of 
transporting the American Army. 

But, on the one hand, the Allies could not 
make up their minds to attack this general 
problem. On the other hand, the American 
Govermnent or American General Staff per- 
sisted in their determination to solve unaided a 
problem that was too big for them. 

The experience gained in transporting the 
First Division was not a solution. It was 
merely negative. The War Department, hav- 
ing only a paltry tonnage at its disposal, had 
to proceed with two convoys utilizing the same 
transports. The transportation was effected 
between June and August, one month behind 
the schedule. At this rate, as the American 
General Staff perceived, it would have taken 
seven years to convoy the army across! 

Meanwhile the War College had been study- 
ing the problem, and in the early days of June 
had already worked out a plan which, while 



102 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

still capable of revision and improvement, 
came pretty near to being the true solution. 
It was based upon the employment of tonnage 
amounting to 900,000 tons for the month of 
August, 1917, rising to a monthly rate of 
1,500,000 in April, and dropping to 975,000 
from August, 1918, onward, for the trans- 
portation of a million men and their main- 
tainance. 

In the calculations which the Allied General 
Staffs had made on their own behalf, they ar- 
rived at similar figures, but if anything a little 
higher. 

In any case these studies had a merely 
academic value, since they were neither based 
on a common understanding nor susceptible 
of immediate execution by the Governments 
concerned. 

The moment had not yet come when Ger- 
many, throwing all her forces into the last 
battle, would oblige the Allies to throw in all 
of theirs, and to this end apply unreservedly 
the fruitful principle of equal cooperation on 
sea and land. 

Up to the month of March, 1918, the United 
States, refusing to make an effective requisi- 
tion of her merchant marine, had at her dis- 
posal a tonnage notoriously insufficient for 



PLAN OF TRANSPORTATION 103 

carrying out the plan proposed by General 
Pershing. 

The months passed . . . and at the end 
of six months only four fighting divisions, and 
certain army troops and services, had been 
transported. 

Meanwhile the German forces were multi- 
plying on the Western front. It was felt that 
the storm was brewing, and it was asked in 
alarm whether the American Army was going 
to be in time for the battle of 1918. Already 
for some time it had been quite certain that the 
American Army would not be in time for the 
spring campaign. 

Evidently the problem of tonnage was the 
foremost question of the hour. It was dis- 
cussed both in official and non-official circles, 
but only for the purpose of deploring it; and 
no practical solution resulted from these purely 
negative arguments. 

Many vast ship-yards were swarming with 
activity, rushing forward the construction of 
the fleet of the future, — but this fleet could not 
possibly be made ready by the spring of 1918. 

The truth was that no one dared to face 
frankly and resolutely the problem which oc- 
cupied the thoughts of everybody, without a 
single person arising who seemed qualified to 



104 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

solve it, notwithstanding that it was the biggest 
problem of the war. 

We recall that during the winter of 1917-18 
at Washington, one of the most distinguished 
general officers of the American Army, who 
well deserved to be called " the father of the 
new army," expressed himself as follows : " I 
am turning over to you here this army of a 
million men, organized and trained as you wish 
it to be. AVhat are you going to do with it? 
There are no vessels to take it across." 

Since the study of the problem of trans- 
portation had not yet been attacked by the 
nations in common, there was only one answer 
to make : namely, that a difficult problem is not 
necessarily an insoluble problem, and that 
there must be a solution for this one. Surely, 
the President of the United States woiild not 
have approved a military plan, without regard 
for the possibility of its execution, and more 
specifically the possibilities of transportation. 

But we repeat that it was a problem which 
had to be worked out in common, with the firm 
resolve to solve it, even at the cost of priva- 
tions and suffering, even though it hurt private 
interests and wounded individual pride. But, 
in this as in many other things, before we could 
all be brought to agree upon the application 



ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 105 

of the principle, it required the intervention of 
another: the Enemy! That was what hap- 
pened in 1918. 

VI. Great Administrative Reforms 

We have seen how cumbersome and com- 
phcated the central military administration 
was, incapable of prompt decisions and with- 
out effective control over their execution. 

The reforms required were too profound to 
be the work of a single day; but at least they 
were the work of a single man. 

The Secretary of War has often been re- 
proached for not having accomplished these 
reforms earlier. But we should not forget the 
circumstances imder which these reforms had 
to be conceived, studied and applied. 

The country was at war. Good or bad, the 
central organization was in operation, and its 
task had very soon assumed unforeseen pro- 
portions. It was certainly not easy to accom- 
plish profound modifications in the full swing 
of intensive work, and to replace, not only the 
old administration and its methods, but also 
the men who had in their hands the work of 
preparing the country for war. 

Consequently we should not be too ready to 
criticise. Let us bear in mind that the most 



106 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

desirable reforms, those that were most ob- 
viously demanded in Europe, were often ac- 
complished only thanks to the enemy : that the 
unity of command was the happy consequence 
of the German offensive of March, 1918, and 
that we Frenchmen could not have done 
nearly such big things if the enemy had not 
been within eighty kilometres of Paris! 

The complete reorganization of the War 
Department was the result of a series of resolu- 
tions taken in the course of the winter of 1917- 
18, and more particularly the period extending 
from December 15th to February 15th. 

They found practical expression in the estab- 
lishment of a War Council, and the reorgani- 
zation of the Ordnance Department on a new 
basis, in the reorganization of the Quarter- 
master Corps, and above all in the complete 
reform of the General Staif , on February 7th, 
1918, which covers all the others. 

The creation of a War Council on December 
20th satisfied the public demand for a coordi- 
nation of the efforts of the different branches 
included in the War Department. 

In point of fact, the chief effect of this meas- 
ure was to make it possible to replace certain 
department heads, especially in view of the 
fact that in the complete recasting of the Gen- 



ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 107 

eral Staff, accomplished six weeks later, this 
War Council was destined to play only a sec- 
ondary role under the Chief of Staff, whom it 
was supposed to aid in his tasks. The reor- 
ganization of the Ordnance Department had 
an entirely different significance. For the 
first time the technical services and those of 
administration were definitely separated from 
the producing services; and a rational method 
was to be followed in establishing the pro- 
grammes for materials and munitions. 

The Administrative Office or Central 
Bureau had charge of these. 

The Engineering Bureau next inspected 
them from the technical point of view, and 
passed them on to the Procurement Division. 

The duty of this division was to place the 
orders of fabrication; and that of the Pi^o- 
duction Division was to assure their execution. 
The Inspection Division received the finished 
materials (guns, munitions, etc.), and the 
Supply Division distributed them. 

The heads of these several departments were 
either Regular Army officers or business men. 
according as their respective duties involved 
questions of ordering and accepting, or merely 
of inspection and production. 

In view of the necessary relations which the 



108 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Ordnance Department must hold with the cor- 
responding services of the French General 
Staff, the Secretary of War, in accord with 
the High Commissioner of the French Re- 
public had prescribed the establishment of a 
constant and trustworthy reciprocal liaison. 

By the spring of 1918 the Ordnance Depart- 
ment was well organized and well informed, 
and thoroughly equipped to perform its duties 
under satisfactory conditions. 

Complaints had been expressed on the sub- 
ject of lack of clothing for the American divi- 
sions, and of irregularities committed in the 
acceptance of contracts (which it was claimed 
were given exclusively to a favored number of 
manufacturers, and often at exorbitant rates). 
These incriminations resulted in reorganizing 
the Quartermaster Department, which corre- 
sponds more less closely to the Frence Service 
de VIntendance, 

The Quartermaster Corps was divided from 
now on into three departments: the first had 
charge of financial questions ; the second of the 
purchases of clothing, equipment and supplies 
of provisions and forage; the third, of trans- 
portation. 

These reorganized departments, as well as 
the newly created " Purchasing Division," 



ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 109 

formed part of the general reorganization of 
the General Staff, which is to be outlined 
below. 

The order for the reorganization of the 
General Staff, signed February 7th, put an 
end to the long discussions and the numerous 
projects of reform studied with infinite care by 
the successive Presidents of the War College, 
It may be summed up as follows : 

(a) The Chief of Staff, assisted by the War 
Council, became really the responsible Chief of 
the Army, and the immediate adviser of the 
Secretary of War upon all matters relating to 
the military establishment. He received pow- 
ers of supervision and of coordination which 
he had never previously had. 

This at last remedied the lack of a High 
Command, which General Scott had already 
pointed out when relinquishing his duties as 
Chief of Staff, and which had heavily handi- 
capped the United States in her new military 
organizations undertaken for war. 

(b) The General Staff, which hitherto had 
played only the role of counsellor, called upon 
to make recommendations without even being 
informed in many cases to what extent they 
had been followed, henceforth was to take an 
effective part in administration. It was sub- 



110 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

divided, to facilitate the work, into five divi- 
sions, each having at its head a Chief respon- 
sible for his particular service, with the title of 
Assistant to the Chief of Staff. 

1. The First Division, or " Executive Divi- 
sion," was in reality a sort of military cabinet 
for the Chief of Staff, having the function of 
coordinating and controling the action of the 
other divisions. Its Chief should act for the 
Chief of Staff or the Acting Chief of Staff 
during their respective absences. 

2. The " War Plans Division " charged 
with the investigation of the general organiza- 
tion of the Army, the projects for National 
Defense, and the development of methods of 
training, was constituted by the War College, 
whose role thus found itself defined by this 
new organization. 

3. The " Purchase and Supply Division " 
merely sanctioned the existence of the Service 
previously constituted under the Chief of Staff 
for the purpose of supervising and directing 
all the contracts approved by the various de- 
partments of the Army. 

4. The " Storage and Traffic Division," in 
which was merged the " Embarkation Divi- 
sion," created in 1917; this division was 
charged with all the transportation of troops 



ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 111 

as well as of all munitions and other supplies 
for the Army both on land and sea, with ex- 
tensive powers of control. Its duties assumed 
the dimensions of an enormous task. 

5. Lastly, the "Army Operations Division," 
under the orders of a Director of Operations, 
superintended the recruiting, mobilization and 
plans of transportation. 

In order to remedy the excessive centraliza- 
tion which has often paralyzed the action of 
the War Department and has given rise to 
criticisms, sometimes justifiable, the Secretary 
of War and the Chief of Staff himself dele- 
gated a portion of their powers to the Division 
Heads. The latter were henceforward au- 
thorized to issue to their own Services all orders 
or instructions proceeding logically from the 
orders they themselves had received. 

There was no mention made in this new 
organization either of the Adjutant General 
or of the Director of Instruction: since the 
existence of the first had never ceased to create 
an unfortunate duplication of the role of Chief 
of Staff; while the recent creation of the sec- 
ond had fallen far short of procuring the ad- 
vantages expected. Apparently, in order to 
remedy a bad institution, in pursuance of 
which the authority of the Adjutant General 



112 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

was too often exerted at the expense of that of 
the Chief of Staff, if not in opposition to him, 
it had been decided to reduce quietly and with- 
out change of law the role of the former to 
what it ought to be, thus securing to the Chief 
of Staff the power he ought always to have 
had. 

These important reforms, which were to be 
completed by others in the course of 1918, 
represented a considerable progress over the 
past. The sound principles of every military 
organization had been here embodied. It still 
remained to apply them, and no matter how the 
problem was faced, they were always driven 
back to the inevitable necessity of finding a 
real Chief of Staff. 

But Mr. Baker had already discovered the 
man who, next to himself, would be of the 
right dimensions to draw with him irresistibly 
into action all the half-hearted and the ob- 
structionists, and he had decided in advance to 
place him at the head of the newly created 
General Staff. 

General Peyton C. March, who had for five 
months commanded the Artillery of the Ex- 
peditionary Force in France, was then on his 
way back to Washington. At the request of 
Secretary Baker, and in the higher interest of 



ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 113 

the Army, General Pershing had consented to 
let him go. 

It would be unfair to terminate this account 
of the effort of military preparation accom- 
plished in the United States, without mention- 
mg the aid spontaneously offered to the Ameri- 
can Government by the most eminent minds 
and distinguished personalties in science, in- 
dustry and commerce. All these men aban- 
doned their personal affairs with fine dis- 
interestedness in order to devote themselves to 
those of their country. We encountered them 
on numerous committees then working in close 
relation with the administrative departments, 
constantly searching to augment the sum of 
their useful information, and always ready to 
welcome suggestions that might be helpful. 

Their action had a direct influence upon the 
public frame of mind, which was becoming 
steadily more inflamed over the problems of 
the war ; and it was possible to watch the birth 
of a new public spirit that fully justified the 
declaration of President Wilson: 

" It is not an army we must shape and train 
for war, it is a nation! " 



CHAPTER IV 

The Preparation in France 

General Pershing had no sooner arrived in 
France than he found himself confronted by a 
task so great that it might well have been 
anxiously asked how he would succeed in ac- 
complishing it. He was destined to work in 
a perpetual atmosphere of battle, without 
knowing either how much time or how many 
troops he would have at his disposal — so 
largely did the future of the American Army 
still remain an unknown quantity. General 
Pershing himself had to decide on the data of 
the problem, at a time when the essential means 
to solve it, the men, the materiel and the ships, 
were not to be had. 

Kitchener had ample time, from the outset 
of 1915, to organize his armies in England, and 
put them in readiness for the battle of the 
Somme, on July 1st, 1916. Yet those armies 
passed through a harsh apprenticeship during 
the opening days of the offensive. He had at 
his command for building them up, established 
means of organization and training, factories 
fully running, officers and non-commissioned 

114 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 115 

officers trained by war, and a method of war- 
fare tested by experience. The transport of 
the armies across the Channel was assured, and 
their employment by the Staff of the British 
Army, at the front since 1914, was relatively 
easy. 

General Pershing had many more difficul- 
ties to overcome, as everything was lacking at 
one and the same time, and he himself was 
thousands of miles away from his base. It 
was no part of his task to organize the em- 
barkation ports in the United States, or the 
trans-atlantic line of communication; but he 
undertook at once the development of the ports 
of debarkation in France, and the lines of rail- 
road communication from these ports towards 
his future sector of battle, at the same time 
that he was working out the general plan, 
which Washington awaited from him. 

But for the successful accomplishment of 
this work, on which would depend the future 
of the American Army, he was assisted by a 
Staff still far too small, while the officers com- 
posing it still had everything to learn regard- 
ing the European war. In judging his work, 
it is necessary to bear constantly in mind the 
almost incompatible conditions under which 
he was obliged to plan, decide and act. 



116 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

The uncertainty which still involved the final 
plans of the United States Government, and 
more especially threatened the chances of 
carrying them out, rendered the necessary 
collaboration with the Allied Staffs a very 
delicate matter. 

The latter, accustomed for three years to 
draw up periodically the balance sheet of the 
belligerant forces, to serve as a basis for the 
decisions of the Allied High Command in the 
choice of its plan of action, wished to know 
definitely what American forces would be 
available. Such knowledge was all the more 
essential to them because of the necessity of 
making provisions for the debarkation and 
land transportation of the troops and supplies 
of the American Army, without interrupting 
their own. General Pershing could not sup- 
ply the statements, for although he knew quite 
well what he needed, he was not yet at all sure 
what could be furnished him. 

The calling of recruits, the problems of 
equipment and of tonnage were not within his 
control; and as for the rest, even when it was 
decided at Washington to satisfy all his de- 
sires, they did not fail, at the same time, to call 
attention to the fact that his " recommenda-^ 
tions " were not orders! 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 117 

On the other hand, the ignorance in which 
the Staff officers and, more generally speak- 
ing, the Allied and Associated nations as a 
whole had lived in regard to one another, was 
not of a nature to remove difficulties. The 
only thing which does not change, and very 
happily cannot be changed, even in war, is the 
national character of each people. At the 
same time, it is essential between Allies to have 
a thorough mutual understanding, if they are 
to avoid offending one another's national pride 
through ignorance. How many misunder- 
standings and errors might easily arise for no 
other reason than that America and France 
lacked mutual acquaintance and under- 
standing ! 

Let us have the courage to admit that such 
misunderstandings and such mistakes did 
occur. But it must be added that they never 
lessened the activity, the willingness and the 
energy employed in the pursuit of a common 
ideal. In war-time, things apparently most 
simple become difficult; and it is the first step 
in good warfare to surmount difficulties as they 
arise, either at the rear or at the front. 

It was to conquer these difficulties that the 
energy and the tenacity of General Pershing 
were employed during the eight months at his 



118 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

command, from July, 1917, to March, 1918. 
At the beginning he installed himself in Paris, 
in close contact with the chief Services with 
which he would have to conduct his business, 
and there he organized his Staff. Meanwhile, 
he himself visited the front in order to form 
his personal opinion regarding the military 
situation, and the respective conditions of the 
armies actively engaged. 

In September, 1917, he definitely established 
his General Headquarters at Chaumont, be- 
hind that sector of the front which was destined 
to belong eventually to his army. This de- 
cision, based, no doubt, on serious considera- 
tions of a military order, removed his Staff and 
his Services too far from the corresponding 
branches of the Allied armies. Some form of 
permanent connection was imperative. The 
means adopted to secure such connection was 
not perhaps the best possible, but some form 
had to be adopted, and this is not the place to 
discuss it. 

The French Commander in Chief detailed a 
Commission at Chaumont, to work at the dis- 
position of the American Staff, but which had 
no connection with the other French Services 
called upon to render assistance to the Ameri- 
can Army — in other words, the Services of 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 4Lx 

the Interior (Ministry of War, Ministry of 
Munitions, etc.), nor with the Commission of 
Information at Washington. Whatever ser- 
vices were rendered by the French Commission 
at Chaumont to the Army of the United States 
— services loyally recognized and appreciated 
by the American Staff — it was not qualified 
to coordinate the other Departments concerned 
in the organization and formation of this army, 
both in the United States and in France. An 
attempt had been made to achieve such condi- 
tions for all Administrative business resulting 
from the presence of American troops in 
France. In December, 1917, M. Clemenceau 
had created the Central Office of Franco- 
American Affairs, and attached it to the 
" Presidence du Conseil," thanks to which all 
the administrative affairs were handled, when I 
involving litigation, by men who had had ex- 
perience in both countries. Its Chief, M. 
Ganne, had worked for ten months in America, 
and in conjunction with Americans. 

But at the moment when the arrival of the , 
troops increased the importance of the ques- 
tions to be settled, it seemed to the French 
Premier : 

1. That coordinating authority should be 
extended in France to all organizations ; 



120 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 




That this same coordinating authority 
should also direct the cooperation of France 
and America in the United States ; 

3. That in order to realize these two condi- 
tions, the coordinating authority should be 
exercised by the Government itself through 
one of its own members. 

Then it was that M. Clemenceau, zealous 
partisan of unity of control in the work of co- 
operation as well as in the conduct of a battle, 
entrusted M. Andre Tardieu, High Commis- 
sioner of the Republic at Washington, with the 
higher functions of General Commissioner of 
Franco- American Affairs of War at Paris. 

From this moment, even if all difficulties 
were not fully overcome, they were at least 
greatly simplified. But up to this time good 
will, industry, perseverance, and sense of duty 
on the part of both the French and American 
Staffs, had made up for defects of the organi- 
zation in which their productive activity was 
exercised. 

The debarkation of the American Army was 
effected, as had been arranged, at the ports of 
Brest, Saint-Nazaire, Nantes, La Pallice and 
Bordeaux. But these five ports offered at the 
outset possibilities for the landing of not more 
than 10,000 tons a day. Extensive improve- 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 121 

merits were required to raise this figure to 
60,000 tons, to meet the needs of a milHon men. 
The American General Staff imdertook these 
without delay. 

From these ports or maritime bases, two 
lines of communication were established lead- 
ing to the army zone : 

The northern line, following the itinerary of 
Saint-Nazaire, Nantes, Tours, Bourges, 
Nevers, Dijon and Is-sur-Tille, with a branch 
line running from Brest to Tours via Le Mans, 
and another from La Pallice to Saumur via 
Niort; 

The southern line, following the Bordeaux- 
Limoges route, joined the northern line at 
Bom'ges. 

It had been provided, in case the Bourges- 
Nevers-Dijon line should not suffice for the 
traffic, that a part of it could be transferred to 
the Bourges-Auxerre-Chaumont line, and 
hence over the line running through Tours, 
Orleans, Troyes and Chaumont. 

A plan for work destined to increase the 
capacity of the French railway lines required 
for lines of communication for the American 
Army, was worked out and promptly put into 
effect. 

At the start the chief difficulties arose from 



1^2 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

a lack of rolling stock, worn out by three and a 
half years of war, and from the small force of 
railway men already overworked. General 
Pershing did not fail, as early as the month of 
July, 1917, to call the attention of his Govern- 
ment to these conditions, and to request the 
working force and the railway material which 
he judged it essential to obtain from America. 

For that matter, the organization of the first 
railway regiments had been undertaken on the 
advice of INIarshal Joffre, and their despatch 
to France stood at the head of the list in the 
order of priority of transportation. 

Along the lines of communication General 
Pershing caused important depots to be con- 
structed, especially in the centre of France, at 
Tours, Bourges and Never s, in which to main- 
tain a three-months' supj)ly of food for the 
entire force landed in France. 

This general plan answered perfectly to all 
existing needs, and had all the desirable elastic- 
ity to meet the future requirements of the Ex- 
peditionary forces. 

The direction of this Expeditionary force 
was assured by a staff that was steadily becom- 
ing better and better prepared for the task 
which the very near future held in reserve 
for it. 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 123 

After having established his general Head- 
quarters at Chaumont, General Pershing, fac- 
ing the problem to be solved in both its aspects, 
that of the front and that of the rear, separated 
his General Headquarters into two groups. 

At Chaumont he maintained his General 
Staff properly so-called, with a representative 
of each of the Services. 

At Tours he grouped all those Services 
whose activities are behind the front, in prox- 
imity to the organizations in connection with 
which they would be called upon to act directly. 

Those who visited the American Staff in the 
month of March, 1918, will recall having met 
there a large number of distinguished officers 
accomplishing enormous tasks, although still 
hampered by the extent and novelty of the 
problems they were daily called upon to solve. 

The problem of training engrossed them 
beyond all else. It was inseparable from the 
question of employing the troops in action; 
and it was only natural to wonder whether the 
American Staff would not prefer to wait until 
the year 1918 in order to bring into action a 
first army of some 15 divisions capable of play- 
ing a big part from the moment of its appear- 
ance at the front. 

Although at first sight this was of a nature 



1^4 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

to flatter national pride, it would have been a 
dangerous decision. For the training of a 
unit intended for offensive battle could not be 
considered satisfactory in a war like this one, 
unless it had been previously war-hardened by 
an interval of training at the front. Accord- 
ingly, it was decided that the American Army 
was to enter action progressively, and not as a 
whole. 

Such was General Pershing's decision, and 
as early as the end of the summer of 1917 he 
adopted the true formula capable of shorten- 
ing as much as possible the period of his army's 
preparation behind the front. The dominant 
idea was bold but sound. It consisted of con- 
ducting the training from the small units up- 
ward, by giving them experience at the front, 
and placing their officers as soon as possible 
face to face with their responsibilities on the 
enemy front. 

These periods of training in active combat 
had to be conducted with special precautions to 
avoid disasters; and the method adopted was 
by placing these smaller units in Allied units 
of a larger type. There was no question of 
" amalgamation," as has been wrongly stated, 
and this word never should have been uttered, 
because amalgamation might seem to imply the 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 125 

creation of Allied mixed units, a method which 
could not be reconciled with the principle of 
forming an autonomous army. It was simply 
a question of temporarily brigading the Ameri- 
can troops with those of the Allies, for the pur- 
pose of giving General Pershing war-hardened 
American units from which to make an Ameri- 
can Army ready for immediate action. 

To this end, the divisions debarking in 
France, were at first grouped in carefully 
chosen and prepared cantonment zones, either 
within the army zone (in the regions of Neuf- 
chateau, Langres, Bar-sur-Aube,^ Chatillon- 
sur- Seine), or in the interior zone (chiefly for 
the base divisions), in proximity to the lines 
of communication starting from the ports. An 
exception was made in the case of the Artillery 
brigades, which were gathered together in 
camps especially equipped for the purpose of 
intensive service practice (at Valdahon, Coet- 
quidan, Meucon, Souge, La Courtine) . 

Thus, the American Army had at its dis- 
posal for its installation in France 35 canton- 
ment zones representing a total area of 15,750 
square kilometres, 43 barracks, not including 
forts, 17 temporary camps and 6 artillery 
camps. 

For the completion of existing instalktiou it 



126 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

received a supply of barrack and camouflage 
materiel, which included more than 4,500 huts 
of various types, and amounted to the sum of 
approximately fifty million francs. 

The sanitary organization was developed 
side by side with the other material installa- 
tions, and the American Staff had at its dis- 
posal, in addition to its own establishment, 
30,000 beds in the French hospitals, and ac- 
commodations for 100,000 in large establish- 
ments, such as colleges and hotels. 

We have seen that on their arrival in Europe 
the divisions were already formed, but that it 
still remained to complete their equipment, 
and more especially their training. 

General Pershing, with the approval of the 
French High Command, decided to have them 
pass through the following cycle, consisting of 
four stages: 

1. The training of the elementary units of 
each branch, up to the Regiment (two to three 
months), in separate camps for the Infantry 
and for the Artillery; 

2. First sojourn on sectors by regiments, 
brigaded with French divisions (about a 
month) , the regiment having its own flag, rep- 
resentative of its identity as an American unit, 
>vhich was not in any case to be lost sight of; 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 127 

3. The reunion of the whole division in camp 
for its training as an organized division ( about 
one month) ; 

4. The taking over of a calm sector by the 
division (indeterminate period). 

To sum up, a division was considered as pre- 
pared to hold a division sector with all its re- 
quired operations, within about five months 
after disembarking. 

There were, as we have seen, the strongest 
incentives for reducing this time. General 
Pershing did not fail to do so, and from the 
moment when the battle was raging, he did not 
hesitate to shorten or even to omit certain 
phases of the programme which he had orig- 
inally and very logically established. 

In 1917 the training of American divisions 
was undertaken with the collaboration of the 
French General Staff, and of the French 
Army itself, since the first divisions that were 
landed were intermingled with the French 
divisions in the same camps. 

Later, as the number of American in- 
structors gradually increased, they stopped 
giving to the newly landed divisions more than 
a few French demonstration units, and some 
fifteen advising officers. 

Finally, these divisions went to the front, 



128 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

accompanied by a small group of selected 
French officers. 

The training of officers and that of the 
special American Services was given in numer- 
ous schools which General Pershing organized 
in 1917, and which were in full operation in 
1918. They may be grouped under three 
heads : 

1. Schools for the training of officers or 
candidates for each branch, the most important 
of which was the Artillery School at Saumur;^ 

2. Corps Schools, comprising a group of 
schools for each Army Corps ; 

3. Army Schools, grouped for the most part 
at Langres, and in particular the Staff School. 

These various establishments were expected 
to furnish several hundred officers per month 
at first, and several thousand per month later. 

In speaking of the military effort in the 
United States, we have already emphasized the 
superior quality of the men composing General 
Pershing's Army. 

The man in the ranks was a good soldier, 
vigorous, agile, intelligent, attentive under 



1 This school, the organization of which had been recom- 
mended as early as the month of May, 1917, by the American 
Military Mission at Paris, with the approval of the French 
General Staff, was remarkably equipped. It comprised no 
less than forty French officers among its teachers. 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 129 

training, vigilant in the trenches and of great 
endurance. There was some lack of discipline 
at the start, but the American Command took 
the most energetic methods to correct this 
defect promptly. The Subaltern officer was 
full of spirit and eager to learn and to fight; 
he had almost everything to learn at the same 
time that he was expected to train his own 
troops; but thanks to his boundless energy he 
was trained quickly and well. 

Undoubtedly what remained General Persh- 
ing's most difficult task was the formation of 
the Staff and Field officers, for regular army 
officers were few in number, and a certain time 
was required even in their case to bring their 
training up-to-date. In point of fact, it was 
the lack of training of the newl}^ formed Staff, 
and the inexperience of the special Services 
which constituted the weak point in these fine 
divisions. 

It must be acknowledged, however, and 
many French and British officers were agree- 
ably surprised, that the American Staffs made 
rapid progress at the front. By confining 
themselves at first to small operations care- 
fully prepared, they sought to test by results 
the practicality of what they had learned, and 
very quickly acquired self-confidence. On the 



130 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

other hand, the time was approaching when 
the disorganization of the German units in the 
last phase of the war, was destined to help 
these American Staffs to fulfil the role for 
which they had done their best to prepare 
themselves, but which demands, no matter 
what one does, several months of apprentice- 
ship. 

To sum up, at the outset of 1918, General 
Pershing lacked nothing but the rapid arrival 
of troops to fulfil the vast prograrmne that he 
had set himself. 

His bases were improved; 

His communications were well established; 

The training was at the high tide of activity 
and productiveness. 

His last recommendations to Washington 
relative to the coordination of instruction in the 
United States and in France, were intended to 
affect an important gain in time, by reducing 
or suppressing the first stage of training, pro- 
vided for the small units after their debarka- 
tion. 

It was at this moment that the character 
assumed by the campaign of 1918 determined 
the intensive current of American transporta- 
tion, and induced General Pershing to engage 



PREPARATION IN FRANCE 131 

all his available troops at the side of the Allied 
armies, with a spirit of decision and abnegation 
which will remain one of his finest claims to 
glory among so many others. 



CHAPTER V 

MiLiTAHY Situation on the Western 
Front in March, 1918 

Waiting for the Great German Offensive 

At the moment when the indecisive cam- 
paign of 1917 came to an end, with the halt of 
the British Army's victorious operations in 
Flanders and the disaster in Italy, the Revolu- 
tion in Petrograd had brought the Bolscheviks 
into power, and had stricken Russia from the 
number of the belligerents. 

Released henceforward from the Russian 
front, and having strengthened the position of 
their Austrian allies in Italy, the Germans 
undertook their preparations for the campaign 
of 1918 by concentrating the greater part of 
their forces on the Anglo-French front. 

By transporting these forces at an average 
monthly rate of between 12 and 13 divisions, 
Germany had, by the beginning of March, 
1918, assembled 195 divisions in France, in 
place of the 146 she had had there in Novem- 
ber, 1917. 

The German General Staff, confident of a 
swift success, considered this figure of 195 divi- 

1S2 



WESTERN FRONT — MARCH, 1918 133 

sions as quite sufficient for engaging battle, 
especially as they had the assurance that they 
could increase it by bringing new units from 
the East, and by employing the class of 1919. 

These movements of troops by rail could not 
be effected without being observed by the 
Allies, but the redistribution of divisions be- 
hind the front left the Allies in doubt, up to 
the last moment, as to the direction of the prin- 
cipal offensive chosen by the German General 
Staff. 

Meanwhile, the Allied General Staffs, con- 
scious of the danger threatening the Entente 
through the defection of Russia, had ever since 
the month of November, 1917, been studying 
the means for checkmating the German offen- 
sive on the Western front. 

On November 19th General Foch, at that 
time Chief of the General Staff of the French 
Army, set forth the conditions of the problem 
and the solution which he favored, insisting 
upon the necessity first of all of strengthening 
the forces of the Entente armies, redistributing 
the reserves, perfecting their defensive organi- 
zations, and lateral communications ; and lastly, 
of formulating an offensive plan for 1918, and 
undertaking its preparation. But he was at 
that time only the Chief of Staff of the French 



IM AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Army, and while he was able to express his 
views, he was not in position to give his orders. 
Accordingly, it was only the first part of his 
programme that was then carried out. 

In a series of deliberations of the Inter- 
Allied Supreme Council of War, held at Ver- 
sailles, the successive steps were determined in 
the defensive portion of the plan for which 
General Foch had indicated the general lines. 

The Belgian Army was reorganized and re- 
inforced.^ 

Italy's Army, with the aid of her allies, was 
reconstructed in 51 divisions, in place of the 
65 which it had comprised before the disaster 
of Caporetto, and resumed the training of its 
units in the course of the winter of 1917-1918. 

The Anglo-French armies developed the 
defensive equipment of their front, and worked 
out the problem of reenforcement, in case of 
need, by calling from the reserves of one or the 
other of their armies. 

The French Army, at the cost of heavy 
sacrifices, accepted by the nation, maintained 
the number of its large units, and comprised 
at the opening of 1918: 

99 divisions in France, 5 in Italy, 8 at 
Salonica; 

1 Its six army divisions formed practically twelve divisions. 



i 



WESTERN FRONT — MARCH, 1918 135 

2,579,600 men on the French front; 

141,000 men on the Italian front; 

228,400 men on the Salonica front.^ 

The British Army, not having sufficient re- 
sources immediately available to complete its 
divisions, reduced their composition, and was 
consequently diminished by 186 batallions. It 
awaited battle with a shortage which its regi- 
mental depots could not fill. 

Lastly, several Anglo-French divisions were 
still maintained on the Italian front, Italy fur- 
nishing in exchange 80,000 laborers for the 
Anglo-French armies. 

To sum up, the Allied Armies on the Anglo- 
French front were about to meet the onslaught 
of the German armies with an initial inferiority 
of about 33 divisions.^ 

The general public had no suspicion of this ; 
and perhaps it would have been difficult to 



2 France which, since 1914, had mobilized 7,570,000 men, still 
counted in January, 1918, 5,286,300 mobilized men distributed 
as follows: 3,239,800 combatants, including her colonies; 
356,500 men in hospitals; 841,000 men (including 226,000 from 
the auxiliary service) mobilized in war industries; 849,000 
men (including 335,000 from the auxiliary service) mobilized 
in other corps and troops of the Interior Economy service. 

3 On the Anglo-French front, on March 21st: France, 97 
divisions; England, 47; Belgium, 12; Portugal, 2; America, 4 
(not fully trained) ; total, 162 divisions, as against 195 German 
divisions. 

In Italy: 5 French divisions; 5 British divisions. 
At Salonica: 8 French divisions; 6 British divisons. 



136 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

confess it to them. They were painfully sur- 
prised when it later became known. 

However, if an estimation had been made of 
all the Allied resources in men, British, French 
and Belgian, even without counting the Ameri- 
can forces yet to come from the United States, 
they would have surpassed the utmost that Ger- 
many appeared able to muster for the year 
1918.* But, in order to use their maximum 
strength, the Entente Powers would have had 
to decide irrevocably to stake their all at the 
beginning of 1918, and at any cost to fight the 
decisive battle of the war in the course of that 
year. 

This resolution was not taken until later in 
the midst of the battle, and under the inspira- 
tion of the great military Chief, who pro- 
ceeded to carry it out with unalterable deter- 
mination to the day of the armistice, Novem- 
ber 11th, 1918. 

At the opening of 1918 there was no ques- 
tion of doing this. The two Commanders in 
Chief, of Great Britain and of France, judged 
that the state of their forces did not permit 



4 Estimate of resources in men at the outset of 1918: 
France, 682,000 men ; England, 764,000 men ; Belgium, 30,000 

men. Total, 1,476,000 men (to keep up the strength of the 181 

divisions in France), 

Germany alone: 1,085,000 men (to maintain the strength of 

241 divisions). 



WESTERN FRONT — MARCH, 1918 137 

them to undertake any great offensive opera- 
tions, but only to await the attack by Germany. 

If it is true, as Marshal Foch expresses it, 
that " making war consists in attacking," the 
waiting policy could not in any case have led 
to a decisive victory/' 

The second part of the plan that he had pro- 
posed on November 19th, the offensive part, 
had not even been entertained. 

Nevertheless the Allied and Associated Gov- 
ernments, impressed by the necessity of at 
least preparing a strong response to the Ger- 
man offensive, decided to constitute an Inter- 
Allied Reserve, to be held at the disposition of 
the Executive Committee of the Supreme 
Council of War, of which General Foch was 
named President. 

This half-measure constituted only a timid 
step on the road to that unity of command 
which was universally recognized as necessary, 
but was still encountering powerful opposition. 

In point of fact the general reserve was 
never constituted, and the Executive Commit- 

5 The disadvantages of the defensive strategy are brought 
out clearly by the follovi'ing figures: 

The defensive at Verdun, from February 21st to July 15th, 
absorbed 62 divisions. 

The offensive of the Somnie, from July 1st to November 1st, 
absorbed 44 divisions. 

Verdun cost us 350,000 men. 

The Somme cost us 195,000 men. 



138 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

tee at Versailles was too short lived to show 
its inefficiency. 

It was the Battle, that is to say, the supreme 
form of dramatic action, which leaves no place 
either for the deliberation of Governments or 
for those of a Council of War, or even of an 
Executive Committee, Battle which must be 
lost or won, which a number of leaders can 
always lose, but which only a single leader is 
capable of winning, that was preparing, in the 
very midst of our discussions and with implac- 
able rigor, to recall each one of us to reality! 



CHAPTER VI 

Situation of the American Army in 
March, 1918 

RESULTS OBTAINED BY ONE YEAR OF PREPARATION 

The American Army on the Eve of Battle 

It will be remembered that the Government 
of the United States had early in the year 1917 
planned for the armament and maintenance of 
an army of 3,000,000 men, to be achieved 
within two years. The first part of this pro- 
gramme consisted, in pursuance of General 
Pershing's request, in forming, equipping and 
transporting to the Western front an army of 
1,200,000 men. 

Now on January 1st, 1918, the United 
States Army had increased only to a total of 
1,325,000 men, a figure still too low to assure 
the carrying out of the programme of 1918. 

Consequently new drafts had to be called. 

Out of the total 42 divisions as yet organ- 
ized, 8 of which were Regular Army, 17 Na- 
tional Guard and 17 National Army, only 6 
had been landed in France. Four of these 
were fighting divisions: the First and Second 

139 



140 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Divisions of Regulars, whose training was fin- 
ished and who were holding a calm sector in 
the Woevre ; the 26th and 42d Divisions of the 
National Guard, who were completing their 
term at the front, as separate regiments, in the 
main body of the French army; and two divi- 
sions for training, base or replacement duties : 
the 41st and 33d of the National Guard, not 
yet completed. 

Consequently 36 divisions still remained in 
the training camps in the United States: 
6 of the Regular Army ; 

13 of the National Guards ; 

17 of the National Army (including one 
division of colored troops, whose composition 
was yet to be determined) . 

The equipment of these units was far from 
complete, because of the time required to get 
the war manufactures in full operations, 
especially that of material and munitions for 
the artillery. While a large output could con- 
fidently be looked for from the American 
plants in the future, it was the part of pru- 
dence — as events proved — not to depend 
upon them for artillery before the end of the 
year 1918. 

Consequently the American divisions left 
the United States with a very meagre arma- 



AMERICAN ARMY — MARCH, 1918 141 

ment, and upon landing in France received 
from the French factories their artillery equip- 
ment, and a large part of the other indispensa- 
ble supplies. The result was that certain 
units, particularly the Artillery regiments, 
were obliged after debarkation to go through a 
period of organization before entering upon or 
continuing their training. 

The vast Aviation programme for which the 
United States had voted impressive sums, a 
X3rogramme w^hich they took pride in having 
conceived and on the accomplishment of which 
public opinion had naively based the hope of 
an easy victory, — this programme had suf- 
fered delays which compromised its success. 
On the one hand, the spirit of innovation, and 
on the other, the search for types adapted to 
American industrial methods had resulted in 
producing practically nothing. Profitable 
efforts were concentrated, and rightly, on the 
Liberty motor, throughout many months ; but 
the motor was not yet perfected; nor was it 
destined to be, until the close of the summer 
of 1918. 

So it was also France which furnished the 
greater part of the Aviation equipment, and 
must face the prospect of continuing to fur- 
nish an important part of it even in 1919. 



142 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

However, thanks to a clear understanding of 
this industrial cooperation, the entry of the 
American army into action remained essen- 
tially dependent upon its training and trans- 
portation, and not upon its equipment. 

Wliat was destined to be the value of Ameri- 
can intervention, assuming that it should take 
place in time ? It was already possible to fore- 
tell this. 

The regular divisions had at first been sacri- 
ficed to the organization of the National Guard 
which, in the original plan of transportation, 
was destined to take precedence over the regu- 
lar army. Later, at General Pershing's re- 
quest, it was decided, or at least so it would 
seem, to give preference to regular divisions 
instead. But with the exception of the 3d and 
4th Divisions, which were practically complete, 
the regular divisions had important deficits in 
men (averaging from 80 to 140 to the com- 
pany, instead of 250), in saddlery, and in Ar- 
tillery horses. 

The various staffs of officers were pretty 
nearly complete; those of the Artillery, how- 
ever, were drawn to a large extent from the 
other arms of the service, and had everything 
to learn. It was only the Regular Officers and 



AMERICAN ARMY — MARCH, 1918 143 

those who came from the school at Fort Sill 
who proved themselves first-class instructors. 

Notwithstanding these facts, and in spite of 
being greatly under-officered because of the 
drain upon them made for the benefit of the 
National Guard or the National Army, the 
Regular Divisions had preserved and sustained 
proudly their fine traditions of discipline and 
honor. They were destined to give proof — 
as the 1st and 2d Divisions had already given 
at the front — of a high order of bravery in 
action. 

The organization of the National Guard was 
pretty nearly completed, and its deficiencies 
were confined to its supplies. But in regard to 
the physical quality of the men, it had suffered 
from defective recruiting; and there was an 
obvious lack of discipline which could be reme- 
died only by a careful choice of officers and by 
rigorous training. It was because of such care- 
ful selection and thorough training that the 
26th and 42d Divisions aroused the admiration 
of their French comrades, who refused to dis- 
tinguish them from the Regular Divisions. 

As to the divisions of the National Army re- 
sulting from conscription and recruiting from 
all classes and from every section of the coun- 
try, they included some excellent material. 



lU AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

One cannot fail to regret the preferential 
transfers made from them and the continual 
shifting about, which retarded their organiza- 
tion, interrupted their training and fostered 
a feeling of discouragement among their of- 
ficers. They had in any case serious handicaps 
to overcome. At the same time, their higher 
officers were drawn from the officers of the 
Regular Army, the subalterns were young 
officers coming from instruction camps, and 
fired, as we know, with a splendid spirit. 
Hence it was impossible to doubt for a single 
instant the account that these divisions would 
give of themselves at the front. 

In a general sense, at the moment that the 
campaign of 1918 opened, the individual 
training of the soldier was ended in the United 
States, and that of the special Services very 
nearly so. 

The Artillery was still behindhand, owing 
to lack of equipment, notwithstanding that the 
French Government had obliged the American 
General Staff to accept a shipment of several 
French instruction batteries for use in the 
American training camps. 

The Coast Artillery alone (thanks to having 
always had a responsible head), had been able 



AMERICAN ARMY — MARCH, 1918 145 

to concentrate its means of instruction so as 
to obtain better results. 

The Engineers were a remarkable body of 
men, but still lacked the proper guidance to 
direct their work in accordance with the needs 
of actual warfare. 

In regard to Aviation the fine results ob- 
tained by instruction at the Aviation fields 
could not fail to make one deplore the lack of 
airplanes. The Chiefs of the American Avia- 
tion Corps, entering boldly upon the path of 
progress (since no routine stood in their way), 
had, in steady collaboration with technical ad- 
visers from the Allied armies, organized 
schools that might be held up as models : schools 
for pilots, assistants and aerial gunners which 
made it possible to count by July upon a suffi- 
ciently numerous and thoroughly trained per- 
sonnel. 

To sum up : in all the branches of the army, 
the training of officers and troops had made 
serious progress in the United States ; but they 
had come to a point where the High Command 
must intervene to put an end to the hesitations 
and divergences of views and efforts, which 
unhappily were to be found between one divi- 
sion and another. 

In France, thanks to the facilities for in- 



146 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

struction offered by the proximity of the bat- 
tlefield, and the nearness and close collabora- 
tion of the Allies, together with an abundance 
of material of war, the troops completed their 
training swiftly and thoroughly under General 
Pershing's direction. 

Their respective Staffs worked with a pro- 
found sense of their responsibility and a high 
ideal of their professional duties. 

The first units to go into action exhibited 
solid soldierly qualities. The Infantry showed 
abundant fighting spirit. The Field Artillery 
showed good marksmanship. The Brigade of 
Coast Artillery, trained in the camp at Mailly, 
with French guns mounted on railway trucks, 
gave, wherever it was utilized, complete satis- 
faction. 

In order to hasten the progress of the train- 
ing of the army. General Pershing, as already 
indicated, had arranged to carry it on concur- 
rently in the United States and in France. 
Furthermore, he did not hesitate for an instant 
to modify the regular course, to the end of 
throwing into battle all his available forces. 

Unhappily these available forces depended 
essentially upon tonnage, and the vital ques- 
tion of transporting the army was still far 
from solved. 



AMERICAN ARMY — MARCH, 1918 147 

All advance calculations regarding trans- 
portation had proved erroneous. Existing 
conditions forced the authorities to recognize 
that they were still very far from carrying out 
the plan proposed by General Pershing and 
approved by President Wilson. 

The American public, sustained by the hope 
of immediate improvement, was wholly igno- 
rant of the actual number of troops landed in 
France. It readily believed, beginning with 
the winter of 1917, that the American army 
in Europe already numbered 500,000 men, — 
who could tell? — perhaps even a million! 

Now the rate at which the troops had been 
transported was at most only as follows : 

20,000 men in July, 1917; 
18,000 men in August; 
24,000 men in September; 
16,000 men in October; 
30,000 men in November; 
35,000 men in December; 
50,000 men in January, 1918; 
34,000 men to the 20th of February. 



Total, 227,000 men in France. 

At the close of the year 1917, the official 
schedule at Washington called for the trans- 



148 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

portation of between 70,000 and 100,000 men 
during 1918, and since the press was permitted 
to echo this report the pubHc had a right to 
assume that the estimate was well founded. 

Apparently it would have been a difficult 
task to justify these figures, for the benefit 
from new vessels under construction would not 
begin to be felt before the end of 1918. Now, 
they were as yet only in the month of March, 
and the menace of the German offensive was 
looming large on the horizon. 

The most frightful battle in all history was 
about to be unchained. Of what weight could 
the army of the United States possibly be, if 
the Government at Washington did not at 
all costs solve the question of transports by 
the prompt and effective requisition of the 
merchant marine, and by the cooperation of 
Great Britain? 

It had been endlessly repeated that the year 
1918 was to be the decisive year, that the army 
of the United States, or at least a large part 
of it, must be ready to enter the struggle, that 
there was not a single hour to lose, not a single 
ship to leave idle. 

Now, on February 1, 1918, Marshal Foch, 
awaiting the imminent battle, said to us re- 
garding the American army, " It is s^ big 



AMERICAN ARMY — MARCH, 1918 149 

thing, and yet after all it is very little. A 
force that is of such trifling military value to- 
day will never make an army capable of play- 
ing the grand role predicted by President Wil- 
son, unless some man of exceptional energy, 
some veritable human motor, can stir up the 
people over yonder sufficiently to prevent 
America's missing her train in 1918!" (sic.) 

Beyond a doubt, the American Government 
found itself facing the vastest, most compli- 
cated and most unforeseen military problem 
that any country has ever had to solve in the 
course of a war. 

It was for these reasons that the progress 
made, up to the opening of the year 1918 
could be very differently estimated, according 
to whether one had in mind the starting point 
in the United States in April, 1917, or the 
point achieved in France in March, 1918. But 
in either case the estimate would be misleading, 
since it would depend either upon unreserved 
admiration for the results obtained after start- 
ing from nothing, or upon premature disillu- 
sion at discovering the lack of efficiency of the 
American army on the eve of the battle of 
1918. In the eyes of those who knew the situa- 
tion on both sides of the Atlantic, the vital 
thing was what still remained to be done, start- 



150 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

ing from the results already obtained, in order 
to make quickly available the considerable ex- 
isting resources. 

To be sure, the American forces, ready to be 
sent into action, fell far short of the figure that 
we might have wished; but we French and 
British might well ask whether we ourselves 
had done our utmost to bring our own forces 
up to the maximum on this French front, 
where the future of the world was to be de- 
cided within the next few months ? And could 
anyone deny that the American army, with its 
forty-two divisions each of 27,000 men then be- 
ing trained, its immense national resources, its 
future production of war material, represented 
an irresistible force for the months to come ? 

Only, it was imperative that this army 
should be employed in a sufficiently near future 
for it to serve to reinforce the Allied armies 
and not to replace them. The supreme 
moment was at hand. The hour had come to 
strike hard and to strike together. 

The truth of this was recognized at Wash- 
ington. We have shown that the means 
existed, and that the directing organism had 
been created by Mr. Baker. There lacked only 
a military Chief, a human " motor," to borrow 
the expression of Marshal Foch. Fortunately 



AMERICAN ARMY — MARCH, 1918 151 

the Secretary of War had just Tound such a 
man in the person of the new Chief of Staff, 
General Peyton C. March. And it was thanks 
to these two men in the United States, and to 
General Pershing in France, that the Ameri- 
can army was destined to take part in the battle 
of the western nations. 



CHAPTER VII 

The American Army's March to the Tune 

OF THE Guns 

The formidable offensive, in which Germany 
was about to engulf all her resources, was 
launched on March 21st, on the Picardy front, 
with unexampled amplitude and violence. 

Its aim, as we know, was to split asunder the 
Anglo-French armies thrusting the British 
aside and at the same time opening a road for 
itself to Paris. 

One year, almost to a day, had passed since 
President Wilson placed the resources of his 
country at the service of the cause of humanity, 
to save the honor of the United States and the 
liberty of the world; yet the United States had 
landed in France at most only five or six in- 
completely trained divisions,^ in contrast with 
the hundred and sixty Allied divisions then 
holding back the German onslaught. What 
was General Pershing going to do? 

On March 28th, at the height of the gigantic 

1 Only the 1st and 2d divisions of regulars were ready to 
go into action. 

The 26th and 42d divisions of National Guard had not com- 
pleted their training as organized divisions. 

The remaining two were base and depot divisions not yet 
fully landed. 

152 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 158 

battle, he took action, the full value of which 
was soon to be shown by the events which fol- 
lowed, placing all his troops and his own ser- 
vices at the disposal of General Foch. 

The first division of regulars was forthwith 
sent to General Petain, to be used in the battle 
of Picardy. The second division, and the 26th 
and 42 d of the National Guard each re- 
spectively relieved a French division; four 
regiments from replacement divisions were as- 
signed to a sector. All the Artillery was sent 
to the front. The first colored regiments en- 
tered battle alongside of French troops. 

This was the best that could be done for 
the time being. But the Government of the 
United States was soon going to make it pos- 
sible for General Pershing to do a great deal 
more. 

Did Germany really believe that even 
though the American Army had landed in 
France, it did not mean to participate in the 
final act? 

Was Germany sincere or was she only trying 
to soothe her people's justifiable alarm, when 
she encouraged the most authoritative of her 
military writers to develop the theme of 
"America's Impotence?" 

" The American army does not exist," was 



154i AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

repeated by the German press to the point of 
weariness. " It is neither equipped nor 
trained ; it is totally lacking in officers ; and in 
any case there are no ships to transx)ort it." 

Germany was destined to be swiftly and 
cruelly disillusioned, for America promptly 
gave a startling contradiction to these inspired 
arguments. 

President Wilson concluded a first agree- 
ment with the English Ambassador at Wash- 
ington, Lord Reading, for the exclusive trans- 
portation of Infantry and Machine-gun 
troops, with no other limit than that imposed 
by the available American and British tonnage. 

His speech at Baltimore, fixing in monu- 
mental phrases the goal to be attained and 
the means by which to attain it, formed the 
only answer to Germany's dream of domina- 
tion that the events would warrant : 

" There is, therefore, but one response pos- 
sible from us. Force, force to the utmost, force 
without stint or limit, the righteous and tri- 
umphant force which shall make right the law 
of the world, and cast every selfish dominion 
down in the dust." 

The echo of these strong words crossed the 
Atlantic, and while Germany was beginning 
to be afraid, all France, comparing the speech 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 155 

of President Wilson with General Pershing's 
act, understood what the former meant to say, 
and what the latter was going to do. 

The force of America, " force without stint 
or limit," was henceforth no longer her gold 
nor her unlimited resources, it was her mag- 
nificent human material, the strength of her 
Regular Army, her National Army and Na- 
tional Guard, which General March was weld- 
ing into one and the same great army, " the 
Army of the United States." 

The Allied and Associated nations were pre- 
paring to face the common danger, which was 
uniting them more and more closely, hy pool- 
ing all their resources^, and by a complete appli- 
cation of the principle of cooperation alike on 
sea and on land, in transportation as well as 
in battle. 

Entire fleets, American and British, were 
soon tracing across the Atlantic the great high- 
way of communication between the democra- 
cies of the West. By hundreds of thousands 
of men, these fleets poured the energy of the 
New World into the Old World, to the end 
of saving them both. 

America, marching to the music of the can- 
non, entered battle at the fiercest moment of 
the struggle of nations. Her soldiers for the 



156 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

past twelve months had awaited only the 
chance to measure themselves with the enemy. 

When the great occasion offered itself. Gen- 
eral Pershing, seized it, in such fashion that, 
if the war had terminated on the morrow, this 
act alone would have entitled him to be en- 
rolled in the pages of History. 

But the war was not destined to end on the 
morrow, since it was destined to end only with 
the victory of the Allies; and the Allies must 
check the German onslaught before they could 
themselves pass on to the offensive. But, at 
the very moment when the unity of command 
was an accomplished fact, and entrusted to 
the hands of an undisputed Chief, the act of 
General Pershing had a very high moral effect. 

It signified the opening of " The Battle of 
the Coalition," the battle in which all separate 
interests were to be effaced before the common 
interest, and every energy strained toward the 
primary goal of the war which M. Clemenceau 
defined by a single word, '' Victory I " 

Within a few days during which the Su- 
preme Chief of the Allied armies by a prodigy 
of energy reestablished and strengthened the 
connections between the British and French 
armies, all the decisions which would formerly 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 157 

have demanded weeks or months, were solved 
by the Alhed and Associated Governments. 

The plan of transportation became the ob- 
ject of a series of agreements prompted: on 
the American side, by General Pershing's quite 
legitimate desire to form a large autonomous 
army at the earliest possible moment; on the 
British and French side, by the need of obtain- 
ing the immediate cooperation vital to the 
maintenance and reenf orcement of the fighting 
forces, the Allied General Staffs being con- 
vinced that this temporary brigading of the 
American troops with the French and English 
forces was the swiftest and surest means that 
General Pershing could adopt to form a great 
army capable of measuring itself with the 
Germans. 

The first agreement concluded between 
President Wilson and the English Ambassador 
at Washington, regarding the exclusve trans- 
portation of Infantry and Machine-gun units, 
was replaced by the conventions of April 24th 
and May 3d between Lord Milner and General 
Pershing. 

General Foch, for his part, requested the 
priority of transportation, during three 
months, of a monthly minimum of 120,000 In- 
fantry troops and Machine-gunners, figures 



158 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

which he considered it desirable to increase as 
greatly as possible, — a result which in point 
of fact was achieved. 

In March 64,000 men had been brought 
across. In April 93,000 were transported, 
which was already a perceptible increase over 
the preceding months. In order to meet the 
desires of General Foch, the Governments of 
Great Britain and the United States estimated 
that by pooling their resources they should be 
able to transport : 

By British tonnage: 130,000 troops in May, 
150,000 in June, 150,000 in July; 

By American tonnage: 95,000 troops in 
May, 80,000 in June, 95,000 in July. 

These estimates were exceeded. In place 
of 225,000, 230,000 and 245,000 troops in the 
respective months, they took across 244,000, 
278,000, and 308,000. 

Lastly, on June 1st, the three Governments 
of Great Britain, France and Italy, facing the 
gravity of the situation in Europe, expressed 
their gratitude to President Wilson for the 
rapidity with which the United States had 
come to their aid; and then requested him, in 
in the name of Marshal Foch, to make provi- 
sion for sending over to France a total of 100 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 159 

divisions for the campaign of 1919, at an aver- 
age of 300,000 men per month. 

This demand, far from alarming the Gov- 
ernment and people of the United States, was 
received in a magnificent spirit. " Why should 
the limit be set at five millions?" demanded 
President Wilson, when speaking in New York 
of the futm-e American Army; and the Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs, faithfully in- 
terpreting the will of the people, demanded 
that there should be sent to Europe before 
July, 1919, an army of three million soldiers, 
of which not less than two million should con- 
sist of fighting forces. 

American public sentiment had outstripped 
the desires and the needs of the Allies, as well 
as the decision of its own Government, in af- 
firming that America was ready for all sacri- 
fices and all efforts, with no other limit than 
that of victory. 

In view of such manifestations, has not one 
the right to maintain that democratic govern- 
ments will never regret placing their confidence 
in popular judgment, so long as they are care- 
ful to enlighten the public in accordance with 
their duty? 

America looked forward to the goal: Vic- 
tory, But, whereas as in 1917 she was ignorant 



160 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

of the difficulties to be overcome, in 1918 she 
was fully conscious of the sacrifices that must 
be accepted. She agreed to them in advance, 
with the resolution of a great people who know 
that, in the course of the grave action called 
Battle^ the hours strike victory or defeat, ac- 
cording to the good or bad use that has been 
made of them. 

After having asserted the necessity for unity 
of command, America recognized that a single 
Chief, whatever might be his authority, could 
not conquer all alone, that first of all he must 
be assured of a numerical superiority over his 
adversary. It was this superiority that 
America resolved to provide. 

Beginning with April 29th, thanks to a clear 
vision of the realities of war, some of the worst 
days of which had been lived through by Secre- 
tary Baker himself in France, the weekly Bul- 
letin of the War Department, inspired by a 
fine frankness and a lofty spirit of the common 
good, contained, under the heading, " Imperi- 
ous Duty Incumbent upon the United States," 
the following declaration : 

" Our imperious duty demands that we 
should furnish replacement units for the armies 
fighting in France. We ought to be in a posi- 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 161 

tion to send to the front reinforcements of 
men completely and systematically trained. 

" In addition to those who are already in 
the service of the flag or in the instruction 
camps, and those who have been called into 
service, very important contingents ought to 
be raised within the near future." 

If we weigh the words carefully, this 
amounted to a recognition of the necessity and 
a declaration of the willingness to reinforce 
the Allies in the course of the war, regardless 
of the use that was to be made of these trained 
reinforcements, up to the moment when the 
American Army would be able to intervene in 
the full plentitude of her own resources. 

The British and French training officers, 
conscious of the greatness of the drama which 
was taking place in Europe, redoubled their 
activity and energy in their desire to place 
all their experience at the service of their 
American comrades. 

They strove to complete the tactical training 
of the small units, with a view to their almost 
immediate employment at the front. In the 
divisional camps, they multiplied the exercises 
essential to successful cooperation between the 
separate branches of the service, as well as the 
practical exercises of the Staff officers. Natu- 



162 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

rally, none of them made any pretention of giv- 
ing complete instruction. But they all had the 
conviction that they were laying a solid founda- 
tion for such instruction, that they were facili- 
tating the personal efforts of the American offi- 
cers and that they were saving valuable lives 
to the great sister nation who was their 
associate. 

Without delay. Congress completed the leg- 
islation necessary to make America a for- 
midable military power. The decision having 
been once taken to increase and practically to 
double the army between 1918 and 1919, the 
problem was to find the means, and to avoid 
every hitch in its organization, just as they 
were trying to avoid all delays in transporta- 
tion. 

But it was found that after furnishing the 
men needed to form an army, which in July 
amounted to two and a half million men, the 
category of American citizens subject to con- 
scription under the Act of Congress of May 
18, 1917, would be exhausted by October 1, 
1918. 

It should be remembered that the registra- 
tion held in pursuance of the conscription act 
of 1917 included 9,600,000 registrants. From 
this total the President had authorized the call- 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 163 

ing out of two contingents of 500,000 men each, 
in addition to bringing up to full strength both 
the Regular Army and the National Guard. 
What still had to be done was to change the 
general registration list into an open list in 
which would be enrolled annually the young 
men who had attained the age of twenty-one 
years. 

This measure was taken by the adoption of 
Senator Chamberlain's bill ; and the President 
was authorized : 

1. To order the registration, at a date to be 
assigned by himself, of all male American 
citizens and all male residents in the United 
States who had attained the age of twenty-one 
years since June 5, 1917 (the order for which 
was issued by the President June 5, 1918) . 

2. To prescribe in the course of the following 
years the registration of the new classes under 
the same conditions. 

This was equivalent to establishing a regular 
method of recruiting which would result in an 
automatic increase of the army by annual 
classes. 

The number, however, of young men who 
had reached the military age of twenty-one 
years between June 5th and August 24th, in 
other words, those affected by the law of 1917 



164 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

amounted only to 158,000, out of which only 
78,000 were eligible for service in the army. 

Consequently this measure did not give all 
the resources immediately necessary. Accord- 
ingly the problem, studied in all its aspects, 
was submitted to Congress, which passed a new 
military act that was approved by the Presi- 
dent on August 31st. 

The military age was extended to the limits 
included between 18 and 45 years. 

On September 12th, the day appointed by 
President Wilson for the registration of all 
citizens affected by the new law, the very day 
when the young Army of the United States, 
led by General Pershing in person, won its 
splendid victory at Saint-Mihiel, 14,000,000 
men registered ! 

Out of this number it was calculated that 
more than 2,000,000 would be called out from 
1918 to 1919, to carry out the programme of 
the American General Staff. 

When the law had once been passed, the 
colossal work involved in the important tasks 
of registration, examination, calling out and 
incorporation of the contingents, was directed 
by Provost Marshal Crowder, with a spirit of 
foresight and decision which only his modesty 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 165 

prevents us from heralding and praising to the 
extent that is his due. 

Then, under the impulse given by the 
Secretary of War and by General March, the 
General Staff made preparations for the for- 
midable increase of the Army, the necessary 
issue of calls to the recruits, the enlargement 
of the programmes for war manufactures, and 
the intensification of training in the United 
States. 

It was truly an heroic period, when all 
America with her spirit reaching out toward 
battle as though she caught its far off echo 
from across the seas, finally felt herself in the 
war, and actually was in it. We might then 
have demanded of her to do the impossible : she 
was ready to do it. She was doing it daily, 
since, in spite of the menace of the submarine 
her innumerable convoys laden with troops 
protected by an active, venturesome, intrepid 
Navy, made their schedule passage from New 
York to Bordeaux, to Saint-Nazaire or to 
Brest. 

These transportations had suddenly assumed 
such importance that it became an urgent mat- 
ter to create new divisions even before com- 
pleting the plan for extension of the Army 
in 1919. 



166 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

General March, reluctant to undertake more 
than he could accomplish, but desirous above 
all else not to lose a single day, decided upon 
an average monthly creation of 5 divisions, and 
began with 6 divisions in July. 

He wanted to have a standing force of 
eighteen complete divisions in the United 
States, together with replacement troops suffi- 
cient to furnish all the monthly reinforcements. 
This was the object of the so-called " Replace- 
ment Camps," which he established to the num- 
ber of three for the Infantry and Machine- 
gunners, two for the Artillery and one for the 
Engineers, with a respective capacity of 40,000, 
30,000 and 28,000 men each. 

It was hoped that these camps would at last 
furnish a remedy for the serious and much 
complained-of disadvantage of having to fill 
up divisions, on the point of departure, with 
antrained recruits. 

To sum up : the programme for augmenting 
the army, contemplated by the Council of Ver- 
seilles, on the lines laid down by Marshal Foch, 
was exceedingly complex. The American 
Chief of Staff, bent upon solving it, conducted 
a study of all possible means of achieving such 
an increase (recruiting, officering, transporta- 
tion, equipment), before formally committing 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 167 

himself for the coming year. But the time 
spent in these necessary studies was not lost, 
since General March was able to take every 
possible measure to prevent the delay of a 
single day in the execution of his plans. 

It was possible to place full confidence in the 
new Chief of Staff and admire the transforma- 
tion that Secretary Baker had introduced into 
the administration of the war since 1917. 

The campaign of 1918 had given food for 
new discussions, without practical conclusion, 
in which the American General Staff too often 
contrasted trench warfare with open warfare. 
Watching from a distance, they were tempted 
to conceive of two different types of fighting, 
when in point of fact it was only a question 
of two closely associated forms of modern war- 
fare, characterized by modern armament, con- 
tinuity of fighting- fronts, and utilization of the 
battle-ground equally in attack and in de- 
fence, for fighting in the open or for en- 
trenching. 

" On our Western front," said Marshal 
Foch, on February 27th, regarding this very 
question of training the American troops, " we 
have ceased to manoeuvre in the open for any 
length of time ; nor is this anything new. As 
far back as 1914, even in battles like that of 



168 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

the Marne, at the end of a few hours trenches 
were dug. But after all, the important thing 
is not training programmes, but a sound doc- 
trine^ and I fear that the American army will 
have to go through the same hard stages as our- 
selves, instead of overleaping them at a single 
bound. She no longer has time to spare for 
experiments." Then, after a moment's reflec- 
tion, he added, " If I were as powerfully aided 
in the United States as I am in France, I could 
easily find, between the American Army and 
our own, the formula for an offensive battle 
that positively would sweep all before it." 
Prophetic words, which were destined to find 
their application sooner, perhaps, than Marshal 
Foch then thought. 

So, even before the German offensive was 
launched, he believed that intensive training 
alone, in accordance with the doctrine of war 
which up to then had made it possible for the 
Anglo-French forces to check or to drive back 
the Germans, would assure in due time the 
effective intervention of the American Army. 

In pursuance of the request of the heads of 
the British and French Commissions, who had 
been informed of the need of this step, General 
March issued orders May 13th that the foreign 
advising officers should henceforth be used not 
merely to give instruction in special features 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 169 

of trench warfare,^ but also to give to the 
smaller Infantry units, up to the battalion in- 
clusive, the complete tactical training de- 
manded by modern warfare. 

This decision, conforming to the views ex- 
pressed by Marshal Foch, agreed also with the 
training programme which General Pershing 
had just sent with his recommendation to 
Washington. 

It was destined at last to do away with the 
very natural doubts and hesitations of the Di- 
vision Commanders, and permit them all to 
make the maximum use of the experience of 
veterans of the war. Certain divisions imme- 
diately constituted a deinonstration battalion, 
and in some of the camps one might even see 
all the subaltern officers taking part in the 
exercises in the ranks. 

The tactical training of the small units and 
of the Staff and Field officers, instruction in 
liaison duties, the training of the Artillery (at 
last organized in special camps by a recently 
appointed chief of that arm of the Service) , all 
received a marked impulsion from the Ameri- 
can Command. 

2 This training in the special features of trench warfare had 
by this time been acquired by American instructors, who had 
nothing further to learn from their foreign teachers. But the 
weak point still remained the tactical training. 



170 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

JJndoubtedly, everything was not yet going 
in a perfect manner. The disadvantage of be- 
ing unable to regulate the embarkment of 
divisions according to their degree of training, 
still continued. Divisions thoroughly trained 
were still subject to disorganization on the eve 
of their departure, and the best use was not 
always made of the good American officers 
whom General Pershing sent back to the 
United States to aid their younger comrades. 

Undoubtedly, also, part of the American 
General Staff, justly proud of the first suc- 
cesses gained at the front by General Persh- 
ing's troops, showed an inclination to dispense 
with the aid and cooperation of the foreign 
advising officers, just as it was too often dis- 
posed to relegate to positions of secondary im- 
portance the best American officers returning 
from the front. 

The first of these tendencies is so numan that 
one could not blame them for it; at the same 
time it was not one in which they could be en- 
couraged to persist; for without wishing to 
detract in any way from the glory of the first 
units to enter battle, we knew that they still 
had much to learn, and that in any case the 
troops and officers alike, who were still in the 
United States, would have to work hard to 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 171 

bring themselves up to the standard set by 
their fellow countrymen already at the front. 

Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the training 
of the Army in the United States was making 
constant progress. The great lessons at the 
front could be trusted to do the rest. 

In France General Pershing had powerful 
methods at his command, and he gave to the 
training of the troops that firm direction and 
sustained impulse which permitted him to 
achieve the prodigy of training an army for 
battle while the battle was in progress. 

The school at Langres for Staff officers, that 
at Saumur for Artillery officers, those at Is- 
soudun and at Tours for Aviation, the Corps 
Schools and the Army Schools were in full run- 
ning order. 

The divisions were being formed; the Ar- 
tillery in special camps in the interior of 
France, with a total capacity of seven brigades 
at a time; the Infantry in camps within the 
army zone. A numerous French personnel, 
Staff and regimental officers, demonstrating 
and training units were permanently at the dis- 
position of the American General Staff. The 
intensive work of the American army recalled 
to mind the training period of the French army 
when, from 1915 to 1916, Marshal Joffre 



172 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

undertook to train the whole army over again 
in conformity with the new methods of combat 
which perfected armament made necessary in 
the very midst of the war, even for those sol- 
diers who had been fighting since 1914. 

Thus, as we have seen, the problem of raising 
an army was solved by Congress ; that of trans- 
portation, thanks to the cooperation of Great 
Britain ; that of training, by the close collabora- 
tion of the Allies; and that of organization, 
through the activity and authority of General 
March. 

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of 
the problem of armament: and one hardly 
dares to think what the consequences would 
have been if, on the one hand, the French war 
factories had not been able to meet the needs 
of the American Army in 1918, and if, on the 
other hand, America had not continued her 
war supplies to the Allies. 

But while accepting the material which 
France manufactured for them (" 155 " how- 
itzers, " 75 " guns, machine-rifles, aeroplanes, 
etc.), the American government and General 
Staff were steadily working toward the goal 
which every great industrial nation ought to 
attain: that of being self-sufficient in the pro- 



AMERICAN ARMY'S APPROACH 173 

duction of all its materiel of war. This goal 
America was bound to reach. 

After a long period of installation, re- 
searches and experiments, which had been the 
cause of hot debates in Congress, it began to be 
really possible to see more clearly into the 
future. 

The American war factories were very 
nearly ready to begin production. With a few 
more months of work, the industrial forces of 
the United States would have rallied to the 
support of her millions of men, to make Ger- 
many feel the full weight of America under 
arms. But, those " few more months " meant 
1919, and already the trend of the war fore- 
shadowed a decision before winter. 



CHAPTER VIII 

The American Army in Battle 

" This country has only a single army : The Army 
of the United States . . . " 

General Order No. 73 of August 7, 1918. 
By order of the Secretary of War, 

P. C. March, 

General, Chief of Stuff. 

For the past three months, the enemy had 
been trying by an almost uninterrupted series 
of formidable battles: in March, to split the 
English and French forces in the region of 
Amiens ; then, in the month of April to break 
through the British front in Flanders; on May 
27th, to pierce the French centre on the Aisne ; 
on the following days to push forward to the 
West in the direction of Paris ; and finally, on 
June 9th, he tried once more to break down the 
front between Montdidier and Noyon. 

After some initial successes, he had been held 
at all points, and, since June 15th his attacks 
had ceased. 

But the offensive of May 27th had brought 
the Germans within 70 kilometres of Paris, and 
had given them an excellent primary base fac- 
ing west, to be used for a new attack upon the 
capital. 

Furthermore, the arrival of Germans on the 
Marne had deprived the Allies of control of 

174f 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 175 

the great Paris-Nancy railway line, most im- 
portant for the movements of their reserves. 

Finally, the last German offensive, that of 
June 9th, notwithstanding the sanguinary 
check with which it had ended, had nevertheless 
brought under the enemy's cannon the import- 
ant railway junction of Compiegne. 

Moreover, these three months of struggle 
had cut wide swathes in the British and French 
ranks. 

The reinforcement of two divisions brought 
from Egypt did not fill up the deficit of the 
British army, and the new military law could 
not give it any available new resources before 
the month of September. 

The French army was painfully maintaining 
through exceptional measures the numerical 
strength of its great units (103 divisions hi 
France, 2 in Italy, 8 in Salonica) ; but the four 
French divisions and the five British divisions 
which had borne the first shock on the Aisne 
on May 27th had suffered enormous losses. 

It had become imperative to contemplate the 
utilization of the numerous American contin- 
gents, which had been landed since the begin- 
ning of May and whose employment on the 
front had been deferred because of their in- 
complete training. 



176 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Following upon the German offensive of 
May 27th, General Foch, in agreement with 
General Pershing, esteemed it necessary to 
take over and place provisionally at the dispo- 
sition of the French army, part of the Ameri- 
can divisions then stationed with the British 
army for training. Up to this time, these divi- 
sions had served to support the British divisions 
at the front, and to make up, in a measure, for 
the extreme numerical weakness of the divi- 
sions as a whole. . 

The application of this measure included 
five American divisions, thus liberating four 
French divisions. 

These five divisions, at first brigaded with the 
French divisions, soon afterwards took over a 
sector of their own, and went into battle, their 
places being taken by newly landed divisions. 

Thanks to the fine spirit and loyalty of the 
American officers and soldiers, this temporary 
brigading of American divisions, incompletely 
trained, with the French army, while demanded 
by circumstances, had given the best results. 
It had brought immediate and important aid 
to the French, and it had prepared fighting 
troops for the day close at hand when General 
Pershing would be able to form his first army. 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 177 

Meanwhile, since the beginning of July, 
numerous signs had indicated that the next on- 
slaught of the enemy, and the last one, would 
take place between the Argonne and Chateau- 
Thierry. 

Groups of reserves were straightway gath- 
ered in the rear of the Champagne front, on 
the mountain of Rheims and south of the 
Marne, between Chateau-Thierry and Dor- 
mans. 

But, faithful to his war doctrine, and con- 
vinced that only an offensive could lead to final 
success. General Foch had been preparing 
since the opening of July for an Allied offen- 
sive on a 40 kilometre front, from the Aisne 
to the Marne. It had for its object the relief 
of Paris, and was to be undertaken by the 
armies of Mangin and Degoutte, reinforced re- 
spectively by several American divisions. The 
execution of this offensive was set for July 
18th. 

The enemy had no suspicion, and pursued 
its preparations for attack. The German as- 
sault was made on the 15th, following the habit- 
ual method. After four hours of Artillery 
preparation, 44 German divisions hurled them- 
selves into action from Main-de-Massiges 



178 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

(Champagne) to Chateau-Thierry, on an at- 
tacking front of more than 80 kilometres. 

By the evening of July 17th, after three days 
of savage fighting, it was evident that the third 
great German offensive, carried out with even 
more powerful means than the two preceding^ 
had completely failed. 

The documents and information obtained 
from prisoners showed that the enemy had in- 
tended to advance through a wide break in the 
Allied front, and within two days reach Mont- 
mirail and the Marne between Epernay and 
Chalons. 

The enemy's check was particularly marked 
to the east of Rheims, where a number of divi- 
sions had been expended in sheer loss. 

On the rest of the battle front the attacking 
formation of the enemy facing south and south- 
east, was definitely held. 

The offensive capacity of the German armies 
was broken, and the Kaiser's battle was defi- 
nitely lost. That of the Allies was about to 
begin. 

When the enemy's attack opened on the 15th 
the question was raised whether the original 

1 March 21st: 40 divisions engaged on a front of 65 kilo- 
metres; May 27th: 38 divisions, of which 24 were used on the 
principal attacking front of 45 kilometres. 



i 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 179 

plan of an Allied counter-offensive was to be 
maintained. 

jMarshal Foch, whom this last effort of the 
adversary had neither sm-prised nor pertm^bed, 
gave the order to carry out on the date already 
set, July 18th, the counter-offensive that had 
been in preparation for two weeks. 

It was conducted by American and French 
troops under the orders of Generals Mangin 
and Degoutte. 

Ijaunched without Artillery preparation,^ 
but supported by a rolling barrage, and by a 
large nufnber of tanks, this counter-offensive 
completely surprised the adversary who had be- 
lieved that the Allied reserves were fast riveted 
to their defensive positions for the protection 
of Paris. 

In two days the enemy lost 20,000 prisoners, 
and 400 guns. 

In order to meet this unforeseen situation, 
the German Conmiand was constrained to re- 
tire its troops from the Marne to the Aisne, at 
the same time protecting their west flank by 
powerful counter-attacks. 



2 

and 
army 



Without any Artillery preparation for the Mangin army, 
I after an hour and a half of preparation for the Degoutte 

TV 



180 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

Henceforward the initiative of operations 
belonged to the Allies, 

Marshal Foch had opened the offensive hat- 
tie of the Nations of the West: he proposed 
to continue it to the point of the total exhaus- 
tion and defeat of the enemy, regardless of how 
long it might take to obtain this decisive result. 

If we have dwelt upon this starting point of 
the decisive act of the battle of 1918, it is 
because it marks an especially glorious date in 
the history of the army of the United States. 

This was actually the first entrance of the 
American forces into offensive battle. 

For the first time, five American divisions 
had been thrown solidly into action, and these 
divisions had shown under fire all the fighting 
qualities that had been expected of them. 

They had revealed their spirit of initiative, 
their eagerness, their great courage and te- 
nacity. 

Like the machine-gunners of the scarcely 
formed Battalion of the Third Division at 
Chateau-Thierry, like the Marines at the Bel- 
leau Wood, like the regiments of the First Di- 
vision at Cantigny, the men of the 4<2d, the 
Rainbow Division, brought face to face with 
the best Prussian troops, gained the confidence 
and won the hearts of their French comrades, 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 181 

All the reports and correspondence of that time 
bear witness to this. 

Such successes permitted the formation of 
a first autonomous army from troops already 
tested; and a great stride was taken in this 
direction, in the month of June, by the prepa- 
ration of an American sector on the front, first 
on the Marne and later on the Aisne. 

Meanwhile, the American Command did 
not hesitate to continue to sacrifice for the com- 
mon good their desire for autonomy, and their 
anxiety to complete the training of their troops 
before sending them into battle. 

Accordingly, the participation of the Ameri- 
can forces in active fighting was extended in 
two ways ; 

1. By the formation of the first army, to be 
subject directly to General Pershing's orders; 

2. By permitting the continued employment 
of isolated divisions in the British and French 
armies for a period of training in active 
warfare. 

The object sought, as one may see, remained 
steadily the same : the formation of an army or 
armies that should be autonomous so far as was 
made possible by their surroundings, and the 
degree of training received by their units, — 
without, however, ceasing to provide constantly 
the maximum aid to the Allies. 



18^ AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

It is quite certain that, owing to the speed 
attained in transportation, the number of divi- 
sions landed was often temporarily greater 
than it was possible to officer and equip with 
trained auxiliary corps essential to the forma- 
tion of a single complete army. 

Accordingly, the solution adopted met the 
well understood needs of the army of the 
United States, and at the same time satisfied 
the common interest created by the necessities 
of war. 

By the 1 8th of June the United States forces 
in France had risen to 19 divisions, of which 12 
were complete. Out of these twelve five were 
at the battle front, seven in calm sectors, ^ve 
undergoing training in the British zone, one 
assigned to the base, and one to the depots. 

One month later, July 20th, the American 
army comprised 27 divisions, eight of which 
were in battle and eleven in calm sectors. 

The transportation was still further acceler- 
ated by improvements at the maritime bases, 
and by shortening the period required by the 
ships for each round trip.^ 

3 The principal causes of the growing efficiency of trans- 
portation throughout the first eight months of 1918 were: 

a. Increase in the number of ships employed; 

5. Increase of their carrying capacity by putting three men 
in each bunk; 

c. Shortening of the duration of round trips, reduced from 
an average of 50 days in January to 36 days after April 1st. 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 183 

On August 1st the army numbered 30 divi- 
sions, and 1,145,747 men had been landed: 

Thirteen divisions were at the front ; 

Five others were serving with the British 
army; 

Six were being trained in the French zone ; 

Two were resting; 

Three constituted the depot divisions. 

The regiments of the division of colored 
troops were fighting with the French troops. 

The training schools (both general and 
special) were operating with full efficiency 
under the ever firmer guidance of the American 
General Headquarters, and furnished in the 
single month of July more than 3,000 trained 
officers ! 

The first successes of the American army did 
not merely mark an important date in the his- 
tory of the war. They represented the result 
on which the respective Governments had 
staked their hopes, and were the deserved 
recompense of those who had collaborated for 
a whole year to this end. 

Both the English and the French had done 
their part in this common task and, although 
figures have only a relative value, it is still 
worth while to note that up to the moment 



184 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

when the armistice was signed, France had 
been able to furnish to the American army: 

136,881 horses; 

1,871 75mm guns; 

762 guns of 155 C. S.; 

224 guns of 155 G. P. F. ; 

240 tanks; 

2,676 airplanes with equipment; 

Thousands of machine guns, machine rifles 
and engines of every sort. 

Now all the material or provisions bought by 
the United States army in Europe, and par- 
ticularly in France, economized to the advan- 
tage of the troops the tonnage which the trans- 
portation of these materials would have 
require. 

The total purchases effected in France thus 
amounted to a saving in tonnage of 3,381,507 
tons.* 

These figures assume their full value when 
compared with the following figures : 

4 The principal purchases in France of material or animals, 
represented in maritime tonnage may be summed as follows: 

Horses and mules 1,085,776 tons 

Wood l,36i,944 " 

Supplies for Ordnance Department 275,361 " 

Aviation supplies 190,000 " 

Supplies for Medical Corps 39,697 « 

Supplies for Signal Corps 16,995 " 

Supplies for Chemical Warfare Service... 1,697 " 

Supplies for Motor Transport Corps 3,770 ^" 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 185 

Purchases made in England: 2,564,612 
tons; 

Purchases made in countries other than 
France and England : 4,218^016 tons; 

Tonnage transported from America: from 
June, 1917, to May, 1918; 2,156,238 tons; 
from June to November, 1918 : 4,059,635 tons. 

Up to the last day of the war, the Ameri- 
can Artillery fired French ammunition, and 
its consumption rose to the point of 100,000 
shells in a single day. 

During the three months, from September 
to November, an average of 300 trains per day, 
representing a daily mileage of 35,000 kilo- 
metres, were at the disposal of the American 
General Headquarters. 

Lastly, 1,500 officers in France and 500 in 
America were at the disposal of the American 
General Staff. Many of them followed the 
American division from the training camp to 
the battle-field. The manner in which they 
fulfilled the part assigned to them in the war 
justified the confidence which the American 
General Staff had accorded them. 

If we are permitted here to remind ourselves 
that seven out of ten of these officers fell in a 
single division, it is solely because we are proud 
that they gave the highest possible expression 



186 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

to the Franco- American collaboration by giv- 
ing it their lives. 

A confident collaboration does as much 
honor to him who accepts it as to him who offers 
it. The collaboration of which we speak had 
its share in increasing the rapidity with which 
American divisions landing in France were 
sent into action. 

It is unfortunately impossible for us to 
follow these splendid troops from their vic- 
torious counter-offensive of July 18th up to 
the preparation of the final offensive, in which 
they were destined to take so large a part on 
the 14th of November, when the armistice of 
the 11th halted them. 

This would lead us to write the history of 
the entire battle, so intimately was the action 
of each army interwoven, in this last phase^ 
with that of the armies beside it. 

We rightly speak of the action of each army, 
for during the interval from July 18th to 
November 11th, the autonomous American 
army had time to take form and play an army's 
part in the war. 

It was for the purpose of reducing the 
Saint-Mihiel salient that the 1st American 
army engaged in action for the first time 
directly under the orders of its Chief, whose 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 187 

command also included several French units, 
cooperating in the attack. 

This action had in view only a limited ob- 
jective; but aside from the technical advan- 
tages which the Allied High Command 
obtained by this success, such as that of clear- 
ing the line of the Meuse, and of furnishing a 
good primary base for subsequent offensives. 
General Pershing found in it an opportunity to 
try out his army. 

The test was conclusive : within twenty-seven 
hours the Saint-Mihiel salient had disappeared. 

Henceforward the American forces were 
free to undertake army operations. 

They went into action between Meuse and 
Argonne in one of the most war-racked zones 
of the whole battle front, but in the execution 
of an offensive movement susceptible of pro- 
ducing great results. 

The nature of this battle ground offered 
great difficulties: it was cut by ravines, and 
protected on either side by two natural posi- 
tions of defense: the Argonne and the Cotes 
de Meuse, intersected by the Meuse River.' 
The enemy had here accumulated powerful 
means of defense, and regarded this naturally 
strongly fortified position as one of the essen- 



188 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

tial bastions of his defensive system on the 
French front. 

The taking of this bastion by the Allies 
would effectively expose the great Lille-Metz 
highway, which served as line of supplies for 
the whole enemy front. On the other hand, a 
general retreat of the German armies could 
not be carried out except by pivoting around 
the Meuse-Argonne front, the corner-stone of 
his positions. 

It was for the purpose of conquering this 
formidable position that the American army 
was employed from September 26th to Novem- 
ber 11th. 

It was a series of magnificent combats that 
well deserve to be recorded, and some day will 
be by the very men who took part in them dur- 
ing the Meuse-Argonne battle, in which Gen- 
eral Pershing, between September 26th and 
November 11th, engaged 580,000 men, and 
suffered 148,000 casualties. 

On September 26th and 27th Montfaucon 
was taken and left behind, Varennes and 
Vauquois were captured, in the advance along 
the Meuse, and the Forges Woods were turned 
on the East; 8,000 prisoners and 100 guns in 
two days. 

From September 27th to October 4th, in a 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 189 

series of local skirmishes, in which the honors 
were carried off by the American doughboys 
and their squad commanders, the ground was 
won foot by foot, until the arrival of the Artil- 
lery and supplies at last permitted the resump- 
tion of the general forward movement. 

On the evening of October 3d the first two 
positions of the German defensive position 
{Hindenhurg and Hag en Stellungen) were 
entirely cleaned out, but the enemy still clung 
to his third position {Kriemhilde) . 

The American army attacked it on October 
4th: fierce fighting and slow progress at the 
price of severe losses. While the 28th and 
82d divisions advanced along the Aire in con- 
junction with the 4th French army, the attacks 
of the 42d division upon Komagne, and of the 
32d on Hill 288, bent in the enemy's principal 
position on a front of two kilometres. 

On October 21st the 5th division, after four 
successive attacks, made itself master of the 
Rappes Woods, while the 78th captured 
Grandpre. 

The American front now extended from 
Grandpre clear to the north of Brieulles-sur- 
Meuse. 

The fighting which had assumed a character 
of unprecedented ferocity, was now destined 



190 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

to moderate steadily from the 1st to the 11th of 
November. 

The enemy were expecting an attack; they 
were growing more and more nervous, and 
were preparing for a general retreat behind 
the Meuse. 

On November 1st the American troops took 
almost the whole extent of the 4th German 
position known as the Freya Stellung, and 
captm-ed 3,602 prisoners. 

From this moment the disorganized Ger- 
mans could no longer make a stand, and the 
American army pursued them without respite. 

From the 1st to the 4th of November the 
Americans advanced 18 kilometres, taking 
3,000 prisoners and 100 guns. 

Hereupon, swinging upon his 5th division 
as his right hand pivot. General Pershing 
forced the passage of the Meuse, and on No- 
vember 10th arrived under Sedan. 

The whole left bank of the Meuse was 
cleared. The great Lille-Metz line of com- 
munication was cut, and the enemy was in full 
retreat. 

But the armistice interrupted the German 
disintergration. 

In these two weeks of ferocious fighting the 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 191 

American soldier had clearly proved his 
superiority over his adversary. 

On March 11th, 1919, at a dinner given to 
the American Delegation at the Peace Confer- 
ence, Marshal Foch himself undertook to out- 
line in the sober tone of a bulletin of victory, 
the role played by the United States army in 
the battle of 1918. 

No other recital could have the precision and 
weight of his statement. It sums up all that 
has been said above, and far better than we our- 
selves could do it. Hence we take the liberty 
of reproducing it : 

" One year ago, on March 11th," said he, 
" the American army in France numbered only 
300,000 men, that is, 6 divisions of Infantry 
undergoing training. 

" It was arriving at the rate of 30,000 men a 
month. 

" On March 21st the German offensive was 
launched at the junction of the Allied armies 
in the region of Saint-Quentin. You know its 
effects. It soon won the Scarpe; it ascended 
the Somme, which it crossed, reached the Oise, 
which it descended. The situation was grave. 

"At that critical time, on March 28th, 
Generals Pershing and Bliss came to make me 
the generous offer of entering the fight, both 



192 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

telling me : * We are over here to get ourselves 
killed; all our troops are at your disposal: 
where do you want us to go ? ' 

" Shortly after this, on April 25th, I met 
these same Generals again at Sarcus; on May 
2d, at Abbeville, according to an agreement 
with the Allied Governments, we asked the 
Government of the United States to send to 
France each month 120,000 Infantrymen, 
machine gunners and complimentary troops. 

" In point of fact, America sent us during 
the month of March 69,000 men, 94,000 in 
April, 200,000 in May, 245,000 in June, 
295,000 in July, 235,000 in August. 

" The American forces increased from 
300,000 men on March 11th to 954,000 in July, 
and 1,700,000 in October. 

" On June 2d the Superior War Council at 
Versailles requested President Wilson to con- 
tinue the same transportation of troops, from 
200,000 to 300,000 men per month, and to pre- 
pare 100 American divisions for the spring of 
1919. President Wilson replied that he 
agreed to this, and if more were needed, we 
should have them. 

" Meanwhile, however, the American troops 
were not inactive. Since the month of May, 
two divisions of American Infantry had been 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 193 

in action with the 1st French army in the 
region of Montdidier; three in the Vosges, 
where they had reheved French troops; two 
were still in training. 

" In June two more divisions were on the 
Marne, at Chateau-Thierry and the Belleau 
Woods, where they took a large part in hold- 
ing the enemy in check. 

" On July 18th five American divisions par- 
ticipated in the victorious counter-offensive of 
the 10th and 5th French armies, and con- 
tributed largely to its success. 

" On July 24th the First American army 
was created, under the command of General 
Pershing. Its task was to open up communi- 
cations between Paris and Nancy, by driving 
back the enemy from Saint-Mihiel. 

" On September 12th fourteen American 
divisions, eight in the first line and six in the 
second line, captured the salient of Saint- 
Mihiel, taking 200 guns and 15,000 prisoners. 

" A few days later, on September 26th, 
fourteen American divisions were engaged in 
a great offensive in the rugged region of the 
Argonne, between the Aisne and the Meuse. 
On the second day Montfaucon was passed; 
on October 14th Grandpre was taken; on the 
21st, Chatillon; on the 30th, Bantheville; on 



194 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

November 1st, Busancy; on the 4th, Beau- 
mont; and by the 9th, the entire hne of the 
Meuse, from Mouzon to Bazeilles, was in our 
power. 

" At the same time two American divisions 
were collaborating with the 5th French Army 
in the direction of Bomains; two others with 
the English armies in the region of Saint- 
Quentin ; still another two in cooperation with 
the 4th French Army had taken the formidable 
positions of Orf euil ; besides this two American 
divisions participated in the offensive of the 
forces in Flanders along the Lys and the 
E scant. Lastly, six more divisions were with 
the French Army preparing for the Lorraine 
attack of November 14th, when the armistice 
of November 11th caused us to lay down our 
arms. 

" In such manner the American Army, 
backed by a Government firmly resolved to 
prosecute the conflict to the end, returned the 
visit paid by Lafayette on the occasion of the 
birth of America. 

" In such manner it contributed powerfully 
in obtaining a victory by armistice, which was 
equivalent to a surrender, an unconditional 
surrender. 

"It is in recalling those moving memories, 



AMERICAN ARMY IN BATTLE 195 

those days of anxiety and success, that I raise 
my glass in honor of President Wilson, who so 
valiantly supported this war, in honor of my 
American comrades at arms, generals and 
soldiersj equally glorious, who rendered de- 
cisive the victory of liberty." 

Such were the words of the chief who had 
led to the assault upon Germany six million 
men belonging to six different nations. And 
as I listened, I recalled his observation on 
February 27th, 1918, a few days before the 
German thrust in Picardy : " With American 
forces joined with the Allied forces, I could 
easily find the formula of an offensive battle 
that would unquestionably break down all 
before it." 

The army of General Pershing had re- 
sponded to that inner appeal of the leader who, 
ever since the 11th of November, 1914, the last 
great day of the struggle in Flanders, had 
never ceased to work and to brood unweariedly 
for victory. 

"Victory," said Marshal Foch at the end 
of November, 1918 (and he was very fond of 
this comparison) , " victory is the inclined plane 
down which the ball rolls, very slowly at first, 
then faster and faster, until there is no stop- 
ping it." 



196 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

The American Army, going into action at 
the precise moment when the ball was starting 
to roll, when Germany was beginning to slip 
down the inclined plane of the Western front, 
contributed all its energy to precipitate Ger- 
many's fall which had now become inevitable. 



CONCLUSION 

Now that we have surveyed the military 
effort of the United States on the two sides of 
the Atlantic, what judgment as a whole should 
we pass upon it, and what first lesson should 
we draw from it? 

America took up arms in the last phase of 
the world war, without being in any manner 
prepared for it. In order to reach a decisive 
battle, she was obliged to solve a problem 
unique in the history of war: that of raising, 
organizing, training and equipping an army 
of 3,600,000 men, and transporting across the 
Atlantic 2,000,000 soldiers in less than twenty 
months, without interrupting the war supplies 
which she had assured to the Allies. 

This problem, the extent and complexity of 
which might well stagger the most confident, 
America solved, thanks to the determination 
of her rulers and military chiefs, and to the 
energy of her entire people. 

But it was only through the collaboration of 
powerful allies that she solved this problem 
in time; and herein lies for her as well as for 

197 



198 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

us, the first lesson to be retained from our com- 
mon victory. 

We have seen that, from early in 1917, the 
certainty of America's military intervention 
gave to the Allies that surplus of moral 
strength which they then needed, to efface the 
disappointment caused by the arrest of the 
offensive of April 14th, and by the more and 
more sombre prospect of the collapse of Russia. 

After the experience of 1917, which had 
been fraught with danger for them, the Allies, 
and more especially France, had staked all 
their hopes on the campaign of 1918. They 
had the firm conviction that America was to 
play a great part in it; nevertheless, they felt 
a real and justifiable anxiety at the opening of 
1918; for notwithstanding the importance of 
the efforts already accomplished on American 
soil, it was by the number of divisions thrown 
into battle that the practical result would have 
to be measured. 

Now, in spite of her immense resources and 
consequently of her military non-preparedness, 
America, if left to herself, without British 
tonnage, without French materials of war, 
without practical training by the Allied armies, 
would have arrived too late to play her part in 



CONCLUSION 199 

the final act. But America had ah^eady real- 
ized that the solution of the world crisis was 
approaching, and she resolutely appealed for 
inter- Allied collaboration, in order to complete 
the solution of those problems of organization, 
instruction and transportation for which she 
had not prepared in times of peace. 

This was how America succeeded in bring- 
ing into action simultaneously twenty-eight 
divisions of 27,000 men each in the battle of 
1918. 

She was ready to throw in the additional 
weight of her divisions of reserves, she was 
ready to form new divisions and to bring her 
forces up to the fighting strength of the nations 
with which she was associated, in that ultimate 
self-sacrifice which is synonymous with victory : 
when the operations were suspended. 

By this moral and material aid, direct and 
indirect, and steadily more and more effi- 
cacious, America, to borrow Marshal Foch's 
own expression, " contributed powerfully in 
obtaining victory by armistice, which amounted 
to a complete capitulation." 

If through force of circumstances, the share 
of military glory which fell to her army No- 
vember 11th, 1918, was not so great as she 



wo AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

would have wished, this sentiment does her 
honor; for it was due to the great and legiti- 
mate ambitions it had conceived that this army- 
was able in so short a time to accomplish such 
great things, and to be in a position to con- 
tinue them. 

It had not been called upon to take part in 
the long and bloody series of battles from 1914? 
to 1917. But it knows and will remember 
what it owes to all those who died in preparing 
the way for it. Its history would be incom- 
plete if it did not include that of those nameless 
heroes of whom half a million^ fell in the single 
year of 1917, while protecting the formation of 
the United States army. 

This army was spared the knowledge of 
those terrible days when, owing to lack of 
munitions, it became necessary to stop a hurri- 
cane of iron with human breasts; nor those 
other days of short-lived glory when the finest 
waves of assault broke against obstacles incom- 
pletely destroyed. But the Allies will never 
forget, on their side, that America from that 
time onward assured them the supplies indis- 
pensable for carrying on the war, nor that she 
continued to furnish them later, without stop- 

1 Losses in killed, died, missing or prisoners, for 1917 alone: 
British, 231,000; French, 243,000. 




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THE German Offexsive ix Picardy. (March 20, 1918.) 



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LEGEND 
Main Line of Railway Transportation 
Second Line of Railway Transportation 
Third Line of Railway Transportation 
Other Lines Used by the A. E. F. 
Allied Battle Front, October, 1917 
General Headquarters A. E. F. 
Ports used by U. S. A; 
Debarkation Camps 
Instruction Camps 
Aviation Camps 
Ammunition Depots 
Storage Depots 
Ammunition Yards 
Regulating Yards 
Rest Stations 
Base Hospitals 
Refrigerating Plants 
Locomotive Facilities 
Car Erection Shops 



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Mft Repair Shops 



Organizations^ of the I 
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Employment of the American Forces in Battle. (August, 

1918.) 



Divi- 
sion 

let 

2xid 
26th 
42nd 
41 St 
32nd 

3rd 
77th 

5th 
27th 
35th 
82nd 

4th 
28th 
30th 
33rd 
80th 
78th 
83rd 
92iid 
89th 
90th 
37th 
29th 

9l8t 

76th 
79th 

6th 
36th 
85th 

7th 

6l8t 

88th 
40th 
39th 
87 th 
06th 
84th 
34th 
38 th 
31st 

eth 



Ijul lAuglSep 



^ _ _- [Mar | Apr[lI ayljTm|jul 




loctlNovlDec janlFeb 



[ I Organization to arrival in France 
^^^ Arrival in France to entering line 
fr;'^ Entering line t© active "battle service 
m Service as active oomljat division 

Diagram 13.-Tlme from organization of divisions to entering: line. 

Time from Orgakization of Divisions to Entering Line. 



THOUSANDS OF TONS DEADWEIGHT 

■I In operation Qout of operation but not 

returned to U. S. Shipping Board 




Transatlantic Tonnage Under Army Control, 

Total tonnage under Army control exclusive of Cross-channel Ser- 
vice and British Loan. 

Cargo ships authorized for release are regarded as out of operation 
upon arrival in home ports. Similarly, cargo ships for conversion to 
troop ships are classified as troop ships upon arrival in home ports. 



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PARIS 













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Situation of the American Army at the Signing of the 
Armistice, November 11, 1918. (11 o^clock.) 



ITew yorJc 

Pennsylv&ala 

IlllnolB 

Ohio 

Texas 

Uichl^an 

Massachusetts 

Missouri 

Califorola 

Indiana 

ITew Jersey 

Minnesota 

Iowa 

Wisconsin 

Geor§ 



Georgifi 
Oklahon 



Tennessee 
Kentuclfy 
Alabama 
Virginia 
H. Carpllna 
Louisiana 
Kansas 
Arkansas 
W. Virginia 
Mississippi 
S. Carolina 
Coimecticut 
Nebraska 
Maryland 
Washington 
Montana 
Colorado 
Florida 
Oregon 
S. Salcota 
N. Dakota 
Maine 
Idaho 
Utah 

Hhode Island 
Porto Bico 
Dist. of Col. 
H. Hanpshire 
Kew Mexico 
Wyoming 
Arizona 
Vermont 
Delaware 
Hawaii 
Nevada 
Alaska 
A.K.F. 

Sot allocated 
Philippines 
Total 



Hen 
367,864 

200 293 
161,065 
135,485 
132,610 




Per cent 
■■■ 7.93 

c £a 




o.oo 


i!l;iS 






106,581 






105,207 






99,116 






98,781 






98 211 






85,506 


■■■^2.28 




80 169 


^■■■■12.13 




75 825 


wmm^iz.oz 




75,043 


■■■■12.00 




74,678 


■■■■™ 1.99 




73,062 


1^^^1.94 




73,003 


^■^M 1.94 




65,988 


^^^1.76 




63:428 


^■■11.69 




61,027 


■■^1.62 




55,777 


■1^1.48 




54,295 


■■■1.44 




53,482 


^■H 1.42 




50,069 


■■IB 1.33 




47; 805 


1HH1.27 


* 


47,0^4 


■■11.25 




45,154 


^^h^^ 




36,293 


■^.97 




34,393 


■M.92 




33,331 


■^H .89 




30,116 


■■•IS 




29 686 


■■ .79 




25.803 






24,252 


■1 •65 




i?;8J! 


S:U 




16.661 


■ •45 




16,538 


■ •44 




15,930 


■ .42 




14 374 


■ •38 




12,439 


■ 433 




11,393 


■ .30 




10|492 


■ .28 




9,338 


■ .25 




7,484 


■ .20 




5 644 t.lB 




5 105 


1.14 




2; 102 


1.06 




i;499 


1.04 




1,318 


1.04 




'255 


1.01 




3,757,624 







Soldiers Furxisiied by Each State. 




LEASED FROM ALLIES OR TAKEN 
DVCn FROM GERMANS 



American Telephoke axd Telegraph Likes ik France, 
England, and Germany. 



CONCLUSION 201 

ping to consider whether it would hamper or 
delay the organization of her own industries 
of war. 

Accordingly, the army of the United States 
benefited, beyond doubt, by the tragic experi- 
ence and dogged effort of the veterans of war 
who had become her brothers at arms. But, 
when the moment arrived to enter the struggle 
beside them, she threw herself into it resolutely 
and without counting the cost. 

That is why the battle of 1918 ought to 
suffice for her glory ; her soldiers also have in- 
scribed the names of The Marne and Verdun 
on their banners. 

After those brief halts known as Cantigny, 
Chateau-Thierry and the Belleau Woods, they 
arrived at Saint-Mihiel, proclaiming by full 
victory the existence of their new army. 

Then in the course of the arduous, costly 
and glorious battle of the Meuse-Argonne, 
they opened before them the road which lead 
them to the Rhine, the frontier of liberty. 

From 1917 to 1918 America, often ignorant 
of the difficulties, but conscious of her strength, 
kept repeating that she meant " to win the 
war." 

Did America win the war? 



202 AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

For that matter, did France win the war ? 

Did England, Italy, Servia, or any single 
one of the nations who fought against the com- 
mon enemy, win the war ? 

This same question in different form calls 
for but a single answer : 

The Allied and Associated Powers all 
together " obtained a victory by armistice 
which amounted to a complete capitulation," 
and each one of them " contributed " to it. 

Marshal Foch adds that America '' power- 
fully contributed " — and it is as far from his 
thoughts, as it should be from ours, to estab- 
lish a scale of merit in our several contributions 
to victory. 

On the contrary, it will help to maintain our 
union in peace, if each one of us will take a 
backward glance over the past and examine im- 
partially the facts and their causes and con- 
sequences. Each will find in them sufficient 
reasons for being legitimately proud of his 
country, while at the same time remaining 
modest in relation to his allies and associates in 
the war. 

In point of fact, we obtained our victory, dH 
of us together, from the day when we applied 
the two principles that have dominated the 



CONCLUSION a03 

whole of this world- war: Unity of Command 
and Inter- Allied Cooperation. America has 
loudly proclaimed the first; and yet even she 
did not dare to demand its application before 
engaging in battle. 

America approved the principle of inter- 
allied cooperation ; but it required the enemy's 
onslaught, with all its too familiar violence, to 
force upon all of us, without eooception, the full 
application of this principle. 

Accordingly, it was the war itself which 
taught us, and it was the battle of 1918 which 
saved us ; because, being obliged to sustain the 
fight to the finish, that is to say, to become 
either victors or vanquished, we acquired in ad- 
dition to that determination to conquer which 
had united us, the willingness to accept every 
means to this end. 

America devoted to it all her own without 
restriction or limit. Her people never delayed 
by a single day the decisions that had to be 
made by their Government. 

They never ceased to demand more than was 
being done, and to do more than they had 
promised to do. 

They marched to the battle front, borne on 
by a heroic breath, and having set forth late. 



204i AMERICA'S RACE TO VICTORY 

they were forced to run in order to arrive in 
time. 

Glory cannot be reduced to figures. That 
of America does not depend upon the number 
of her soldiers nor upon the number of her 
dead, any more than it is affected by the mis- 
takes and the delays which are inevitable in the 
difficult accomplishment of so great a task. 

Her glory rests in having had a part in the 
War of the Nations of Europe, in spite of 
all the obstacles which might have kept her 
from it. 

The glory of her Commander in Chief lies in 
having brought into action first his division and 
later his army at whatever point the Com- 
mander in Chief of the Allied forces called 
upon him to do so ; it lies in having anticipated 
this appeal and in having himself offered to 
test out an army, barely formed the previous 
eve, under fire of the greatest battle in history. 

The glory of her soldiers lies in having gone 
into action with their organization barely com- 
pleted and their training still unfinished, mak- 
ing up for this lack by energy, courage, irre- 
sistible enthusiasm, indomitable steadfastness 
and, to sum up in a single word, that fine self- 
confidence which was to have been expected 
from so great a people. 



CONCLUSION 



205 



Definitive Losses op the Allied and Associated 

Nations During the War 

(Exclusive of the Disabled from Wouncls) 



Russia 

France 

Great Britain 
and Dominions 

Italy 

Serbia 

Roumania. . . . 
United Statesi 

Belgium 

Montenegro. . . 

Greece 

Portugal 

Japan 



KILLED — 
DEAD OR 
MISSING 

1,700,000 (?) 
1,369,000 

840,000 
460,000 
370,000 
160,000 

75,039 

40,000 

20,000 (??) 

12,100 
8,500 
1,000 (?) 



total 
inhabitants 

170,000,000 
38,000,000 

68,000,000 

37,000,000 

4,500,000 

8,000,000 

102,000,000 

8,000,000 

430,000 

5,000,000 

6,000,000 

56,000,000 



PERCENTAGE 
OF THE TOTAL 
POPULATION 



1 

3.6 






1.25 % 
1.24 % 
8.2 % 
1.87 % 
0.07 % 
0.5 % 
4.6 % (??) 
0.24 % 
0.14 % 
0.001% 



1 Killed in action 32,842 

Lost at sea 733 

Died of wounds 13,554 

Died of accident 4,640 

Died of disease 23,270 

Total deaths 75,039 



INDEX 



Abbeville, 192 
Administration reforms, 105- 

113 
Aerial observation, 65 
Air Service, 24 
Airp 18Q 

Aisne, 174, 175, 179, 181, 193 
Allied Commissions, 30 

Counter-offensive, 179 
"Amalgamation," no question 

of, 124 
America indulged in experi- 
ments, 29 
" powerfully contributed to 

victory," ' 202 
ready for all sacrifice, 159 
America's " impotence," 153 

mistakes, 29 
American Army, first suc- 
cesses of, 183 
in times of peace, 25 
weak points of, 129 
Forces, first entry in bat- 
tle, 188 
Forces, participation ex- 
tended, 181 
Front, 189 
Military Commission in 

Paris, 94 
Sector, 181 
trait, regrettable, 28 
Ammunition, consumption of, 

64 
Anglo-French Front, 8 
Argonne, 177, 187, 193 
Armistice of Nov. 11, 1918, 

136, 194 
Army Schools, 128, 171 
Arsenals (U. S.), 75 
Artillery, training of, 169 
materiel, 63, 75-78 



materiel, lack of, 47 
materiel, superiority of 

French, 67 
School at Fort Sill, 96 
School at Saumur, 128 
Austrian Army, 7 
Autonomous American Army, 

186, 187 
Aviation, 80-82 

Equipment, furnished by 

France, 141 
Programme, 141 
Schools at Issoudun, 171 
Service, 81 

Baker, Newton D., 39, 94, 

112, 150, 160 
Bar-sur-Aube, 125 
Bantheville, 193 
Belgian Army, 3, 134 
Belleau Woods, 180, 193, 201 
Bombing Aviation, 65 
Bordeaux, 120, 165 
Bordeaux-Limoges line, 121 
Bourges, 121, 122 
Bourges - Auxerre - Chaumont 

Hne, 121 
Bourges-Nevers-Dijon line, 

121 
Bliss, General, 191 
Brest, 120, 121, 165 
Bridges, General, 91-92 
BrieuUes-sur-Meuse, 187 
Brigading of American forces 

with French, 125, 176 
British Army, 2, 137 
British Commission, 95 
British Reinforcements, 175 
British Training Officers in 

America, 91, 95, 96y 161 
Bulgarian Army, 7, 8 
Busancy, 194 



207 



208 



INDEX 



Campaign of 1917, 13 
Cantigny, 180, 201 
Cantonment Zones in France, 

125 
Chalons, 178 

Chamberlain, Senator, 163 
Champagne Front, 177 
Chateau-Thierry, 177, 178, 

180, 193 
Chatillon-sur-Seine, 125, 193 
Chaumont, 119, 121 
Chief of Staff, American, 107 
lacking high authority, 23 
Clemenceau, 119, 120, 156 
Coalition, Battle of the, 156 
Coast Artillery, 145, 146 
Coelsquidan, 125 
Colored troops, 60, 62, 140 
brigaded with French 

forces, 183 
Conscription Act of 1917, 162 
Corps Schools, 128, 171 
Cotes de Meuse, 187 
Counter-offensive of July 18, 

1918, 186, 193 
Crowder, Provost Marshal, 

184 

Debarkation, Ports of, 120 
Degoutte, General, 177, 179 
De Haviland Aeroplane, 81 
Demonstration Battalion, 169 
Depots in France, American, 

122 
Dijon, 121 

Dinner to American Delega- 
tion, 191 
Division (A.E.F.), 1st, 139, 
140, 143, 180 
2d, 139, 140, 143 
3d, 142, 180 
4th, 142 
6th, 189 
26th, 140, 143 
28th, 189 
33d, 140 
41st, 140 
42d, 140, 143 



78th, 189 

82, 189 

Rainbow, 180 

former American type of, 

19, 20. 
new American type, 50, 61 
foreign type, 50 
Dormans, 177 



ECOLE SUPERIEURE DE GuERRE, 
111 

Engineers, 145 

Escaut, 194 

Freya Stellung, 190 

First American Army, 186 
Flanders, 132, 174, 195 
Foch, Marshal, 111, 134, 137, 
148, 150, 157, 158, 166- 
69, 176, 177, 179, 180, 199 
defines Victory, 195 
offensive plan for 1918, 

133-34 
opinion of American Army, 

149 
speech at Dinner to Dele- 
gates, 191-195 
Forces in France, American, 

147, 182, 183, 191, 192 
Forges Woods, 188 
Franco-American Affaires, 

Central Oflace of, 119 
French Army, 6, 134 
on Italian Front, 135, 175 
on Salonica Front, 135, 175 
French Artillery equipment 
sent to American Train- 
ing Camps, 144 
Commission at Chaumont, 

118 
Offensive of 1917, halt of, 

10-11 
Officers at disposal of 

American Army, 185 
Training Officers in Ameri- 
ca, 91, 95, 161 



INDEX 



209 



Ganne, M., 119 
General Headquarters in 
France, American, 118, 
123, 183, 185 
General Staff, American, 30, 
31, 70 
defects of, 23, 94 
problems of, 46-48 
reorganization of, 106, 109 
German Army, 6 

General retreat, 188, 190 
General Staff, 10, 44, 132 
losses 179 
Offensive of 1918, 148, 152, 

168, 174, 175, 178, 191 
Press, 154 

prisoners taken by Ameri- 
cans, 190, 193 
Germany's defeat inevitable, 
196 
game, 44 

maximum effort, 6 
w^ar materiel, 7 
Glory of America, 201, 204 
Grandprd, 187, 193 

Hagen Stellung, 189 
Hill 288, 189 

Hindenburg Stellung, 189 
Hospital accomodation in 
France, 126 

Industrial breakdown, un- 
founded report of, 81-82 
Instruction Camps, Divi- 
sional, 48 
Inter- Allied, Conference at 
Chantilly, 1 
Cooperation, 92, 102, 199, 

203 
Reserve, 137 

Supreme Council of War, 
134 
Interned Enemy Vessels used 

as transports, 48 
Is-sur-Tille, 121 
Italian Army, 3, 134 

Front, 8 
Italy, disaster in, 132 



JoFFRE, Marshal, iii, 48, 66, 

89, 93, 122, 171 
Kitchener, 114 
Kriemhilde Stellung, 189 
Kuhn, General, 48 

La Courtine, 125 

Lafayette, 194 

Lane, Secretary, 27 

Langres, 125, 128, 171 

La Pallice, 120, 121 

Le Mans, 121 

Lessons of the War, 203 

Liberty Motor, 80, 81, 141 

Lille-Metz Highway, 188, 190 

Lys, 194 

Macedonian Front, 8 
MaiUy, 146 
Main-de-Massiges, 177 
Mangin, General, 177 179 
March, Gen. Peyton C, 112, 

151, 155, 165-68, 172 
Marines at Belleau Woods, 

180 
Marne, 168, 174, 177-79, 181, 

193 
Battle of, 64 
Materiel, defined, 32 (note) 
Mead, Camp, 62 
Meucon, 125 

Meuse, 187, 190, 193, 194 
Meuse-Argonne, Battle, 201 

Front, 188 
Milner, Lord, 167 
Monastir, 6 ^ 

Montdidier, 174, 193 
Montfaucon, 188, 193 
Montmirail, 178 
Morale, effect of despatch of 

American troops on 

French, 11 
Mouzon, 194 

Nancy, 193 
Nantes, 120, 121 
National Guard, 26, 66 
Neufchateau, 125 



gio 



INDEX 



Nevers, 121, 122 
New York, 26 
Niort, 121 
Non-preparedness, America's, 

17, 198 
Noyon, 174 

Officers' Schools, 86-87 
Oise, 191 

Open Warfare, 167 
Ordnance Department, de- 
fective, 77 
Reorganization of, 106-108 
Orfeuil, 194 
Orleans, 121 

Paris, 174, 177 

Paris-Nancv line, 175 

Pershing, General, 32, 33, 36, 
39-42, 45, 46, 59, 84, 90, 
91, 93, 103, 113-118, 122, 
125, 129, 130, 139, 142, 
146, 151-53, 155-57, 164, 
169-71, 176, 181, 187-91, 
193, 195 

P6tain, General, 153 

Petrograd, Revolution in, 132 

Picardy, 153, 195 
Front, 152 

Prussian troops, 180 

Quartermaster Corps re- 
organized, 106, 108, 109 

Rainbow Division, 180 
Reading, Lord, 154 
Regular Army, 25, 54, 55, 85 
Replacement Camps, 166 
Rheims, 177, 178 
Romagne, 189 
Roumanian Army, 4, 5 
Rock Island Arsenal, 75 
Russia, collapse of, 2, 198 

events in, 13 
Russian, Army, 3, 4 

Revolution, 10 
Russo-Roumanian Front, 7, 8 



Saint-Mihiel, 164, 186, 193, 

201 
Saint-Nazaire, 120, 121, 165 
Saint-Quentin, 191, 194 
Salonica, 175 
Sarcus, 192 
Saumur, 121 
Scarpe, 191 
School of Fire for Field 

Artillery, 22 
Scott, General, 48, 109 
Sedan, 190 
Serbian Army, 5 
Seventh Regiment (N.G., S. 

N.Y.), 67 
Sixty-Ninth Regiment (N.G., 

S.N.Y.), 57 
Somme, 191 

Battle of the, 68, 114 
Souges, 125 

Special Services, 53, 128 
Staff School, 128 
Supplies furnished A.E.F. by 

France, 184 
Supplies furnished A.E.F. by 

England, 185 
Supreme Control, lack of, 60 

Tables of Organization, 54 
Tardieu, Andr^, 71, 95, 120 
Tours, 121, 122 
Training the Army, 32, 82- 

100, 123 
in France, cycle established 

by Pershing, 126-127 
Training Camps, 62, 63 

for Reserve Officers, 86 
Training Committee, 84, 85 

Schools, 183 
Transfers of soldiers during 

training, harm done by, 

97 
Transportation of troops, 46, 

47, 100-105, 147, 158, 182 
Trench Warfare, 167 
Troves, 121 
Turkish Army, 8 



INDEX 



211 



uxity op commakd, 203 

Valdahon, 125 
Varennes, 188 
Vauquois, 188 
Verdun, 44 
Versailles, 138, 192 

Council of, 166 
Victory by Armstice, 202 

War College, 22, 48, 96, 101, 

109 
War CouncU, 106, 107 



War Department, reorganiza- 
tion of, 38, 106 
War Factories, American, 173 
War Materiel, 63, 69, 70, 72, 

73, 79 
Watertown Arsenal, 75 
Watervliet Arsenal, 75 
Wilson, Woodrow, 16, 18, 30, 
113, 147, 149, 152, 155, 
158, 159, 164, 192, 195 
Speech at Baltimore, 154» 
Woevre, 140 














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